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Abstract 
The recent financial crisis of 2009 and corporate failures have highlighted the 
importance of monitoring risk-taking within corporations, raising the attention of 
practitioners and researchers to corporate risk disclosures. This thesis provides a 
comprehensive analysis, which aims to examine corporate risk disclosure practices, 
determinants, and implications on the cost of capital. To this end, this study employs a 
sample consisting of all non-financial listed firms in Saudi Arabia to investigate risk 
disclosure practices. All data for the study were manually collected from the annual reports 
of sample firms over four years (from 2012 to 2015) using content analysis. The 
descriptive findings show that Saudi firms disclose 24 risk-related sentences on average. 
Operational and financial risks appear to be the most frequent disclosed risks while 
strategic risks are significantly lower. Most disclosed risks in the Saudi context are 
positive, forward-looking, and qualitative. This study further examines the determinants of 
corporate risk disclosure in Saudi public firms, with particular emphasis on corporate 
governance mechanisms, ownership structure, Islamic values, and the Loss-Making Firms 
Procedures (LMFPs). The findings indicate that board size, government ownership, and 
inside ownership are negatively and significantly related to risk disclosure. Independent 
and non-executive directors are positively and significantly related to risk disclosure. 
However, auditor type, board education, risk management committee, institutional 
ownership, block ownership, and Islamic values have no statistically significant 
relationships with risk reporting. Using a difference-in-difference model, the results show 
that risk disclosure for loss-making firms has increased significantly after the introduction 
of the Loss-Making Firms Procedures. The evidence presented thus far supports the 
positive impact of corporate governance on risk disclosure by examining an exogenous 
shock. The results also show that risk disclosure is negatively and significantly associated 
with the cost of capital. These results are robust to a battery of robustness tests. 
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Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION 
   The scandals and failures of several well-known corporations in recent decades such 
as Enron, Lehman Brothers, AIG, and WorldCom have motivated regulators to work 
towards improving the levels of transparency and corporate governance. Likewise, the 
financial crisis of 2009 can be considered the consequence of taking extensive risks with a 
lack of disclosure. The financial crises thereby increased the attention to corporate risk 
reporting and encouraged shareholders and stakeholders to investigate firms` riskiness. 
Hence, the users of firms` financial reports are increasingly demanding more risk-related 
disclosure in order to assess the level of risk engaged in by firms and how it is being 
managed. It is believed that the enhancement of risk reporting has the potential to protect 
stakeholders` interests (Solomon, Solomon, Norton, & Joseph, 2000). Thus, risk disclosure 
research has become a popular research field in accounting and finance (Beretta & 
Bozzolan, 2004; Linsley & Shrives, 2006). This strand of literature seeks to understand the 
determinants and implications of risk disclosure, which is defined by Linsley and Shrives 
(2006) as “any opportunity or prospect, or of any hazard, danger, harm, threat or 
exposure, that has already impacted upon the company or may impact upon the company 
in the future or of the management of any such opportunity, prospect, hazard, harm, threat 
or exposure.” 
 It is assumed that the disclosure of detailed risk-related information would help 
investors, lenders, analysts, auditors, and other users of accounting reports to better assess 
and evaluate firms (Cabedo & Tirado, 2004; Solomon et al., 2000). Hence, regulators 
around the world have been motivated to develop formal codes and new rules of best 
practices in transparency and corporate governance where the disclosure of risk-related 
information is obligated or encouraged. In this regard, and after the collapse of the Saudi 
market in 2006, the Capital Market Authority (CMA) in Saudi Arabia introduced corporate 
governance reforms (Al-Abbas, 2009; Al-Nodel & Hussainey, 2010).  The code states that 
one of the boards of directors` functions is to indicate areas of risk, launch risk 
management plan, and ensure that the plan is implemented through forecasting the risks 
that may confront the firm in the future and disclose them with transparency. The updated 
version of the code issued in 2017 discusses the composition, competencies, and meetings 
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of the risk management committee1. Any improvement in the disclosure of risk-related 
information would be viewed as a partial proof of the effectiveness of recent corporate 
governance reforms (ICAEW 1999; Solomon et al. 2000) since the Saudi Corporate 
Governance Code encouraged the disclosure of risk-related information. Indeed, the 
enhancement of risk reporting has been one of the objectives of the corporate governance 
reforms around the globe (Madrigal, Guzmán, & Guzmán, 2015). 
In recent years, several studies have been conducted to find the determinants of 
corporate risk disclosure (Abdallah, Hassan, & McClelland, 2015; Abraham & Shrives, 
2014; Al-shammari, 2014; Domínguez & Gámez, 2014; Elshandidy, Fraser, & Hussainey, 
2013, 2014; Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012; Hassan, 2009; Madrigal et al., 2015; Linsley & 
Shrives, 2005, 2006; Miihkinen, 2012; Mohd Ali & Taylor, 2014; Muzahhem, 2011; Ntim, 
Lindop, & Thomas, 2013; Rajab & Schachler, 2009). These studies propose various 
theories (e.g. signaling theory, agency cost theory, capital need theory, proprietary cost 
theory, political cost theory, and institutional theory) to explain the variation in risk 
disclosure across companies. Yet, the evidence in these studies is mixed, calling for further 
empirical studies.  
The extant theories suggest that the level of risk disclosure depends on firms` 
characteristics that determine the different benefits and costs of risk disclosure. Therefore, 
the present study relies on the extant theory which suggests that firms` attributes (e.g. 
corporation size, firm risk, profitability, leverage, liquidity, concentrated ownership, board 
size, the proportion of independent directors, and auditing type) play important roles in 
determining the level of risk disclosure of Saudi listed firms. Hence, this study intends to 
investigate the association between corporate governance, ownership structure and the 
level of risk reporting with a view to explaining the variation of corporate risk disclosure in 
the Saudi context. Consequently, the study aims to investigate the main drivers of risk 
disclosure in Saudi publicly listed firms. The study will help to broaden our understanding 
of the main drivers of corporate risk disclosure in one of the most important developing 
countries. 
Saudi Arabia is considered the provenance of Islam. Most of the administrative 
regulations of the country emanate from Islamic law (Sharia) (Al-Shamrani, 2014) 
 
1 Further details of the Saudi Corporate Governance Code are discussed in section 2.6.  
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resulting in a substantial influence of Islamic values on corporate governance practices 
(Safieddine, 2009). Sharia emphasizes that Muslims are required to be truthful, honest, and 
careful of others at any time especially the time of business transactions (Ayub, 2007). 
Hence, exploring the impact of Islamic values on risk disclosure would add valuable 
insight to the existing governance and disclosure literature. 
Additionally, the present study aims to investigate the impact of new procedures 
(i.e. the Loss-Making Firms Procedures) that have been enforced by the Saudi Capital 
Market Authority since mid-2014 which aim to rectify the performance of loss-making 
firms. It is important to study the effect of enforcing the procedures on risk disclosure 
practices for two reasons. First, the study will assess the effectiveness of the procedures 
given that other capital markets regulators might apply similar procedures once they are 
proven to be effective2. Second, the study will investigate the exogenous impact of 
corporate governance on risk disclosure given that the current empirical literature may 
suffer from endogeneity. Thus, investigating the impact of introducing the Loss-Making 
Firms Procedures on risk disclosure is expected to have major practical and theoretical 
contributions.  
Prior studies argue that greater disclosure leads to less uncertainty and, in turn, low 
estimation risk which results in lowering the cost of capital (Botosan, 1997; Diamond & 
Verrecchia, 1991; Healy & Palepu, 2001; Kim & Verrecchia, 1994). Additionally, 
Miihkinen (2013) demonstrates that the high quality of risk disclosure of Finnish firms 
leads to lowering information asymmetry. Therefore, theoretically, it is expected that risk 
disclosure should be negatively related to the cost of capital after controlling for firm 
riskiness. The more the firm discloses its potential risks the lower the information 
asymmetry faced by investors, and hence, the lower the cost of capital. Nevertheless, 
empirical studies provide mixed evidence on the relationship between corporate risk 
disclosure and cost of capital. For instance, Semper and Beltrán (2014) report a positive 
association between financial risk disclosure and the cost of equity in the Spanish market. 
This finding is in contrast to the theoretical expectation which motivates the extension of 
investigating this issue in other countries (Semper & Beltrán, 2014). Accordingly, the 
 
2 For instance, Abu Dhabi Global Market announces that they will introduce some precautionary procedures 
for loss-making firms (Almanshawi, 2018). 
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present study aims to contribute in this direction by providing new evidence on the impact 
of risk disclosure on the cost of capital in Saudi Arabia.  
1.1. Research motivation 
   Although many studies have been conducted on corporate disclosure, there are still 
only a few studies that investigate corporate risk disclosure. Nevertheless, the academic 
works on risk disclosure are becoming popular (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004). However, 
most of these studies are conducted in developed countries such as the UK (e.g. Elshandidy 
et al. 2013; Elzahar and Hussainey 2012; Linsley and Shrives 2005, 2006; Rajab and 
Schachler 2009) Germany and the US (e.g. Elshandidy et al. 2014) Finland (e.g. Miihkinen 
2012, 2013) and Spain (e.g. Semper and Beltrán 2014). Hassan (2009) states that a few 
studies were conducted on risk disclosure in the emerging markets such as the GCC (e.g. 
Abdallah et al. 2015) Kuwait (e.g. Al-shammari 2014) UAE  (e.g. Hassan 2009 and 
Muzahhem 2011). Given that emerging markets differ from developed ones in terms of 
market efficiency, regulatory, transparency, and corporate governance (Aguilera & 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009), it is possible that the determinants of risk disclosure and its impact 
on the cost of capital differ in developed and developing markets. 
The present study concentrates on the Saudi context for several reasons. First, Saudi 
Arabia is considered the provenance of Islam given that one of the present study`s 
objectives is to explore the impact of Islamic values on risk disclosure. The Kings of Saudi 
Arabia are titled as the Custodians of the Two Holy Mosques since the two holy mosques 
(Mecca and Medina) are located within its land. Islam is considered the official religion of 
Saudi Arabia. Therefore, most of the administrative laws of the country emanate from 
Islamic law (Sharia) (Al-Shamrani, 2014) leading to a substantial influence of the Islamic 
values on corporate governance practices (Safieddine, 2009). Thus, the concentration of 
the present study on Saudi Arabia is convincing given that one of the research`s objectives 
is to explore the impact of Islamic values on risk disclosure practices in a major Islamic 
context. 
Second, Saudi Arabia is a resource-rich country. Beck (2011) finds empirical evidence 
that the stock markets of resource-rich countries are significantly less liquid with a lower 
level of trading activities. A low level of stock liquidity might indicate the presence of 
information asymmetry (Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991). Miihkinen (2013) empirically 
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finds that greater risk disclosure results in reducing information asymmetry. Therefore, the 
finding of Beck (2011) may indicate that resource-rich countries may suffer from 
information asymmetry. Baydoun et al. (2012) state that little academic attention has been 
paid to studying business and finance activities in the main oil producers countries such as 
Saudi Arabia. Hence, it is worthwhile to investigate risk disclosure practices where there is 
a lack of empirical evidence in an emerging resource-rich country such as Saudi Arabia.  
Third, there is a growing interest in studying and investigating corporate governance in 
Islamic and Arab countries including Saudi Arabia since they are different from developed 
countries in terms of religion, culture, and politics (Alsaeed, 2006; Baydoun et al., 2012; 
Kamlam & Robert, 2010). For instance, informal social relationships prevail in Saudi 
Arabia and expected to have a significant influence on the business environment in the 
Saudi context (Al-Bassam, Ntim, Opong, & Downs, 2016; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007) where 
the authority of individuals and families dominates over regulations (Hussainey and Al-
Nodel 2008). Therefore, directors may act in the best interest of their families and personal 
relationships instead of acting in the best benefit of shareholders.  Firms` managers can be 
affected by informal rules more than formal ones which motivate them to act in their 
families’ interests (Boytsun, Deloof, & Matthyssens, 2011). This implies that the risk 
disclosure decision may be affected by informal social relations. Arguably, social and 
cultural norms are expected to have a great influence on the disclosure of risk-related 
information in the Saudi context. 
Fourth, the business environment in Saudi Arabia is also distinct by ownership 
concentration by families and government. For instance, the Saudi government owns 42% 
of the total market value. It is expected that the lack of direct foreign investment and 
institutional ownership in the stock market would result in limiting the ability for 
complying with corporate regulations (Al‐Razeen & Karbhari, 2004) including the 
engagement in risk reporting. Additionally, it is argued that concentrated ownership would 
result in agency conflicts between minority and large owners in contrast to the developed 
markets where the conflict is mainly between shareholders and managers (Alves, 2012; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). When concentrated ownership prevails, large shareholders are 
the controllers of the firm because of the voting right system. Also, controlling 
shareholders do not depend on public disclosure, and hence, they are expected to 
discourage financial reports` preparers from engaging in risk reporting which makes 
17 
 
minority owners worse off. This implies that the risk disclosure decision may be affected 
by ownership concentration.  Arguably, the ownership concentration in Saudi Arabia is 
expected to weaken the ability of the recent corporate governance reforms to encourage 
risk disclosure3.  
Fifth, Saudi firms are exposed to further different types of risks. For example, Saudi 
companies face the risk of Saudization where they are asked by the government (Ministry 
of Labour) to employ Saudi citizens. Saudi workers are much more costly on firms than 
foreign labor. Therefore, firms are at risk of harsh penalties if they do not employ Saudi 
workers at a minimum percentage of total labor. The minimum percentage varies among 
industries. Also, Saudi firms depend more on direct and indirect governmental subsidies. 
There are several forms of governmental support for firms including, but not limited to: 
lending huge loans with no interest, providing oil derivatives with an extremely low level 
of prices, offering very low energy prices, paying part of Saudi workers` salaries, in 
addition to keeping the absence of corporate taxes system. Therefore, Saudi companies are 
at risk of losing some of the governmental supports if they do not comply with 
governmental demands. Additionally, Saudi Arabia suffers from terrorism. Terrorism can 
have a significant direct and indirect impact on Saudi firms. Several Saudi firms have been 
attacked by terrorists. Some foreign workers have been kidnapped or killed. As a result, 
Saudi companies are at risk of terrorism. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia is engaging in a war 
on the southern border. Since there are many listed firms located near the war area, they 
are at risk of the continuation of the war. This risk can apply to all other firms in Saudi 
Arabia since the geopolitical instability is a substantial danger. Given the above discussion, 
Saudi Arabian listed firms exhibit different types of risks which thereby might have an 
impact on the disclosure practices of risk-related information. 
Sixth, Capital Market Authority which is the regulator of the Saudi stock market 
established a corporate governance code in 2006 after the collapse of the Saudi stock 
market. The purpose of this code is to enhance the efficiency of the Saudi stock market. 
The code encourages risk disclosure by stating that one of the boards of director`s function 
is to indicate areas of risk, launch risk management plan, and ensure that the plan is 
implemented through forecasting the risks may confront the firm in the future and disclose 
 
3 The results of the present study find no evidence of the adverse impact of ownership concentration on risk 
disclosure as will be discussed in section 6.4.2. 
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them with transparency. Thus, any improvement in the disclosure of risk-related 
information would be viewed as proof of the effectiveness of recent corporate governance 
reforms (ICAEW 1999; Solomon et al. 2000).  
Seventh, Saudi Arabia is one of the largest oil exporters and producers and plays an 
important role in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). 25% of 
the globe`s oil reserve is in Saudi Arabia (OPEC 2012). Additionally, Saudi Arabia is a 
member of the Group of Twenty (G20). Also, Saudi Arabia invests heavily in both 
developed and developing countries (Al-Filali & Gallarotti, 2012). Therefore, the Saudi 
context is a crucial emerging context which means that the failure of corporate governance 
in Saudi Arabia may have a significant impact beyond its borders (Al-Bassam et al., 2016; 
Albassam & Ntim, 2016). Hence, the engagement of risk reporting will increase the level 
of transparency which is important for the investment environment. As a result, 
investigating risk disclosure issues in the Saudi context is of importance since it 
contributes to the literature and practices of corporate governance and transparency in 
Saudi Arabia. In addition, Baydoun et al. (2012) state that little academic works have been 
conducted in relation to business and finance activities in the major oil producers countries 
such as Saudi Arabia.  
Eighth, foreigners invest extensively in Saudi Arabia. According to OECD (2015), the 
value of the foreign direct investment in Saudi Arabia is 39 Billion USD. Additionally, 
Saudi Arabia looks for attracting foreign investors. A recent example is that regulators in 
Saudi Arabia opened the Saudi Stock Market for foreign direct investment in June 2015. 
Therefore, the present study would be beneficial for regulators and foreign investors to 
understand risk disclosure practices and determinants in the Saudi context since the weak 
disclosure and corporate governance will deepen information asymmetry and, in turn, 
make the Saudi Stock Market less attractive to foreign investors. 
To sum up, the present study expects that the nature and determinants of corporate risk 
disclosure and its influence on the cost of capital in the Saudi context might be different 
from other developed markets because of the distinctive features of the Saudi context as 
discussed above. In addition, the study contributes to the literature by providing a primary 
understanding of risk disclosure practices in Saudi Arabia. The findings of this study have 
the potential to help regulators and financial reports` preparers when improving corporate 
risk disclosure practices in addition to helping investors, lenders, analysts, and other users 
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to understand the nature of risk reporting in the Saudi Arabian context when evaluating 
firms. 
1.2. Research aims and objectives 
The current study seeks to achieve four objectives.  First, it aims to explore corporate risk 
disclosure level and practices within the annual report of Saudi listed firms over four years 
(2012 - 2015).  The research provides evidence on the volume and trend of risk reporting, 
risk information categories (financial, operational, or strategic), nature (qualitative or 
quantitative), time-frame (historical or forward-looking), and economic sign (good, bad, or 
neutral). Second, the current study aims to identify the main factors that drive risk 
disclosure practices with emphasis on corporate governance mechanisms, ownership 
structure, and Islamic values. To date, studies investigating the practices and determinants 
of risk disclosure have produced equivocal results which highlighted the needs for more 
empirical studies. For instance, much uncertainty still exists about the relationship between 
corporate governance and risk disclosure. Moreover, existing studies do not explicitly 
address potential problems that may be caused by the existence of an endogenous 
relationship between corporate governance and risk disclosure. Thus, the third objective of 
the present study aims to fill this gap by examining the impact of an exogenous corporate 
governance shock on risk disclosure. More precisely, the present study examines the 
impact of the introduction of the Loss-Making Firms Procedures (LMFPs) on risk 
disclosure practices in Saudi Arabia4. This examination is crucial given that most of the 
existing empirical studies may suffer from endogeneity. The fourth objective of the present 
study aims to examine whether the higher level of risk disclosure would result in lowering 
the cost of capital in order to provide an insight into the implication of corporate risk 
disclosure on the required rate of return. The higher level of risk disclosure would lead to a 
reduction in the level of uncertainty thereby improving the willingness of investors and 
creditors to provide the disclosing firms with capital at lower costs.      
 
4 The Saudi Capital Market Authority introduced new procedures (i.e. the Loss-Making Firms Procedures) 
that apply to firms with cumulative losses with the aim to rectify the performance of those firms. Loss-
making firms were required to create a plan and establish a new committee to implement the plan in order 
to mitigate firms` losses. The Loss-Making Firms Procedures are discussed thoroughly in section 3.6. 
20 
 
1.3. Research questions 
    The current study aims to answer four main questions. First, what is the level and 
practices of the disclosure of risk-related information by Saudi listed firms? This question 
seeks to explore the extent to which Saudi Arabian listed firms disclose risk-related 
information by using a content analysis methodology approach. There are several sub-
questions under the first key question. The first sub-question is: What is the trend of risk 
reporting over the years by Saudi Arabian listed firms? This sub-question would help to 
shed light on whether risk disclosure practices are improving over the years. The second 
sub-question relates to the nature of risk disclosure (e.g. qualitative or quantitative). The 
third sub-question is about the time-frame of risk disclosure (e.g. historical or forward-
looking). The fourth sub-question relates to the economic sign of risk disclosure i.e. 
whether the news is good, bad, or neutral and lastly what the industry effect on risk 
disclosure is. 
The second main question in the study is: What determines the level of corporate risk 
reporting of Saudi public firms? This question aims to explore the main drivers of risk 
disclosure by examining the relationship between various firms` attributes and the level of 
risk disclosure in order to explain the variation in corporate risk disclosure by Saudi firms. 
There are several sub-questions under the second key question. First, what is the impact of 
corporate governance mechanisms on risk disclosure? Second, what is the impact of 
ownership structure on risk disclosure? Third, what is the impact of Islamic values on risk 
disclosure?  
The third key question is: What is the effect of the Loss-Making Firms Procedures 
(LMFPs) on risk disclosure practices? This question aims to investigate the effectiveness 
of the procedures and to explore the exogenous effect of corporate governance on risk 
disclosure using a difference-in-difference model.  
The fourth key question is: How does the disclosure of risk-related information affect 
the cost of capital? This question aims to investigate whether an increased level of risk 
disclosure will lead to a lower cost of capital through lowering the uncertainty by 
providing managerial perspective on the risks faced by the firm. 
1.4. Key Empirical Findings 
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   Using hand-collected data of 463 firm-year observations5, this thesis examines 
the level and practices of risk disclosure for Saudi firms from 2012 to 2015. It also 
examines the effect of corporate governance, ownership structure, Islamic values, and the 
Loss-Making Firms procedures on risk disclosure. It further examines the effect of risk 
disclosure on the cost of capital.  
The major findings of this thesis are as follows. The descriptive results show that 
Saudi firms report 24 risk-related sentences on average. This number is much lower than 
that reported in other studies elsewhere (e.g. Greco 2012; Beretta & Bozzolan 2004; 
Linsley & Shrives 2006; Rajab & Schachler 2009; and Konishi & Ali 2007). The low level 
of risk disclosure in Saudi Arabia can mainly be explained by the lack of enforcement. 
During the sample period, there were no mandatory requirements for Saudi listed firms to 
provide risk-related information in the annual reports. The results also show that there has 
been a steady increase in the average number of risk disclosure items by Saudi listed firms 
over the sample period. The rise in the number of risk-related sentences is more 
pronounced in the year 2015 where risk disclosure grew from 24 in 2014 to 30 in 2015. 
The increase in risk disclosure in 2015 can be explained by the increased risk in the Saudi 
economy due to the dramatic decline of oil prices which led to a financial crisis in Saudi 
Arabia.  
Operational and financial risk disclosure appeared to be the most frequent disclosed 
risk while the strategic risk is significantly lower. The lack of strategic risk disclosure can 
be explained by the verifiability of information. Given that the strategic risks are less 
controllable by firms such as risks related to society, economy, or politics, firms managers 
have less incentive to disclose information that might put them at intense criticisms and 
possible legal actions if their estimation goes wrong (Mohobbot, 2005).  
The most disclosed risk in the Saudi context is positive in nature. Linsley & Shrives 
(2006) suggest that managers would not reveal bad news since they prefer to signal a 
bright image of their risk management performance to the market with a view to avoiding 
reputation costs. Therefore, Schrand & Elliott (1998) argue that the requirements of risk 
disclosure should concentrate on bad risk since companies would be reluctant to disclose 
such information. The most disclosed risk in the Saudi context is forward-looking. Aljifri 
 
5 The sample size for the current study is substantially larger than most risk disclosure studies. The content 
analysis for more than 26,620 pages has to be undertaken in the present study. 
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& Hussainey (2007) and Linsley & Shrives (2005) argue that the disclosure of forward-
looking information has the potential to help investors in forecasting future cash flows 
which result in making better-informed investment decisions as opposed to the disclosure 
of historical information. However, it can be argued that forward-looking information is 
less reliable because it involves a high level of uncertainty in addition to the subjectivity 
issue associated with forward-looking information (Cabedo & Tirado, 2004). The present 
study also finds that most disclosed risk is qualitative in nature. Linsley & Shrives (2006) 
argue that companies should disclose more quantitative risk-related information in order to 
help stakeholders to assess the risk engaged in by firms.   
The results also show significant differences in risk disclosure between industries 
in the Saudi context using a one-way ANOVA test. Firms` managers usually mimic the 
disclosure practices of other companies in the same industry regardless of the relevance of 
the provided information which may result in significant variation among different 
industries (Hassan, 2009). 
The results on the corporate governance effects on risk disclosure show that board 
size is negatively and significantly related to risk disclosure. Jensen (1993) suggests that 
large board size might suffer from the deficiency of group cohesion, resulting in 
communication and cooperation difficulties, which might hinder the operation of the 
company. Xie, Davidson III, & DaDalt (2003)  argue that smaller boards are better at 
functioning and providing a higher level of financial reporting. Thus, the present study 
supports the view that smaller boards are more effective regarding risk disclosure in the 
Saudi context6.  
Board independence shows a significant positive relationship with risk disclosure at 
a 1% level of significance. Independent directors tend to put more pressure on executives 
to provide a higher level of disclosure and transparency since independent directors would 
be more concerned about their personal reputations (Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007). The Saudi 
Corporate Governance Code states that one-third of the board directors shall be 
independent, at a minimum. The present study supports the view that independent directors 
 
6 This finding is in contrast to the present study`s expectation. The present study hypothesized that board size 
is positively related to risk disclosure. Agency theory suggests that a larger board impacts positively on 
disclosure, risk reporting, and performance because of the higher level of monitoring and the wider 
variety of expertise by the larger board (Bozec & Bozec, 2012; Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012; Singh, 
Mathur, & Gleason, 2004). 
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have vital roles in promoting risk disclosure practices in Saudi Arabia. Likewise, the 
proportion of non-executive directors has a significant positive relationship with risk 
disclosure at a 1% level of significance. Non-executive directors with various experience 
and knowledge are more capable of enhancing the level of risk disclosure (Ntim & 
Soobaroyen, 2013). 
The results show that the relationship between auditor type and risk disclosure is 
insignificant. Although auditing is considered a monitoring mechanism, recent auditing 
scandals (e.g. Arthur Andersen, Parmalat, etc.) do not support this assertion. The results 
also show that the relationship between board education and risk disclosure is insignificant. 
It is argued that board members with a higher level of education play a vital role in 
monitoring, consulting, and implicating corporate governance rules (Francis, Hasan, & 
Wu, 2014). However, the present study suggests that the impact of board education on risk 
disclosure cannot be confirmed in the Saudi context. The results also show that the 
relationship between the risk management committee and risk disclosure is insignificant. 
The existence of a risk committee would be viewed as a sign of proper risk management 
and risk reporting. Nevertheless, what is not yet clear is whether or not this finding study is 
a true representation given that only a few firms of the sample have risk committees. 
In the case of ownership structure, government ownership shows a significant 
negative relationship with risk disclosure. Firms with a higher level of government 
ownership may lose the incentive to disclose more risk-related information since they do 
not have the need for attracting capital.  These firms enjoy easy access to various forms of 
capital (Ghazali & Weetman, 2006). In the same vein, inside ownership is negatively and 
significantly related to risk disclosure. When directors` ownership is large, they might have 
incentives to maximize their own interest by lowering the level of transparency (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997).  
The findings also show that the relationship between institutional ownership and 
risk disclosure is insignificant. It is argued that institutional investors have a higher ability 
for monitoring companies given that they possess the required resources such as 
experience, efficiency, and effective use of voting rights (Donnelly & Mulcahy, 2008). 
Nevertheless, this argument is not supported by the results of the present study. This is in 
line with the results of a qualitative study conducted by Albassam (2014) where he finds 
that the institutional investment in Saudi listed firms concentrates on short-term 
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investments. The results also show that block ownership is insignificantly related to risk 
disclosure. Firms with concentrated ownership do not experience a separation between 
ownership and control. In fact, block owners do not depend on public disclosure since they 
have access to internal information. This finding indicates that concentrated ownership 
might play a limited role in influencing the disclosure of risk-related information in Saudi 
Arabia.  
The present study could not find a positive relationship between Islamic values and 
risk disclosure. This finding is a bit puzzling because of the established Islamic literature 
that encourages disclosure practices. For instance, Sharia emphasizes that Muslims are 
obligated to be honest, truthful, and careful of others at any time especially the time of 
business transactions (Ayub, 2007). The Holy Prophet Muhammad encourages the 
disclosure of all attributes of traded commodities in which traders receive enough 
information about commodities and their prices in the market. However, the empirical 
results of previous studies on the relationship between Islamic values and risk disclosure 
are inconclusive. For example, Albassam & Ntim (2016) report a significant and positive 
effect of Islamic values on corporate governance disclosure whereas Al-Maghzom et al. 
(2016b) and Abdallah, Hassan, & McClelland (2015) find a significant and negative effect 
of Islamic values over risk disclosure. Moreover, Abu-Tapanjeh (2009) compares the 
OECD principles with the Islamic principles and discovers that both are similar in relation 
to transparency and disclosure. The empirical results of the present study support this view.  
In mid-2014, the Saudi Capital Market Authority enforces the Loss-Making Firms 
Procedures (LMFPs) that apply only to firms with cumulative losses. Using a difference-
in-difference model, the results show that loss-making firms reveal significantly more risk-
related information after the introduction of LMFPs in comparison with non-loss-making 
firms. This finding is statistically significant at the 5% level. The evidence presented thus 
far supports the notion that the introduction of the procedures has proven to be effective 
with respect to risk disclosure. This finding also supports the positive impact of corporate 
governance on risk disclosure by examining an exogenous shock. This approach 
overcomes the problem of endogeneity. 
The results on the effect of risk disclosure on the cost of capital show that risk 
disclosure is negatively and significantly associated with the cost of capital. A higher level 
of risk disclosure leads to less uncertainty and, in turn, low estimation risk which results in 
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lowering the cost of capital. Disclosing managerial perspective on the risks faced by the 
firm has the potential to reduce the cost of capital by lowering the level of uncertainty. 
Firms` managers may have the incentive to engage in risk disclosure as they need to raise 
capital at a lower cost. 
The present study uses a battery of robustness checks (e.g. a difference-in-
difference model, a placebo test, lagged structure models, and random effect models) to 
verify the solidity of the results and to mitigate the problem of endogeneity. Thus, the 
results of the current study can be described as robust. 
1.5. Contributions of the Study 
      The present study contributes to the corporate governance and disclosure literature 
in several ways. First, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, the present study is the 
first to examine the impact of an exogenous corporate governance shock on risk disclosure. 
More precisely, the present study is the first to examine the impact of the introduction of 
the Loss-Making Firms Procedures (LMFPs) on risk disclosure practices in Saudi Arabia. 
This examination of an exogenous corporate governance shock on risk disclosure practices 
is methodologically original. It adds theoretical contributions in relation to the impact of 
corporate governance on risk disclosure given that most of the existing empirical studies 
may suffer from endogeneity7. It also provides practical contributions through informing 
Saudi regulatory bodies of the effectiveness of such enforcement and its impact on risk 
disclosure practices. Investigating the effectiveness of the procedures is vital given that 
other capital markets regulators may apply the same procedures once they are proven to be 
effective. For instance, Abu Dhabi Global Market has recently announced that they are 
introducing some precautionary procedures for loss-making firms (Almanshawi, 2018). 
Hence, this research question has major practical and theoretical contributions. 
Second, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, the present study is the first to 
investigate the effect of Islamic values of non-financial firms on risk disclosure practices. 
Since Saudi Arabia is considered the provenance of Islam, exploring the impact of Islamic 
 
7 It is argued that empirical results can be seriously influenced by endogeneity (Larcker & Rusticus, 2010), 
which happens if one or several variables are related to the error term (Wooldridge, 2015). The causes of 
endogeneity can be due to errors with the measurements, omitting of some variables, or simultaneity 
(Larcker & Rusticus, 2010). Using a difference-in-difference approach is considered an effective 
technique for solving the endogeneity issue (Roberts & Whited, 2013). 
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values on risk disclosure would add valuable insight to the existing governance and 
disclosure literature.  
Third, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, the present study is also the first to 
investigate the effect of risk disclosure practices on the cost of capital. Hence, the findings 
of this thesis could potentially be valuable to stakeholders in comprehending the 
importance of the disclosure of risk-related information in reducing the cost of capital. 
Additionally, this study will contribute to the literature by investigating the impact of risk 
disclosure practices on the cost of capital in an emerging context. Because emerging 
markets are different from developed ones in terms of regulations, transparency, market 
efficiency and corporate governance (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009), the present study 
adds to the existing literature on the influence of risk reporting on the cost of capital in an 
emerging country. 
Fourth, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, the present thesis is the first to 
control for the effect of total disclosure when examining the determinants of risk 
disclosure. This thesis argues that firms may disclose more about risk because they are 
good at disclosure in general. Hence, adding this variable to the regression model would 
take into account this effect. Thus, the present thesis isolates the effect of the tendency of 
firms with regards to disclosure practices from the specific disclosure on risks. This can be 
considered a major contribution to previous works in risk disclosure literature.  
Fifth, the present study contributes to the corporate governance and disclosure 
literature by adding new and unique governance variables in the research model. More 
precisely, the present thesis provides empirical evidence on how board education and the 
existence of a risk management committee can affect the level of risk disclosure. These 
governance variables were absent from most previous studies (Abdallah, Hassan, & 
McClelland, 2015; Abraham & Shrives, 2014; Al-shammari, 2014; Domínguez & Gámez, 
2014; Elshandidy, Fraser, & Hussainey, 2013, 2014; Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012; Hassan, 
2009; Madrigal et al., 2015; Linsley & Shrives, 2005, 2006; Mohd Ali & Taylor, 2014; 
Ntim, Lindop, & Thomas, 2013; and Rajab & Schachler, 2009). 
Sixth, the present study contributes to the literature by building a relevant risk 
disclosure index for the Saudi context given that Saudi firms are exposed to some unique 
types of risks. For instance, Saudi firms face the risk of Saudization where they are 
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requested by the government (Ministry of Labor) to employ Saudi citizens. Given that 
Saudi workers are much more costly on firms than foreign labor, firms are at risk of harsh 
penalties if they do not employ Saudi workers at a minimum percentage of total labor. 
Additionally, Saudi Arabia has an ongoing war on the southern border. Since there are 
many listed firms located near the war zone, they are at risk from the continuation of the 
war. Moreover, Saudi Arabia has been experiencing a threat of terrorism. Terrorism can 
have significant direct and indirect influences on Saudi firms. Several Saudi firms have 
been attacked by terrorists. Some foreign workers have been kidnapped or killed. Hence, 
Saudi firms are at risk of terrorism. To the best of the researcher`s knowledge, the present 
study is the first to incorporate these unique risks in its risk disclosure index. 
1.6. Structure of the Thesis 
  The thesis is organized into eight chapters as follows: Chapter two discusses the 
framework of risk disclosure and corporate governance in the Saudi context. It provides a 
general background of the regulatory bodies in Saudi Arabia. The chapter also aims to 
review the conceptual literature relating to defining and classifying risk.  
Chapter three reviews the previous literature on risk reporting. The chapter 
discusses the key theories of risk disclosure and the empirical studies conducted in the 
developed and developing markets. Further, the chapter develops the hypotheses of the 
impact of corporate governance, ownership structure, and Islamic values on risk disclosure, 
the impact of introducing the Loss-Making Firms Procedures on risk disclosure practices, 
and the impact of risk disclosure on the cost of capital.  
Chapter four reviews the sample and population for this study in addition to 
specifying the empirical models. Specifically, the chapter addresses the data collection 
process including the choice of the study`s sample and the source of risk disclosure. The 
chapter also discusses the process of content analysis used to construct the risk disclosure 
index. The chapter presents the research models of the determinants of risk disclosure, the 
impact of Loss-Making Firms Procedures on risk disclosure, and the impact of risk 
disclosure on the cost of capital.  
Chapter five presents the results of the content analysis. Particularly, the chapter 
presents descriptive statistics of risk disclosure in order to explore the practices of risk 
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disclosure for Saudi listed firms. It reviews the trend of risk reporting over the sample 
years 2012-2015. It discusses the various attributes of risk disclosure (i.e. qualitative, 
quantitative, forward-looking, historical, good, bad, or neutral). The chapter also examines 
the industry effect on risk disclosure.  
Chapter six discusses the findings of the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation 
technique in investigating the effects of corporate governance, ownership structure, and 
Islamic values on risk disclosure in Saudi Arabia. Further, the chapter presents the results 
of the impact of introducing the Loss-Making Firms Procedures on risk disclosure using a 
difference-in-difference model and a placebo test. It also tests the robustness of the results 
and investigates the presence of endogeneity problems using several statistical techniques.  
Chapter seven presents the empirical results of the impact of risk disclosure on the 
cost of capital for Saudi listed firms. Specifically, the chapter presents the descriptive 
statistics, the correlation matrix, the empirical results, and the robustness checks for 
verifying the findings of the main model.  
Chapter eight presents a conclusion of the thesis. Specifically, the chapter presents 
a summary of the findings of this thesis, the policy implications, the contributions and 
limitations of this thesis, and future possible research avenues.  
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Chapter 2 RISK DISCLOSURE FRAMEWORK IN SAUDI ARABIA  
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter provides a detailed discussion on risk disclosure framework and 
provides an overview of the Saudi context. It provides a review of the conceptual literature 
relating to defining and classifying risk. It also discusses the framework of risk disclosure 
and corporate governance in Saudi Arabia. It also provides a discussion on regulatory 
bodies in Saudi Arabia such as the Ministry of Commerce, the Capital Market Authority, 
and the Saudi Organization for Certified Public Accountants.  
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the definition of risk. 
Section 2.3 presents the discussion on categorizing risk. Section 2.4 discusses the risk 
disclosure attributes. Section 2.5 discusses the risk disclosure framework in Saudi Arabia. 
Section 2.6 discusses the corporate governance framework in Saudi Arabia. Section 2.7 
discusses the regulatory bodies in Saudi Arabia. Section 2.8 provides a summary of the 
chapter. 
2.2. Definition of risk  
 Linsley & Shrives (2006) state that one of the difficulties in conducting a risk 
reporting study is the definition of ‘risk’. The term ‘risk’ refers to the distribution of future 
consequences (Doherty, 2000). The distribution of those future events cannot be known for 
certain (Rajab, 2009). Hence, any risk-related information regarding that distribution is 
considered as ‘risk information’ (Dobler, 2008). The Cambridge Dictionary (2002) defines 
risk as “the possibility of something bad happening”. In line with this definition, the 
Oxford Dictionary (1995) defines risk as “the possibility of something bad happening at 
some time in the future; a situation that could be dangerous or have a bad result”. The 
previous two definitions by Cambridge and Oxford dictionaries make the term ‘risk’ 
limited to just bad events while these two definitions exclude potential gains or 
opportunities. In the same vein, Ibrahim and Hussainey (2019) support this notion which 
suggests limiting risk disclosure to the negative side of risk. They formulate the definition 
upon the results of two empirical tests on a sample of annual reports of UK firms. They 
also provide several theoretical arguments to justify the losses-only definition of risk. They 
argue that most advanced risk disclosure regulations concentrate on bad risk-related 
information such as the German Accounting Standard and Basel Committee risk 
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regulations. They also refer to the definitions of risk by different dictionaries. They also 
find that most empirical studies on risk disclosure concentrate on the negative definition 
and keywords of risk.  
 However, another well-cited definition is proposed by Accounting Standards Board 
(ASB, 1994) and has been used by risk disclosure professional reports (e.g. ICAEW 1997; 
ICAEW 1999) and academic literature (e.g. Solomon et al. 2000; Linsley & Shrives 2005) 
where risk is defined as “…uncertainty as the amount of benefit, the term includes both 
potentials for gain and exposure to loss.” The later definition considers both downside risk 
(e.g. exposure to loss) as well as upside risk (e.g. potential for gain). Elshandidy (2011) 
argues that there are three main streams in the literature with regards to the inclusion of 
gains in ‘risk’ definition. The first stream considers only the downside risk (e.g. Adams 
2009; Akintoye & MacLeod 1997; Kaplan & Garrick 1981). The second stream considers 
both good/upside risk and bad/downside risk (e.g. Schrand & Elliott 1998; Elmiger & Kim 
2003; Damodaran 2007). The third stream uses a statistical approach in considering risk 
such as the probabilities of events that lead to potential gains or losses (e,g, Ansell & 
Wharton 1992; Stoneburner et al. 2002; Lopes 1987).  
The current study adopts the broad definition of risk that includes upside and downside 
risks in order to identify risk disclosure in annual reports. Therefore, this study follows the 
definition of risk by Linsley & Shrives (2006, p.3) where they define risk disclosure as “if 
the reader is informed of any opportunity or prospect, or of any hazard, danger, harm, 
threat, or exposure, that has already impacted upon the company or may impact upon the 
company in the future or of the management of any such opportunity prospect, hazard, 
harm, threat or exposure”. Similarly, Accounting Standards Board (FRS 5, Reporting the 
Substance of Transactions, ASB, 1994) defines risk as “…uncertainty as the amount of 
benefit, the term includes both potentials for gain and exposure to loss.” Moreover, Hassan 
(2009, p.669) define risk disclosure as “the financial statements inclusion of information 
about managers` estimates, judgments, reliance on market-based accounting policies such 
as impairment, derivative hedging, financial instruments and fair value as well as the 
disclosure of concentrated operations, non-financial information about corporations‟ 
plans, recruiting strategy and other operational, economic, political and financial risks”. 
In addition, Abraham & Cox (2007) suggest several keywords that refer to risk such as 
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risk, variation, fluctuation, volatility, oscillation, amplitude, uncertainty, unexpected, 
contingency, surprise, shock, opportunity, prospect, potential, upside, advantage.  
2.3. Quality vs. quantity of risk disclosure 
The vast majority of risk reporting studies investigate the quantity of risk disclosure 
(e.g. Linsley & Shrives 2006; Rajab & Schachler 2009; Muzahhem 2011; Elzahar & 
Hussainey 2012; Elshandidy et al. 2013; Elshandidy et al. 2014; Al-shammari 2014; 
Abdallah et al. 2015; Lopes & Rodrigues 2007; Lajili & Zéghal 2005; Abraham & Cox 
2007). However, there are several attempts by previous studies to capture the quality of 
disclosure instead of quantity (e.g. Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004, 2008; Jia et al., 2016). For 
instance, Beretta & Bozzolan (2004), (2008); and Jia et al. (2016) propose a new 
methodology that tries to measure the quality of risk disclosure. they argue that the quality 
of disclosure is a combination of two factors: (i) quantity and (ii) richness. Quantity refers 
to the number of sentences disclosed and richness refers to the width and depth of 
disclosure. First, Width is a combination of coverage and dispersion. Coverage is the 
number of sub-topics disclosed divided by total subtopics. Dispersion is a measure of how 
much risk information is concentrated. Second, depth is a set of measurements that 
includes the type of measure (qualitative or quantitative), economic sign (whether the 
expected impact on future performance is disclosed or not), and outlook profile (whether 
the disclosure contains actions, decisions, or programs).  This approach of measuring the 
disclosure quality has been criticized by Botosan (2004). Her criticisms can be explained in 
two points. First, Botosan (2004, p.292)states that: 
It is clear that each component of Beretta & Bozzolan (2004)’s quality metric is comprised 
of a scaled count of disclosure items. Thus, regardless of how the measure is described, it 
is clear that QUALITY is the outcome of a weighted count of the number of items 
disclosed. In this sense, Beretta & Bozzolan (2004)’s  metric is no different from prior 
attempts to quantify disclosure levels, and, as such, it is inappropriate for Beretta & 
Bozzolan (2004) to claim that their framework overcomes the shortcomings of prior 
attempts to assess disclosure quality by measuring the quantity of information provided. 
Second, Botosan (2004) argues that their premises of developing a new measure of 
disclosure quality are not grounded on well-supported discussions. She adds that the 
development of a risk disclosure measurement should start with solid discussions of the 
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attributes of information that determine disclosure quality. For instance,  Botosan (2004) 
claims that this measurement8 is not built on a conceptual framework derived from 
standard setters such as the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB). More 
precisely, IASB proposes four qualitative attributes of information which make it more 
helpful and meaningful to decision makers. They are understandability, relevance, 
reliability, and comparability. Those were not taken into consideration by Beretta & 
Bozzolan (2004), (2008); and Jia et al. (2016). Therefore, Botosan (2004) attempts to 
develop a new measure of risk disclosure quality relying on those four characteristics. 
However, she concludes that it is extremely difficult to quantify disclosure quality due to 
the difficulty of defining disclosure quality satisfactorily. Additionally, even if it is 
possible to quantify disclosure quality, using this procedure empirically is out of the 
question because of the need for extravagant judgment, lack of information, or huge costs 
(Botosan, 2004). 
2.4. Categorisation of risk  
After defining the notion of ‘risk’, it is essential to identify the various sources of 
risk. There are different sources or categories of risk that have been distinguished by prior 
studies. For instance, ICAEW (1997) uses the Arthur Anderson Business Risk Model that 
offers overall guidance for the purpose of developing a list of risk categories. The model 
divides the risk to three main categories: environmental risk, process risk, and information 
for decision-making risk. Under each type of risk, there are many sub-categories of risk 
listed such as financial, strategic, operational, integrity, empowerment, and technology 
risk. 
Another business risk model is proposed by another professional body which is the 
International Federation of Accountants (IFAC, 1999). In this model, the risk is grouped 
into three different classes. The first class contains uncontrollable risks such as risk related 
to society, economy, or politics. The second class contains the types of risk that a firm has 
a limited ability to control such as reputation and competitiveness risks. The third class 
consists of several types of risk that a firm can have a high degree of impact on them such 
as financial risk.  
 
8 The measurement proposed by Beretta & Bozzolan (2004) to capture risk disclosure quality. 
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Several prior empirical studies propose different categories of risk. For instance, 
Lajili & Zéghal (2005) divides the risk to eleven risk components. They are operational, 
financial, government regulations, technology, political, environmental, weather, 
seasonality, cyclicality, natural resources, and suppliers risks. Linsley & Shrives (2006) 
and Linsley & Shrives (2005) group risk into financial, operations, empowerment, 
Information processing and technology, integrity, and strategic risks. Deumes (2008) 
classifies risk into a number sources i.e. loss and probability of loss, variance, lack of 
information, lack of control, macro-environmental sources, industry sources, internal 
sources, and other sources. Rajab & Schachler (2009) differentiate risk into a number of 
classes namely, environmental, operational, and strategic risks. Hassan (2009) and 
Abdallah et al. (2015) categorize risk as general risk information, accounting policies, 
financial instruments, derivatives hedging, reserves, segment information, and financial 
and other risks.  
Miihkinen (2012) classifies risk into strategic, operational, financial, damage, and 
risk management. Al-shammari (2014) categorizes risk into general risk information, 
accounting policies, financial instruments, derivatives hedging, reserves, financial and 
other risks, and commodity risk. Hernández Madrigal et al. (2015) categorize risk to eight 
categories. They are internal environment, objective setting, events identification, risk 
assessment, risk response, control activities, information and communication, and 
monitoring.  Ntim et al. (2013), Jorion (1997), and Cabedo & Tirado (2004) divide the risk 
to financial, operational, and strategic risks. 
The current study follows the categorization of risk by Ntim et al. (2013), Jorion 
(1997), and Cabedo & Tirado (2004) where they divide the risk to financial, operational, 
and strategic risks. The choice of this classification can be justified by the absence of 
agreed risk classification as various categorizations of risk have been used by prior studies 
and professional reports. Also, the other classification of risk that has been employed by 
other studies (e.g. Linsley and Shrives 2000, Hassan 2009, and Abdallah et al. 2015) would 
be more appropriate to employ in countries that apply the International Financial Reporting 
Standards – IFRS. Their risk indices have been built in accordance with the IFRS. Saudi 
non-financial listed firms were not required to comply with the requirement of the IFRS 
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during the sample period (2012 – 2015)9. The present study makes some modifications in 
risk items in order to be more relevant to the Saudi Arabian context. To do so, the 
researcher reviews risk items used by previous studies.  Further, the researcher examines a 
pilot sample of 10 annual reports in order to generate risk items that are most relevant to 
the Saudi context.  
Financial risk is the risk associated with finance activities such as interest rate, 
liquidity, exchange rate, and financial instruments. Financial risk has a direct impact on 
cash flow where the non-financial risk affects the cash flow indirectly. Operational risk 
refers to the risk arising from the operation side of the company such as business 
disruption, Saudization, reputation, and internal control. It is the risk arising from the daily 
decisions that firms` managers make in order to maximize the shareholders` wealth (Ntim 
et al., 2013). Strategic risk refers to the risk arising from the change in the external 
environment (Ntim et al., 2013) and it is associated with future plans and strategies of the 
firm such as research and development, politics, regulations, competition, and 
macroeconomic factors.  
2.5. Risk disclosure attributes 
Further to the classifications of risk (financial, operational, and strategic), risk-
related sentences are classified to various groups depending on their attributes. The groups 
are the nature of risk (qualitative vs. quantitative), the time-frame (historical, forward-
looking), and the economic sign (good, bad, or neutral). 
2.5.1. Nature of risk sentences (qualitative vs. quantitative)  
  Linsley & Shrives (2006) state that firms should disclose more quantitative risk-
related information in order to help stakeholders in assessing the risk engaged in by the 
firms.  Cabedo & Tirado (2004) believe that the disclosure of quantitative risk information 
has the potential to assist the annual reports` readers in making better-informed decisions. 
The disclosure of quantitative risk-related information can increase the credibility of the 
information provided in the annual reports which thereby increases the potential of 
 
9 The Capital Market Authority (CMA) requires Saudi non-financial listed firms to comply with the 
requirement of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) from the beginning of 2017. The 
adoption of IFRS would make the classification employed by other studies (e.g. Linsley and Shrives 
2000, Hassan 2009, and Abdallah et al. 2015) more appropriate to apply in the Saudi context from the 
year 2017 onward. 
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investment (Schrand & Elliott, 1998). SEC 1997 regulation in the US encourages firms to 
provide quantitative information on market risk. 
However, Linsley and Shrives (2006) and Mohobbot (2005) argue that it is 
challenging to measure and quantify most types of risks10. Rajgopal (1999) finds that the 
SEC 1997 regulation in the US resulted in the disclosure of unreliable information because 
of measurement errors. Also, Mohobbot (2005) argues that firms` managers have less 
incentive to estimate and quantify information because it might put them at intense 
criticisms and possible legal actions if their estimation goes wrong.  
Previous empirical studies report that most risk disclosure is qualitative in nature. 
For instance, Linsley & Shrives (2006), Rajab & Schachler (2009), Beretta & Bozzolan 
(2004), and Muzahhem (2011) find that 94.7%, 87.7%, 84.5%, and 70% of risk disclosure 
is qualitative respectively.  
2.5.2. Time-frame of risk sentences (historical vs. forward-looking) 
The disclosure of risk-related information can be historical, or forward-looking. 
Aljifri & Hussainey (2007) and Linsley & Shrives (2005) argue that the disclosure of 
forward-looking information has the potential to assist investors in forecasting future cash 
flows which result in making better-informed investment decisions unlike the disclosure of 
historical information.  
However, it can be argued that forward-looking information has less reliability 
since it involves a high level of uncertainty in addition to the subjectivity issue associated 
with forward-looking information (Cabedo & Tirado, 2004). Also, the nature of forward-
looking information is believed to be more valuable to be exploited by competitors which 
might influence the competitive advantage of the firm (Aljifri & Hussainey, 2007; 
ICAEW, 1999). Hence, financial reports` preparers might have less incentive to reveal 
forward-looking information (Konishi & Ali, 2007). 
  Empirically, Linsley & Shrives (2006) find that, on average, UK firms disclose 
20.29 and 27.47 historical and forward-looking risk-related information respectively. This 
finding shows that UK firms disclose more forward-looking information. On the other 
 
10 For instance, value at risk (VaR) can only be applied to market risks. 
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hand, Konishi & Ali (2007) and Beretta & Bozzolan (2004) discover that Japanese and 
Italian firms, respectively, disclose significantly more historical information while 
forward-looking information is limited.  
2.5.3. Economic sign of risk sentences (good, bad, or neutral). 
  Schrand & Elliott (1998) argue that the requirements of risk disclosure should 
concentrate on bad risk since companies have less incentive to disclose such information. 
Linsley & Shrives (2006) suggest that managers would not reveal bad news since they 
prefer to signal a bright image of their risk management performance to the market with a 
view to avoiding the reputation costs. According to a report by the Association of 
Chartered Certified Accountants (2014), analysts believe that most disclosed risk is biased 
toward positive disclosures. Kothari, Shu, & Wysocki (2009) argue that firms` managers 
have a higher tendency toward the disclosure of positive news while they are reluctant to 
disclose negative news. On the other hand, Mohobbot (2005) argues that directors have 
more incentive to provide negative risk information for a few reasons: (i) the absence of 
negative risk information would potentially damage the firms` reputations in a higher 
degree than if such information was disclosed, (ii) they would reveal negative risk 
information and refer the causes to external factors, and (iii) they would notify 
stakeholders about the difficulties associated with the future.  
Empirically, Konishi & Ali (2007), Rajab & Schachler (2009), Muzahhem (2011), 
and Linsley & Shrives (2006) find that the disclosure of good news risk information is 
higher than bad news information. In contrast, Lajili & Zéghal (2005) discovered that 
Canadian firms disclose more negative risk information. 
2.6. Risk Disclosure in Saudi Arabia 
The capital market regulations in the Saudi context (e.g. SCGC, Capital Market Law, 
and Listing Rules) emphasize the importance of disclosure and transparency. For instance, 
Capital Market Law, issued by the CMA, requires the prospectus to contain any 
information needed by investors and their consultants to make investing decisions. It also 
requires a clear statement regarding the financial position of the issuer and any relevant 
financial data, including the audited financial balance sheet, profit, and loss account and 
cash flow statement according to the rules of the Authority (Article 42). Also, the SCGC 
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has a separate part that discusses the disclosure and transparency with respect to the 
company policies and the board`s report. Listing Rules regulation contains seven articles 
concerning disclosure including but not limited to means and form of disclosure, timing of 
disclosure, and review of disclosure. However, the emphases of the disclosure of risk-
related information come into the regulators` attention as late as 2017 when the updated 
version of the SCGC is issued.  
The enhancement of risk reporting has been one of the objectives of the corporate 
governance reforms around the globe (Hernández Madrigal et al., 2015). Accordingly, the 
updated issue of the SCGC11 is the first regulation that asserts the importance of appointing 
a risk management committee. This is a remarkable improvement with regards to risk 
management and disclosure given that the old version of the SCGC was content with only 
two lines stating the following: “Among the main functions of the Board is ... ensuring the 
implementation of control procedures appropriate for risk management by forecasting the 
risks that the company could encounter and disclosing them with transparency”. Chapter 5 
of part 4 of the updated Saudi Corporate Governance Code contains three articles which 
discuss the composition, competencies, and meetings of the risk management committee 
(Articles 70, 71, and 72).   
Article 70 of the updated SCGC requests the company's board to establish a risk 
management committee where the chairperson and majority of its members are non-
executive directors. It also requires the members of that committee to have an adequate 
level of knowledge in risk management and finance. Article 71 lists the competences of the 
risk management committee as follows: 
1) “developing a strategy and comprehensive policies for risk management that are 
consistent with the nature and volume of the Company's activities, monitoring their 
implementation, and reviewing and updating them based on the Company's internal and 
external changing factors; 
2)  determining and maintaining an acceptable level of risk that may be faced by the 
Company and ensuring that the Company does not go beyond such level; 
3)  Ensuring the feasibility of the Company continuation, the successful continuity of its 
activities and determining the risks that threaten its existence during the following twelve 
(12) months; 
 
11 The updated version of the SCGC is issued in Feb. 2017. 
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4) overseeing the Company's risk management system and assessing the effectiveness of the 
systems and mechanisms for determining and monitoring the risks that threaten the 
Company in order to determine areas of inadequacy therein; 
5) Regularly reassessing the Company's ability to take risks and be exposed to such risks 
(through stress tests as an example); 
6) preparing detailed reports on the exposure to risks and the recommended measures to 
manage such risks, and presenting them to the Board; 
7) providing recommendations to the Board on matters related to risk management; 
8) ensuring the availability of adequate resources and systems for risk management; 
9) reviewing the organizational structure for risk management and providing 
recommendations regarding the same before approval by the Board; 
10) verifying the independence of the risk management employees from activities that may 
expose the Company to risk; 
11) ensuring that the risk management employees understand the risks threatening the 
Company and seeking to raise awareness of the culture of risk; and 
12) reviewing any issues raised by the audit committee that may affect the Company's risk 
management.” 
Article 72 of the updated SCGC requests the risk management committee to meet 
regularly at least once every six months, and as needed. However, articles 70, 71, and 72 
are still considered as guiding articles. This means firms are not obligated by the law to 
comply with these guiding articles related to risk disclosure. 
From the discussion above, it is clear that there is no mandatory requirement of risk 
disclosure in the Saudi context. During the time period of the present study`s sample 
(2012-2015), the sole regulation regarding risk disclosure was the article 10b (3) of the old 
version of the SCGC where it encourages the managing, forecasting, and disclosing risks 
as one of the main functions of the board. 
2.7. Corporate governance in Saudi Arabia 
 In 2006, the Saudi capital market experienced a sudden crash with a loss in value 
that amounted to $480bn and accounted for 53% of total stock market value (Alzead, 
2017). As a response, the Capital Market Authority (CMA) introduced the Saudi Corporate 
Governance Code (SCGC) in an attempt to restrain any further crashes, to protect 
shareholders, and to bring back the lost confidence of investors in the capital market (Al-
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Abbas, 2009). The code consists of five main parts. Part one discusses the objectives of the 
regulations in addition to defining the key terms, such as ‘Executive Director’ ‘Related 
Parties’ and ‘Stakeholder’. Part two reviews the rights of shareholders and the rights 
related to the meeting of the general assembly. Part three discusses disclosure and 
transparency with respect to the company policies and the board`s report in order to reduce 
information asymmetry.  Part four reviews several mechanisms with regards to the board 
of directors such as the main functions, the responsibilities, the formation, and committees 
of the board. Part five reviews the closing provisions and publications coming into force. 
 The SCGC is voluntary in nature and the majority of the provisions are on the basis 
of ‘comply or explain’. Nevertheless, not all the provisions are voluntary. The CMA seems 
to follow the ‘comply or be penalized’ approach to enforcing the mandatory provisions 
(Aleshaikh, 2018). The main features of the SCGC are as follows. The board of director is 
a one-tier system. The number of board directors shall be between three and eleven. 
Directors are classified as executive, non-executive, or independent directors. The SCGC 
prohibits the CEO- Chairperson duality. The chairperson has to be a non-executive 
director. The majority of directors shall be non-executive directors. At a minimum, one-
third of the board directors shall be independent. The number of meetings is not specified. 
The SCGC suggests the initiation of audit, remuneration and nomination committees. All 
the members of audit, remuneration and nomination committees shall be non-executive 
directors. The code recommends the disclosure of board and management compensations. 
Disclosure of ownership structure, dividends policy, and social contributions are required.  
In 2017, the Capital Market Authority (CMA) has issued a revised version of the 
Saudi Corporate Governance Code (SCGC) with major improvements. Unlike the old 
code, the updated version states that it is compulsory for firms to comply with all 
provisions except what the code states otherwise. This is considered a remarkable 
improvement. The updated code consists of twelve parts and 98 articles. This is a 
considerable enhancement given that the old code has only five parts and 19 articles. The 
updated code provides a higher degree of details compared to the previous code. For 
instance, article 26 discusses the competencies and duties of executive management. 
Article 27 discusses the competencies and duties of the chairperson of the board. Articles 
30 and 31 review the tasks and duties of the board members and duties of the independent 
director, respectively. Article 38 discusses the qualifications of the secretary. Article 39 
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reviews the training and preparation of the board members and executive management. 
The updated code prohibits that the tenure of independent directors to exceed nine-year, 
consecutive or inconsecutive (Article 20c/10). Another crucial development in the updated 
version is the articles (70, 71, and 72) which discuss composition, competencies, and 
meetings of the risk management committee. Further details of these articles are discussed 
in the next section.  
2.8. Regulatory Bodies in Saudi Arabia  
This section shed some light on regulatory bodies in Saudi Arabia. They are the 
Ministry of Commerce, the Capital Market Authority, and the Saudi Organization for 
Certified Public Accountants.  
2.8.1. Ministry of Commerce 
The Ministry of Commerce works as the main body responsible for regulating 
Saudi firms. It oversees Saudi firms to safeguard the commercial activities and to assure 
the economic agents that firms are complying with national rules. Before the establishment 
of the Capital Market Authority in 2003, the Ministry of Commerce was responsible for 
regulating listed firms. Afterward, this duty was transferred to the Capital Market 
Authority.  
In 1965, The Ministry of Commerce introduced a regulation called the Companies 
Act which governs Saudi firms (Kantor, Roberts, & Salter, 1995). Later in 1982 and 1985, 
the Companies Act was modified extensively (Albassam, 2014). Albassam (2014) states 
that the Companies Act concentrates on board attributes and provides several provisions 
regarding the protection of shareholders while it does not shed a light on disclosure and 
transparency. According to the Companies Act, the determination of board size is left to 
the company’s discretion; however, it must not be less than three directors. The Company 
Act does not specify the classification of directors (e.g. executive, non-executive, or 
independent directors). This is also left to the company’s discretion. The CEO-Chairperson 
duality is allowed. These features are contradictory to the Saudi Corporate Governance 
Code which is discussed in section 2.3. However, Saudi listed firms are obligated to 
comply with both regulations.  
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2.8.2. Capital Market Authority 
 The Capital Market Authority (CMA) was instituted in the middle of 2003. 
Simultaneously, the Capital Market Law was also introduced. The formation of CMA is 
considered the most significant enhancement of the corporate governance reform in Saudi 
Arabia (Hussainey & Al-Nodel, 2008). The CMA has gained complete independence by 
reporting directly to the Prime Minister. This independence provides the CMA with the 
power needed in applying and implementing the corporate governance reforms (Albassam, 
2014). Since its formation, the CMA has enforced several regulatory codes in relation to 
corporate governance practices. For example, the CMA has launched the Market Law and 
the Listing Rules in 2004, the Investment Funds Regulations and the Merger and 
Acquisition Regulations in 2005, the Saudi Corporate Governance Code in 2006, and the 
Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Rules in 2008. The main duties 
of the CMA are as follows: 
▪ “Regulate and develop the capital market and promote appropriate standards and 
techniques for all sections and entities involved in Securities Trade Operations. 
▪ Protect investors and the public from unfair and unsound practices involving fraud, 
deceit, cheating, manipulation, and inside information trading. 
▪ Maintain fairness, efficiency, and transparency in transactions of securities. 
▪ Develop appropriate measures to reduce risks pertaining to transactions of 
securities. 
▪ Develop, regulate, and monitor the issuance of securities and under-trading 
transactions. 
▪ Regulate and monitor the activities of entities working under CMA. 
▪ Regulate and monitor full disclosure of information related to securities and 
issuers” (CMA, n.d.). 
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2.8.3. Saudi Organization for Certified Public Accountants 
(SOCPA)  
Before the establishment of the Saudi Organization for Certified Public 
Accountants (SOCPA) in 1991, the accounting and auditing professions in Saudi Arabia 
were suffering from the absence of an independent body that supervises the profession 
(Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007b). The SOCPA was initiated by the Ministry of Commerce. The 
main objectives of the SOCPA are the following: 
• “Review, develop and approve accounting standards. 
• Review, develop and approve auditing standards. 
• Establish the necessary rules for fellowship certificate examination (CPA exam) including 
professional, practical and scientific aspects of the audit profession and applicable 
regulations. 
• Organize continuous education programs. 
• Establish an appropriate quality review program in order to ensure that Certified Public 
Accountants implement professional standards and comply with the provisions of Certified 
Public Accountants Regulations and relevant by-laws. 
• Conduct special research work and studies covering accounting, auditing, and other 
related subjects. 
• Publish periodicals, books, and bulletins covering accountancy and audit-related subjects. 
• Participate in local and international committees and symposiums relating to the 
profession of accounting and auditing.” (SOCPA, n.d.). 
Alsaeed (2006) states that the quality of accounting and audit companies has been 
improved upon the establishment of the SOCPA. Moreover, the institution of the SOCPA 
results in enhancing investors’ confidence in corporate governance disclosure and the 
reliability of firms` annual reports (Albassam, 2014). 
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2.9. Chapter summary 
This chapter has reviewed the framework of risk disclosure and corporate 
governance in the Saudi context. The present thesis follows the definition suggested by 
Linsley & Shrives (2006, p.3) where they define risk disclosure as “if the reader is 
informed of any opportunity or prospect, or of any hazard, danger, harm, threat, or 
exposure, that has already impacted upon the company or may impact upon the company 
in the future or of the management of any such opportunity prospect, hazard, harm, threat 
or exposure”. This thesis categorized risk to financial, operational and strategic. Regarding 
the nature of risk disclosure, risk sentences are classified as either qualitative or 
quantitative. In terms of the time-frame, risk sentences are divided into historical or 
forward-looking. In terms of the economic sign, risk sentences are classified as good, bad 
or neutral. 
The emphases of the disclosure of risk-related information in Saudi Arabia are 
recent when the updated version of the SCGC is issued in 2017. Article 70 of the revised 
SCGC requires the company's board to establish a risk management committee. Also, 
Article 71 provides a detailed list of the competencies of the risk management committee. 
The SCGC is voluntary in nature and the majority of the provisions are on the basis of 
‘comply or explain’. In 2017, the Capital Market Authority (CMA) has issued a revised 
version of the Saudi Corporate Governance Code (SCGC) with major improvements. The 
revised version states that it is compulsory for firms to comply with all provisions except 
what the code states otherwise. This is considered a remarkable improvement. The updated 
code consists of twelve parts and 98 articles whereas the old code has only five parts and 
19 articles. 
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Chapter 3 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter reviews the previous literature on risk reporting. Specifically, there are 
five main objectives for this chapter. First, this chapter aims to review the key theories of 
risk disclosure. Second, it sheds light on the empirical studies conducted in the developed 
and developing markets. Third, it reviews the impact of corporate governance, ownership 
structure, and Islamic values on risk disclosure. Fourth, it discusses the impact of 
introducing the Loss-Making Firms Procedures (LMFPs) on risk disclosure practices. 
Finally, it provides a theoretical and empirical review relating to the impact of risk 
reporting on the cost of capital. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the key theories of risk 
disclosure. Section 3.3 and section 3.4 review the empirical studies conducted in the 
developed and developing markets respectively. Section 3.5 reviews the hypotheses 
development of the impact of corporate governance, ownership structure, and Islamic 
values on risk disclosure. Section 3.6 discusses the impact of introducing the Loss-Making 
Firms Procedures (LMFPs) on risk disclosure. Section 3.7 discusses the theoretical and 
empirical review relating to the impact of risk reporting on the cost of capital. Section 3.8 
provides a summary of the chapter.  
3.2. Theories of risk disclosure 
Abraham and Shrives (2014) argue that there is no comprehensive theory yet 
explains the determinants of disclosure in a clear way. Instead, prior works on risk 
reporting usually make references to several theories while the link between these theories 
and the variables used is not always addressed clearly. An overview of several theories 
linked to risk disclosure is presented in the following subsections.  
3.2.1. Signaling theory 
The signaling theory has been put forward by Spence (1973) to interpret behaviors 
regarding information asymmetry in the labor market. The theory was also employed to 
enhance our understanding of voluntary disclosure and other accounting and finance 
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puzzles such as corporate dividends policy and capital structure decisions (Morris, 1987). 
It is argued that managerial signaling is a result of the asymmetric information between 
managers and stakeholders (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). The theory illustrates how the 
information asymmetry can be minimized by signaling the informed party to others 
(Morris, 1987). The theory also suggests that firms` insiders are more informed about the 
company than outsiders (Bebchuk & Weisbach, 2010). Thus, investors and other firms` 
outsiders may consider managers` actions as signals (Scott, 2014).  
In the disclosure context, signaling theory suggests that managers who expect their 
firms to perform well in the future would like to signal this to the owners by enhancing 
disclosures with a view to attracting more capital. This suggestion implies that firms with 
limited voluntary disclosure are suspected to be withholding unwanted information 
(Verrecchia, 1983). In fact, when information asymmetry holds, outsiders may not have the 
ability to identify firms with high-quality investments, from firms with lower quality 
investments. As a result, investors may not invest in any listed companies or they may 
offer lower prices for the stocks (Scott, 2014). Hence, highly profitable firms have greater 
incentives to reveal more information to the stock market in order to differentiate 
themselves from other firms and enjoy higher valuation (Campbell, 2001). This 
assumption can be also applied to the disclosure of risk-related information.  This implies 
that firms` managers with excellent risk management performance exhibit increased desire 
to report more detailed risk-related information in order to signal to the market that they 
are professionals at managing their firms` risks rises the stock price (Lev & Penman, 1990; 
Linsley & Shrives, 2006; Shrives & Linsley, 2003; Woods & Reber, 2003). However, 
Morris (1987) argues that when a firm sends to the market incorrect signals, the market 
would penalize the firm since the credibility of the disclosure can be easily recognized 
later. Hence, only qualified firms can use signaling tools.  
The brief review of signaling theory implies that the higher the level of risk 
disclosure, the higher the possibility of managers` signaling. Similar to previous studies 
(e.g. Elshandidy et al. 2013; Elzahar and Hussainey 2012; Mokhtar 2010; Muzahhem 
2011; Rajab and Schachler 2009) that test the implications of signalling theory on risk 
reporting, this study tests this relationship by investigating the correlation between 
corporate risk reporting and different firms` characteristics such as firm profitability and 
firm risk.  
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3.2.2. Agency cost theory 
Agency cost theory is one of the most popular theories in the literature of corporate 
governance. In fact, most of the studies in this context based their arguments on this theory 
(Filatotchev & Boyd, 2009). The agency theory by Jensen and Meckling (1976) implies 
that conflicts can arise between managers and shareholders because of the separation of 
control and ownership of the firm. The theory is based on the assumptions that 
stockholders (principles) and managers (agents) have different interests, and each party has 
an incentive to maximize their own interests (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In theory, 
managers have to try their best to do what is most beneficial to shareholders. Whilst, in 
reality, it is possible that managers would not work for the best benefit of the shareholders 
(Arnold, 2007). In substance, agency theory aims to mitigate the agency costs between 
principles and agents by bringing the interests of managers towards what is beneficial to 
stockholders.  
 Jensen and Meckling (1976) state that the agency problem is inevitable and 
managers will pay the price of this problem. Therefore, managers are encouraged to 
minimize the agency cost to the possible minimum level. Reporting high level of 
information in the annual reports is one of the major techniques that managers can conduct 
in order to minimize the agency costs and to ensure that they are acting in the best interests 
of stockholders (Ness & Mirza, 1991; Watson, Shrives, & Marston, 2002; Watts, 1977). It 
is believed that one of the most important aims of the annual financial reports is to provide 
stockholders with useful information about the firm in order to assist them in monitoring 
agency relationships (Firth, 1980). In fact, the annual corporate report is an efficient way to 
reduce agency costs (DeAngelo, 1981; Depoers, 2000). Hence, the disclosure is considered 
a mechanism that can reduce this agency cost by revealing a larger amount of information 
in financial reports (Marston & Shrives, 1996; Morris, 1987). Reporting a high level of 
information is expected to result in increasing the confidence of stockholders and 
mitigating information asymmetry.  
The link between agency cost and corporate risk disclosure has been explained by 
Linsley and Shrives (2000). They argue that outsiders (e.g. shareholders and stakeholders) 
have little information with regard to firms` risks and how the risks are being tackled. This 
might motivate the owners to monitor the directors` actions in order to confirm that they 
are acting in the best interest of owners. In addition, the owners might put more pressure 
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on managers to produce a higher level of risk-related information. Hence, the executives 
are encouraged to reveal more information including risk and risk management disclosure 
with a view to fulfilling the owners` desires (Linsley & Shrives, 2000). This implies that 
the higher the level of risk reporting, the lower the agency costs.  
In line with prior studies (e.g. Al-shammari, 2014; Domínguez & Gámez, 2014; 
Elshandidy et al., 2013; Elshandidy, Fraser, & Hussainey, 2014; Elzahar & Hussainey, 
2012; Mokhtar, 2010; Muzahhem, 2011; Ntim et al., 2013; Prencipe, 2004; Rajab & 
Schachler, 2009) that investigate the implications of agency theory on corporate risk 
reporting practices, the present study aims to investigate this association through testing 
the relationships between corporate risk disclosure and various firm attributes and 
corporate governance mechanisms such as leverage, audit type, ownership concentration, 
board size, and board independence as proxies for agency cost.   
3.2.3. Capital need theory 
Prior accounting studies (e.g. Alzead 2017, Muzahhem 2011, Rajab 2009, and Abd-
Elsalam and Weetman 2003) have applied capital need theory in order to interpret the 
variation of disclosure between firms. The theory states that firms are motivated to disclose 
voluntarily since they desire to raise capital at a lower cost (Chio, 1973). In fact, disclosing 
more information will enhance transparency and mitigate information asymmetry between 
firms` managers and investors which reduces investors` uncertainty regarding the expected 
future cash flows (Choi, 1973). Hence, the ability of investors to reach informed 
investment decisions is increased which, in turn, results in cheaper capital (Chio, 1973). 
The ease of raising new capital can be enhanced by complying with mandatory disclosure 
and improving voluntary disclosure (Chio, 1973). 
Cooke (1993) finds that listed firms disclose more information than unlisted ones.  
He also discovers that firms listed in multiple markets disclose more information than 
firms listed in one capital market. Based on the notion that one of the motivations for firms 
to be listed is to raise more capital, Cooke`s finding indicates that capital need is one of the 
motivations for firms to engage in voluntary disclosure. Choi (1973) argues that companies 
that engage in voluntary reporting are the ones are listed or going to be listed in the near 
future with a view to enjoying a lower cost of equity capital. Since there are a lot of 
uncertainties and risks engaged by the firms, investors need a higher level of risk 
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disclosure in order to allow them to evaluate the firms` riskiness and to be more accurate 
when forecasting the future cash flows (Foster, 1978). As a result, firms are motivated to 
reveal a higher level of risk-related information which helps them in raising capital at the 
lowest possible cost.  
Alzead (2017), Muzahhem (2011), and  Rajab (2009) employ capital need theory to 
explain the variation of risk reporting between different firms. In line with Muzahhem 
(2011), the present study intends to use firms` liquidity as a proxy for capital need theory. 
Moreover, other proxies are applied. For instance, the current thesis applies capital need 
theory for examining the impact of introducing the Loss-Making Firms Procedures on risk 
disclosure. Also, capital need theory is used to explain the impact of risk disclosure on the 
cost of capital.  
3.2.4. Proprietary cost theory 
The theory states that firms are discouraged to disclose detailed information to the 
public due to the costs associated with disclosing such valuable information that can be 
exploited by competitors (Darrough & Stoughton, 1990; Dye, 1986; Marshall & Weetman, 
2007; Prencipe, 2004; Verrecchia, 1983; Wagenhofer, 1990). Therefore, companies may 
choose to not engage in voluntary disclosure since it might adversely affect their 
competitiveness in the business. For instance, since the petrochemical industry relies on the 
development and research, this leads to a higher level of proprietary cost of disclosure in 
comparison to other industries (Meek, Roberts, & Gray, 1995). 
 It is argued that firms are advised to not report some risk-related information if it 
has a commercial sensitivity (ICAEW, 1997). However, Linsley & Shrives (2005) argue 
that this suggestion may encourage the financial reports` preparers to omit the disclosure of 
risk-related information under the pretext of commercial sensitivity; which results in 
misleading the users of financial reports. In the presence of high level of proprietary cost in 
competitive sectors, investors are less likely to punish the firms for the lack of disclosure 
(Verrecchia, 1983).  
Due to proprietary cost, there would be a gap between the content of risk in internal 
documents and external reports. Hence, managers decide what kind of risk-related 
information to disclose and to what extent. Because of proprietary costs, there is a trade-off 
between the positive and negative consequences of voluntary disclosure. In this regard, the 
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degree of market competition and the challenge of new companies entry to the market is 
expected to play an important role in determining the voluntary disclosure decision 
(Darrough & Stoughton, 1990; Verrecchia, 1983). Previous studies have discovered that 
the level of disclosure varies among industries  (see Haniffa & Cooke 2005; Ahmed & 
Courtis 1999; Stanga 1976). Likewise, several empirical studies find a significant 
difference between industries in terms of risk reporting (e.g. Abraham et al. 2007; Amran 
et al. 2008; Hassan 2009; Lopes and Rodrigues 2007; Rajab and Schachler 2009). 
However, other empirical studies find that the significant difference between sectors with 
regard to risk disclosure does not exist (e.g. Abdallah et al. 2015; Al-shammari 2014; 
Beretta & Bozzolan 2004; Konishi & Ali 2007; Rodríguez Domínguez & Noguera Gámez 
2014; Hernández Madrigal et al. 2015; and Mohd Ali & Taylor 2014). 
 In line with prior studies (Abdallah et al., 2015; S Abraham et al., 2007; Al-
shammari, 2014; Amran et al., 2008; Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Domínguez & Gámez, 
2014; Mostafa Hassan, 2009; Hernández Madrigal et al., 2015; Konishi & Ali, 2007; 
Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007; Mohd Ali & Taylor, 2014; Rajab & Schachler, 2009), the 
present study intends to examine risk reporting differences between Saudi industries as a 
proxy variable where proprietary costs can be tested. 
3.2.5. Political cost theory 
The theory suggests that some firms which are concerned by the public, media, and 
regulators are receiving high pressure (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986) and, therefore, the 
firms` managers decide to reveal voluntary information in order to deflect the unfavorable 
attention (Linsley & Shrives, 2000). In other words, managers have incentives to disclose 
more information in order to mitigate the political cost (Cooke, 1989).  
With regards to risk disclosure, Shrives and Linsley (2003) argue that political cost 
theory can be employed to provide an explanation of risk disclosure practices. For 
instance, they assume when a rail firm has a poor safety system, it is expected to be under 
media and regulators’ pressures. Hence, the directors of the firm might desire to reveal 
more information with regard to traveling risks and precautions taken to eliminate the 
dangers with a view to deflecting the unfavorable attention (Shrives & Linsley, 2003).  
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Firm size has been employed as a proxy for political cost. Because large companies 
have a larger amount of stakeholders and shareholders, those firms are expected to exhibit 
a higher level of political cost (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). Also, larger firms draw higher 
attention of the regulators, public, and media; hence, a higher level of disclosure has the 
potential to mitigate political cost (Linsley & Shrives, 2000). Additionally, Watts & 
Zimmerman (1986) propose an industry type variable as another proxy that can capture the 
validity of political cost theory. The present study aims to employ the two variables (firm 
size and industry type) as proxies for the political cost. Also, this study employs the 
political cost theory to explain the impact of the Loss-Making Firms Procedures on risk 
disclosure. 
3.2.6. Institutional Theory 
The theory argues that managers may have incentives to imitate other firms` 
disclosure because of the difficulty in determining the costs and benefits of disclosure 
(Dillard et al., 2004). Firms usually imitate the disclosure of other firms with a good 
reputation (Abraham & Shrives, 2014). By doing so, firms signal that they have a risk 
management framework which is similar to the industry standard. However, within the 
same industry, different firms are exposed to different kinds of risks in spite of the fact that 
they share common risks factors (Abraham & Shrives, 2014). This is mainly because of the 
differences in firm attributes (e.g. location of the business, the quality of products, the 
range of business activities, etc.). Hence, firms` risk disclosure should reflect the specific 
risk that occurs due to particular firms` characteristics whereas institutional theory suggests 
that companies would not disclose such information since they are just mimicking the 
disclosure of peer firms (Abraham & Shrives, 2014). As a result, firms are likely to 
disclose symbolic and general risk-related information (Abraham & Shrives, 2014). The 
vague disclosure will not be useful to the readers of the annual reports which hinder their 
abilities to assess the risks faced by firms. As a result, disclosures might be ignored in the 
long-run as they are perceived as unhelpful (Abraham & Shrives, 2014). 
“Institutional pressures can drive organizations to engage in routine social actions” 
(Cormier, Magnan, & Velthoven, 2005, p. 13). This suggests that firms` managers are 
reluctant to deviate from general and routine risk disclosure in order to avoid the adverse 
consequences of providing such extra disclosures (Abraham & Shrives, 2014). As a result, 
firms` managers find it more convenient to rely on standardised disclosures. Given that 
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risks are constantly changing, the reliance on standardised static disclosures seems 
unacceptable in the long-term (Abraham & Shrives, 2014). The present study proposes the 
industry type variable as a proxy for institutional theory.  
3.3. Risk disclosure in developed countries 
Most of the empirical works on the level and determinants of risk reporting have been 
conducted in developed contexts (e.g. Abraham & Shrives, 2014; Beretta & Bozzolan, 
2004; Domínguez & Gámez, 2014; Elshandidy et al., 2013, 2014; Elzahar & Hussainey, 
2012; Hernández Madrigal et al., 2015; ICAEW, 1999; Linsley & Shrives, 2006; 
Miihkinen, 2012; Rajab & Schachler, 2009). ICAEW (1999) discusses the disclosure of 
risk-related information of UK firms. ICAEW (1999) argues that the current accounting 
standards and regulation of risk reporting in the UK fulfill shareholders` requirements and, 
hence, the introduction of more regulations with respect to risk disclosure is not needed. 
However, Linsley & Shrives (2006) argue that firms need to disclose further risk-related 
information. 
Linsley and Shrives (2006) investigate the disclosure of risk-related information for a 
sample of 79 UK firms. They find that UK firms disclose 78 risk-related sentences on 
average. They also discover a positive relationship between the level of risk disclosure and 
firm size. Larger firms disclose much more than smaller ones and riskier companies do not 
provide much information regarding their riskiness. Also, the study finds that the 
relationships between risk disclosure and asset cover, beta factor, leverage, and book-to-
market value are insignificant.  
Similarly, Elshandidy, Fraser, and Hussainey (2013) explore the influence of firm risk 
on risk reporting for all UK FTSE non-financial publicly traded firms. They document that 
the levels of systematic, financing risks and risk-adjusted returns are positively related to 
aggregated and voluntary risk reporting. By contrast, the level of stocks return volatility is 
negatively associated with aggregated and voluntary risk disclosure. Generally, they find 
that high-risk companies seem to disclose more voluntary and mandatory risk reporting 
than low-risk firms. Their findings are supportive of the idea that regulators should 
encourage firms rather than mandate them to disclose risk-related information.  
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Elshandidy et al. (2013) also find a positive association between the level of aggregate 
and voluntary risk disclosure and firm size, dividend-yield, outside directors, and efficient 
audit environment. Likewise, Elzahar & Hussainey (2012) discover that company size and 
industry type have significant effects on the level of risk reporting in the interim reports for 
a sample of 72 UK firms. They also report that the mean of total risk disclosure is 28 
sentences. Interestingly, they find that risk disclosure is not affected by the level of 
financial and liquidity risk.  
In like manner, Rajab & Schachler (2009) find that industry type and US dual listing 
are significantly related to risk disclosure. However, they find no significant effect of firm 
size and leverage on risk reporting in a sample of 52 UK firms. They also report that the 
trend of risk disclosure is significantly increasing. The average number of risk-related 
sentences is 70. However, the average numbers of risk-related sentences are 50, 65, and 94 
over the years 1998, 2001, and 2004 respectively. 
Furthermore, Abraham & Shrives (2014) employed institutional theory and proprietary 
cost theory as the main drivers of risk reporting. Their sample is four UK firms from the 
food producers and processors sector. They find that firms` managers have incentives to 
provide general risk-related information rather than revealing detailed risk information that 
is specific to their firms. Moreover, Elshandidy, Fraser, and Hussainey (2014) examine the 
determinants of the variations of mandatory and voluntary risk disclosure across Germany, 
the UK, and the US during the period from 2005 to 2010. They document significant 
variations between companies across these countries. They also find that the variations of 
mandatory and voluntary risk reporting are significantly related to systematic risk, the legal 
system, and cultural value.  
In addition, Konishi and Ali (2007) search for the association between firm-specific 
attributes and the disclosure of risk-related information in the Japanese context. They find 
a positive relationship between the level of risk disclosure and firm size. However, there is 
no significant correlation found between the disclosure of risk-related information and 
capital structure, style of ownership, profitability, industry type, and cross-corporate 
shareholdings. Interestingly, Konishi and Ali (2007) declare that when the Financial 
Service Agency in Japan introduces regulatory guidelines on risk disclosure, the level of 
risk reporting has enhanced dramatically. Similarly, Miihkinen (2012) reports that the 
quantity of risk disclosure increases after the introduction of IFRS among Finnish firms. 
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He also finds significant relationships between risk reporting and profitability, firm size, 
and foreign listing status. In Italy, Beretta & Bozzolan (2004) find that there is no impact 
of industry type and firm size on the quantity of risk disclosure. They also find that Italian 
firms disclose 75 risk-related sentences on average. 
3.4. Risk disclosure in developing countries 
There have been several studies on corporate risk disclosure in the developing 
countries in the recent years such as the GCC (e.g. Abdallah et al. 2015 and Al-shammari 
2014) the UAE (Muzahhem 2011 and Hassan 2009) Malaysia (Mohd Ali & Taylor 2014) 
and South Africa (Ntim et al. 2013). Hassan (2009) studies the relationship between the 
level of risk reporting and firms characteristics of 41 listed firms in the UAE. The findings 
illustrate that leverage is positively associated with risk disclosure. Also, he finds a 
significant variation in the level of disclosure between financial and non-financial firms. 
He also finds that UAE companies disclose 19.6 risk-related sentences on average.  
Moreover, Muzahhem (2011) investigates the disclosure of risk-related information 
for a sample of 48 UAE firms over the years 2007, 2008, and 2009. He finds that the 
average numbers of risk-related sentences are 74, 95 and 120 sentences in 2007, 2008 and 
2009 respectively. For all years, the average is 97 risk-related sentences. The results also 
indicate that the firms do not reveal a full picture of firms` risks which suggests the need 
for further regulatory requirements on risk reporting. The findings also illustrate that risk 
reporting is positively related to firm size, auditor type, and the presence of an audit 
committee. However, CEO duality is negatively associated with risk reporting. 
Additionally, the results show mixed evidence on the relationship between the level of risk 
reporting and liquidity, firm performance, industry type, risk level, board size, independent 
and non-executive directors.  
In addition, Ntim et al. (2013) examine the impact of corporate governance 
mechanisms on risk reporting with a large dataset (500 firm-year observations) during the 
period 2002-2011 in South Africa. They report that the nature of risk-related information 
tends to be more ‘non-financial’, ‘historical’, ‘good news’ and ‘qualitative’. They also 
document that there are negative associations between risk reporting and block-holder 
ownership and institutional ownership. Also, they report that board size, independent non-
executive directors, and board diversity exhibit positive relationships with risk disclosure. 
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However, CEO-duality appears to have no significant association with risk reporting. Their 
findings indicate that South African firms report, on average, 526 risk-related sentences 
which are significantly higher than other findings from other studies. This is mainly 
because their sample contains the largest South African firms in addition to the large 
dataset of their study. They also find a significant improvement in the quantity of risk 
disclosure over time.  
Similarly, Al-shammari (2014) investigates the influence of corporate governance 
on risk disclosure practices in a sample of 109 non-financial Kuwaiti firms in 2012. He 
documents that, on average, Kuwaiti firms report 20 risk-related sentences which are 
considered very limited. He reports that board size is positively related to risk disclosure 
while firms with CEO-duality reveal a lower level of risk disclosure.     
Additionally, Abdallah et al. (2015) examine what determines the disclosure of risk-
related information in a sample of 424 listed companies in the Gulf Cooperation Council 
countries. They divide firms into three categories. The categories are conventional 
financial institutions, Islamic financial institutions, and non-financial firms. As they 
expect, they find Islamic financial institutions disclose less risk information than 
conventional ones. Also, the high quality of corporate governance results in a higher level 
of risk reporting. They also explore that risk reporting vary across the GCC countries in 
spite of the regulatory and cultural similarities.  
Al-Maghzom, Hussainey, & Aly (2016a) examine the effect of corporate governance 
on risk disclosure among Saudi listed banks during the period 2009-2013. They use an 
unweighted index to measure the level of risk disclosure. They find that the average risk 
disclosure among Saudi listed banks is 66%. They report that the main drivers of risk 
reporting in Saudi listed banks are firm size, profitability, gender, and external ownership. 
Al-Maghzom, Hussainey, & Aly (2016b) investigate the level of risk disclosure among 
Saudi listed banks during the period 2009-2013 using a weighted index. Their empirical 
results reveal that Islamic banks disclose a significantly lower level of risk disclosure than 
non-Islamic banks. 
Most recently, Alzead (2017) investigates the practices, determinants, and 
consequences of risk reporting among 88 Saudi listed firms during the period 2010-2014. 
He uses an unweighted index to measure the level of risk disclosure. The findings show 
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that the level of risk disclosure among Saudi listed firms is 17%. The findings also reveal 
that board sized, board independence, and government ownership are negatively and 
significantly associated with risk reporting. On the other hand, Alzead (2017) finds that 
auditor type is positively related to risk disclosure. He also discovers that risk reporting has 
a significant negative relationship with firm value as measured by Tobin Q. 
3.5. Hypothesis development: Determinants of risk disclosure 
3.5.1. Corporate governance mechanisms  
The present study employs various corporate governance variables. The rationale 
for choosing these variables is based of theoretical expectations and empirical findings by 
prior studies which examined the relationship between corporate governance and 
disclosure. Some corporate governance variables have been excluded or replaced with 
other governance variables because of the lack of a theoretical link with risk disclosure, a 
lack of variation, or the unavailability of data. For example, the board leadership structure 
(i.e. CEO duality) has been excluded since the Saudi Corporate Governance Code prohibits 
CEO duality. Also, gender diversity has been excluded because none of the sample firms 
has a gender diverse board. However, the present study employs another diversity variable 
which is the education level of directors. The audit committee variables have been replaced 
with a risk committee variable since the latter is more relevant to risk disclosure. The 
updated Saudi Corporate Governance Code states that one of the responsibilities of the risk 
committee is to prepare detailed reports on the exposure to risks and the recommended 
measures to manage such risks. Also, the audit committee may not have the time, skills, 
and support to assess the firm’s overall risks because of the complexity of modern 
corporations (Field, Lowry & Mkrtchyan, 2013). The   following   subsections   review the 
literature on the chosen corporate governance mechanisms that can affect corporate risk 
disclosure. 
3.5.1.1. Auditor type and risk disclosure 
Although managers are in charge of preparing and producing the annual reports, 
auditors may affect the level of disclosure through their consultations (Firth, 1979). It is 
argued that independent auditors play a vital role in the improvement of firms` annual 
reports especially well-known audit companies (Hail, 2002) in spite of the argument by 
several authors which states that auditors may act in favor of firms` managers who hire 
them, which might make shareholders worse off (see Healy and Palepu 2001).  
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Agency costs theory could be applied to explain the association between risk 
reporting and auditor type. Auditing is considered a monitoring mechanism that mitigates 
the agency costs between agents and shareholders and increases firm value (Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1983). It is also assumed that corporations with high agency costs tend to hire 
well-known audit firms in order to decrease agency costs (Inchausti, 1997). Large audit 
firms are expected to put pressure on their clients to reveal a high level of disclosure since 
the large auditors care more about their reputation (Watts & Zimmerman, 1983). 
Therefore, agency costs theory assumes that risk reporting is positively related to auditor 
type. However, recent auditing scandals (e.g. Arthur Andersen, Parmalat, etc.) do not 
support these theoretical assertions. 
Empirically, Alzead (2017), Ntim, Lindop, and Thomas (2013) and Lopes and 
Rodrigues (2007) find a significant positive relationship between auditor type and the level 
of risk disclosure. However, other empirical studies find the association insignificant (e.g. 
Deumes and Knechel 2008; Neri 2010). Al-shammari (2014) also reports an insignificant 
relationship between auditor type and risk disclosure among banks in the GCC. Similarly, 
Alsaeed (2006) reports an insignificant relationship between audit firm size and voluntary 
corporate disclosure in the Saudi context.  
From the theoretical discussion above, the first hypothesis to be tested is 
formulated as follows: 
H1: There is a significant and positive relationship between auditor type and risk 
disclosure. 
3.5.1.2. Board size and risk disclosure 
Cheng & Courtenay (2006) state that the empirical literature shows mixed findings 
regarding the relationship between board size and voluntary disclosure. The same could be 
applied in the context of risk disclosure (e.g. Al-shammari, 2014; Alzead, 2017; 
Elshandidy et al., 2013; Muzahhem, 2011; Ntim et al., 2013).  
Agency theory could be applied to explain the association between risk reporting 
and board size. Agency theory suggests that a larger board impacts positively on 
disclosure, risk reporting, and performance because of the higher level of monitoring and 
the wider variety of expertise by the larger board (Bozec & Bozec, 2012; Elzahar & 
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Hussainey, 2012; Singh, Mathur, & Gleason, 2004). When there are a larger number of 
members sitting on the board, a greater impact is expected on the managerial monitoring 
activities and control (Healy & Palepu, 2001). Thus, the larger board is expected to result 
in revealing a higher level of reporting in order to mitigate the information asymmetry 
problem (Chen & Jaggi, 2000). This theoretical argument suggests a positive association 
between risk reporting and board size.  
On the other hand, Cheng & Courtenay (2006) argue that the relationship between 
board size and voluntary disclosure is negative since the large board may adversely affect 
the company’s control and monitoring procedure. A smaller board could be more efficient 
regarding the improvement of performance and disclosure (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  It 
is argued that a large board might be worse at disclosing information since the large board 
suffers from free-rider problems between directors, lack of communication and monitoring, 
a longer time for making decisions, and higher costs (Jensen, 1993). 
Empirically, Al-shammari (2014); Elshandidy et al. (2013); Muzahhem (2011); 
Ntim et al. (2013) report a positive association between the level of risk disclosure and 
board size. However, Alzead (2017) reports a significant negative relationship between 
board size and risk disclosure among Saudi listed firms. Similarly, Al-Maghzom (2016) 
reports a negative relationship between board size and risk reporting among Saudi banks. 
However, his finding is not significant.  
Based on the theoretical foundation and the equivocal findings from prior empirical 
studies that show positive and negative relationship between board independence and risk 
disclosure as discussed above, the second hypothesis to be tested is formulated as follows: 
H2a: There is a significant and positive relationship between board size and risk 
disclosure. 
H2b: There is a significant and negative relationship between board size and risk 
disclosure. 
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3.5.1.3. Independent directors and risk disclosure 
In theory, managers have to try their best to do what is most beneficial to shareholders. 
Whilst, in reality, it is possible that managers would not work for the best benefit of the 
shareholders (Arnold, 2007) causing an agency problem. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
define Agency theory as the conflicts that arise between managers and shareholders 
because of the separation of control and ownership of the firm. One of the mechanisms that 
can reduce the agency cost is by appointing independent directors and reducing the 
proportion of executive directors (Abraham & Cox, 2007; Al-Janadi, Rahman, & Haj 
Omar, 2013; J. Solomon, 2007).  
Agency theory suggests that independent directors play an important role in monitoring 
and controlling the managers` behaviors and hence, it is expected that the more 
independent directors on the board, the higher the level of risk disclosure (Lopes & 
Rodrigues, 2007). Independent directors tend to put more pressure on executives to provide 
a higher level of disclosure and transparency since independent directors care about their 
personal reputation (Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007). Therefore, the theoretical argument 
suggests a positive association between corporate risk disclosure and independent 
directors.  
The empirical findings support this view (e.g. Abraham & Cox, 2007; Al-
Maghzom, Hussainey, & Aly, 2016a; Elshandidy et al., 2013; Muzahhem, 2011; Ntim et 
al., 2013) despite the fact that Alzead (2017) finds a negative relationship between board 
independence and risk disclosure. However, Lopes and Rodrigues (2007) report that the 
relationship between risk disclosure and independent directors is insignificant. Based on 
the theoretical foundation and the findings from most empirical studies that show a 
positive relationship between board independence and risk disclosure as discussed above, 
the third hypothesis to be tested is formulated as follows: 
H3: There is a significant and positive relationship between independent directors and risk 
disclosure. 
3.5.1.4. Non-executive directors and risk disclosure 
The proportion of non-executive directors on the board has been a major corporate 
governance variable for examining the impact of corporate governance on risk disclosure  
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(e.g. Abraham & Cox, 2007; Alzead, 2017). One of the mechanisms that can mitigate the 
agency cost is by reducing the proportion of executive directors (Abraham & Cox, 2007; 
Al-Janadi et al., 2013; Solomon, 2007). Decreasing the proportion of executive directors is 
important since it can mitigate the issue of information asymmetry, which in turn, has the 
potential to improve the board effectiveness (Abraham & Cox, 2007; Fama & Jensen, 
1983). In this case, non-executive directors provide the necessary checks and balances 
required to make the board of directors more effective.  
Non-executive directors are perceived to be capable of honouring the obligations of the 
firm and encouraging firms` managers to provide a higher level of transparency and 
voluntary disclosure (Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012). Likewise, Ntim, Lindop, & Thomas 
(2013) suggest that non-executive directors with various experience and knowledge are 
more capable of enhancing the practices of risk disclosure. Further, non-executive directors 
tend to be exposed to higher levels of risk with respect to their personal reputation 
(Oliveira et al., 2011) which encourages them to put higher pressures on managers to 
engage in risk disclosure practices. 
Empirically, Chen & Jaggi (2000); Abraham & Cox (2007); Al-Maghzom et al. 
(2016a); Elshandidy et al. (2013); and Ntim et al. (2013) report a positive relationship 
between non-executive directors and risk disclosure. From the discussion above, the fourth 
hypothesis to be tested is formulated as follows: 
H4: There is a significant and positive relationship between non-executive directors and 
risk disclosure. 
3.5.1.5. Board education and risk disclosure 
It is argued that board members with a higher level of education play a vital role in 
monitoring, consulting, and implicating corporate governance rules (Francis, Hasan, & 
Wu, 2014). Forbes & Milliken (1999) state that the functions of the board of directors can 
be improved by employing academics on board. In this study, board education is calculated 
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as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if there is a board member with a PhD 
certificate and 0 otherwise12.  
The positive relationship between academic directors and risk disclosure is based 
on the theoretical work by Adams & Ferreira (2007) which emphasizes that both the 
monitoring and advising functions of directors are important for board efficiency. The 
hypothesis is also consistent with Fich and Shivdasani (2006) who argue that outside 
directors are not homogenous, and that some kinds of outside directors are better than 
others.  Adams & Ferreira (2007) discover that external board members spend most of 
their time providing advice to executives instead of monitoring them. Therefore, Audretsch 
& Lehmann (2006) state that firms can improve their competitive advantage by employing 
academic directors since firms can benefit from the external knowledge that academics 
have. They also add that academic directors are experts in their fields (e.g. technology, 
law, or business) which increase the efficiency of the board. Academics also look at the 
issues in a different way from non-academics which can bring diverse opinions to the 
board table (Francis et al., 2014). Given the above discussion, the upper echelons theory 
could be applied to explain the association between risk reporting and board education. 
The upper echelons theory is proposed by Hambrick & Mason (1984) where they state that 
organizational outputs are partially predicted by managerial background attributes. Upper 
echelons theory claims that the attributes of firms` directors, including education, can 
influence strategic decision-making. Having highly educated board members, the firm is 
expected to reveal more risk-related information. Martikainen, Miihkinen, Kinnunen, & 
Trober (2015) argue that directors with a higher level of education have more ability to 
report more risk-related information since they are more able to provide critical judgments 
regarding the content of disclosed information. 
Empirically, Jiang & Murphy (2007) find that firms with business professors 
executives perform significantly better than their peers with no academics. Francis et al. 
(2014) discover that the presence of academics on boards is significantly and positively 
related to stock prices informativeness. Regarding risk disclosure, Martikainen et al. (2015) 
find that boards with higher levels of education provide more risk-related information and 
 
12 This measurement is in line with prior studies (e.g.  Jiang & Murphy, 2007 and Francis et al., 2014). This 
measurement is consistent with the arguments proposed in developing the hypothesis which concentrate 
on board members with PhD certificate. 
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the result is statistically significant. Thus, this study hypothesizes a positive relationship 
between the level of board education and risk reporting: 
H5: There is a significant and positive relationship between board education and risk 
disclosure. 
3.5.1.6. Risk management committee and risk disclosure 
It is argued that the existence of a risk committee on the board of director would be 
viewed as a sign of proper risk management and risk reporting (Neri, 2010). Risk reporting 
is considered a fundamental task of risk management systems. Thus, it is expected that 
firms will disclose more risk-related information when there is a risk committee on the 
board. The updated Saudi Corporate Governance Code states that one of the 
responsibilities of the risk committee is “preparing detailed reports on the exposure to 
risks and the recommended measures to manage such risks, and presenting them to the 
Board”13.  
The updated Saudi Corporate Governance Code lists the competences of the risk 
management committee: 
13) developing a strategy and comprehensive policies for risk management that are 
consistent with the nature and volume of the Company's activities, monitoring their 
implementation, and reviewing and updating them based on the Company's internal 
and external changing factors; 
14)  determining and maintaining an acceptable level of risk that may be faced by the 
Company and ensuring that the Company does not go beyond such level; 
15)  Ensuring the feasibility of the Company continuation, the successful continuity of 
its activities and determining the risks that threaten its existence during the 
following twelve (12) months; 
16) overseeing the Company's risk management system and assessing the effectiveness 
of the systems and mechanisms for determining and monitoring the risks that 
threaten the Company in order to determine areas of inadequacy therein; 
 
13 The updated Saudi Corporate Governance Code is issued on 13/02/2017. This updated issue is the first version that 
asserts the importance of appointing a risk committee. However, the appointment of the risk committee is still 
voluntary.  
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17) Regularly reassessing the Company's ability to take risks and be exposed to such 
risks (through stress tests as an example); 
18) preparing detailed reports on the exposure to risks and the recommended measures 
to manage such risks, and presenting them to the Board; 
19) providing recommendations to the Board on matters related to risk management; 
20) ensuring the availability of adequate resources and systems for risk management; 
21) reviewing the organisational structure for risk management and providing 
recommendations regarding the same before approval by the Board; 
22) verifying the independence of the risk management employees from activities that 
may expose the Company to risk; 
23) ensuring that the risk management employees understand the risks threatening the 
Company and seeking to raise awareness of the culture of risk; and 
24) reviewing any issues raised by the audit committee that may affect the Company's 
risk management. 
Stakeholder theory can be employed to explain the relationship between the existence 
of a risk committee and risk disclosure. Freeman (1984) defines stakeholders as individuals 
and groups who can influence or are influenced by firms’ operations. Stakeholder theory 
implies that firms may be keen to have a balance between the interests of different 
stakeholders in order to ensure that each group receives some degree of contentment.  In 
line with this theory, firms may form a risk committee to preserve its stakeholders’ 
interests, which thereby can improve the disclosure of risk-related information. Firms with 
risk committees on the board are more likely to have more information with regards to firm 
riskiness which will be reflected in their disclosure quality. Also, agency theory can 
explain the relationship between the existence of a risk management committee and risk 
disclosure. The Saudi Corporate Governance Code states that the chairperson and majority 
of the risk management committee members shall be non-executive directors. The major 
responsibility of non-executive directors is monitoring the board actions with a view to 
protecting shareholders` interests. Therefore, this study expects that the risk management 
committee will play a vital positive role in risk disclosure practices due to its independence 
and its expertise in relation to managing risk. Since the risk management committee is 
requested by the law to manage risk and report appropriate disclosure to the owners, the 
level of risk disclosure is expected to be higher for firms that have a risk management 
committee (Hassan, Saleh, & Abd-Rahman, 2008).  
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Empirically, Al-Hadi (2015) reports a significant positive relationship between the 
existence of a risk committee and market risk disclosure in the Gulf Cooperation Council 
Countries. Similarly, Hassan et al. (2008) find a significant positive relationship between 
the existence of a risk committee and financial instruments disclosure among Malaysian 
listed firms. 
Therefore, this piece of work hypothesizes a positive relationship between the 
existence of a risk management committee and risk reporting: 
H6: There is a significant and positive relationship between the existence of a risk 
management committee and risk disclosure. 
3.5.2. Ownership structure variables 
3.5.2.1. Government ownership 
The business environment in Saudi Arabia is distinct by ownership concentration by 
the government where the Saudi government owns 42% of the total market value. Ghazali 
& Weetman (2006) argue that government ownership has the potential to encourage firms 
to reveal less information. Capital need theory can be employed to explain the negative 
association between government ownership and risk disclosure. Firms with a higher level 
of government ownership may lose the incentive to disclose more risk-related information 
since they do not have the need for attracting capital.  These firms enjoy easy access to 
various forms of capital (Ghazali & Weetman, 2006). On the other hand, state holding can 
be considered as a monitoring tool which has the potential to influence the level of 
disclosure in firms’ annual reports because of accountability to society (Ghazali & 
Weetman, 2006). 
Empirically, Eng & Mak (2003) report a positive relationship between government 
ownership and voluntary disclosure in Singapore. Ntim et al. (2013) find a positive 
relationship between government ownership and risk disclosure in South Africa. On the 
contrary, Samaha, Dahawy, Hussainey, & Stapleton (2012) discover a significant negative 
association between corporate governance voluntary disclosure and state holdings among 
Egyptian listed firms. Al-Janadi, Rahman, & Haj Omar (2013) report a significant negative 
association between voluntary disclosure and state ownership in Saudi Arabia. Alzead 
(2017) also find a significant negative relationship between risk disclosure and government 
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ownership in Saudi Arabia. Through an analysis of the existing literature, the study 
develops the following hypothesis: 
H7: There is a significant and negative relationship between government ownership and 
risk disclosure. 
3.5.2.2. Institutional ownership 
Institutional investors have a higher ability for monitoring companies since they are 
acquiring the required resources such as efficiency, experience, and robust employment of 
voting rights (Donnelly & Mulcahy, 2008). They are motivated to protect their investment 
which, in turn, encourages them to monitors management in order to mitigate the agency 
conflict between owners and executives (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). Hence, firms are 
encouraged to reveal more risk-related information to fulfill the pressure imposed by 
institutional investors. Empirically, Guan, Sheu, & Chu (2007); Healy, Hutton, & Palepu 
(1999); Khan (2016); Laidroo (2009); and Ntim, Opong, Danbolt, & Thomas (2012) find a 
significant positive relationship between institutional ownership and disclosure. On the 
other hand, Schadewitz & Blevins (1998) discover that interim disclosure is negatively and 
significantly related to institutional holdings in Finland.  
Based on the theoretical foundation and the findings of previous studies (e.g. Guan 
et al., 2007; Healy et al., 1999; Khan, 2016; Laidroo, 2009; Ntim et al., 2012), the eighth 
hypothesis to be tested is formulated as follows: 
H8: There is a significant and positive relationship between institutional ownership and 
risk disclosure. 
3.5.2.3. Inside ownership 
Inside ownership is the proportion of stocks owned by executive directors. It is 
argued that inside ownership is an important factor affecting firms` disclosure policy 
(Khlif, Ahmed, & Souissi, 2016). Agency theory suggests a possible conflict of interest 
between insiders and externals because of the separation between ownership and control. 
However, it is believed that inside ownership has the possibility to align the interests of 
insiders with the interests of external shareholders (Ghazali & Weetman, 2006; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Hence, insiders might be discouraged to violate the interest of external 
owners and they may have a long-term interest in the firm  (Khlif et al., 2016). This 
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theoretical assumption suggests that insider ownership is positively related to risk 
disclosure. On the other hand, McConnell & Servaes (1990) argue that insiders might use 
inside information to maximize their own wealth which makes the external owners worse 
off. Similarly, Shleifer & Vishny (1997) argue that if directors` ownership is large, they 
might have incentives to maximize their own interest by lowering the level of 
transparency. 
  Chow (1982, p.274) states that ‘the degree of conflicts between the manager and 
the firm’s shareholders and thus the amount of potential wealth transfer, increase inversely 
with the managers’ ownership’. This implies that lower inside ownership requires more 
monitoring activities (Mokhtar, 2010). Therefore, firms with a low level of inside 
ownership are expected to reveal more risk disclosure in order to assure outsiders that they 
are working in the best interest of them (Mokhtar, 2010). This theoretical argument 
proposes that insider ownership is negatively related to risk disclosure.   
Empirically, and consistent with agency theory, Eng & Mak (2003); Ghazali & 
Weetman (2006); and Hussainey & Al‐Najjar (2012) report that disclosure is significantly 
and negatively related to inside ownership. However, Al-Maghzom et al. (2016a); and 
Guan et al. (2007) find that the relationship is insignificant. From the discussion above, the 
ninth hypothesis to be tested is formulated as follows: 
H9: There is a significant and negative relationship between inside ownership and risk 
disclosure. 
3.5.2.4. Block ownership 
It is assumed that governance mechanisms and ownership structure are of 
importance in determining the level of risk disclosure since directors and shareholders are 
responsible in preparing the firms` annual reports (Abraham & Cox, 2007). Agency costs 
theory could be applied to explain the correlation between ownership concentration and 
risk reporting. Firms with dispersed ownership experience higher degree of agency 
problem because of the separation between ownership and control which motivates 
shareholders to put more pressure on managers to reveal a higher level of risk disclosure 
(Muzahhem, 2011). On the other hand, companies with concentrated ownership do not 
experience a separation between ownership and control. In fact, owners do not depend on 
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public disclosure to monitor managers since they have access to internal information. 
Therefore, agency theory suggests that ownership concentration is negatively associated 
with risk reporting. 
 Ntim, Lindop, and Thomas (2013) find a significant negative association between 
risk reporting and ownership concentration in South Africa. Deumes and Knechel (2008) 
discover a negative relationship between ownership concentration and internal control 
disclosure. However, Konishi and Ali (2007) and Mohobbot (2005) find no significant 
relationship between risk reporting and ownership concentration. From the discussion 
above, the tenth hypothesis to be tested is formulated as follows: 
H10: There is a significant and negative relationship between block ownership and risk 
disclosure. 
3.5.3. Islamic values and risk disclosure 
Saudi Arabia is considered the provenance of Islam since the two holy mosques 
(Mecca and Medina) are located within its land. The kings of Saudi Arabia are titled as the 
Custodians of the Two Holy Mosques. Islam is the official religion of Saudi Arabia. 
Therefore, most of the administrative regulations of the country emanate from Islamic law 
(Sharia) (Al-Shamrani, 2014) resulting in a substantial influence of Islamic values on 
corporate governance practices (Safieddine, 2009). One of the research`s objectives is to 
explore the impact of Islamic values on risk disclosure practices in a major Islamic context. 
Muslims are guided by Sharia to practice every aspect of their lives including business in 
certain manners which has an impact on the decision making (Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009) since 
Sharia considers this as a form of worship (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007a) in contrast to some 
other societies where business is separate from religion (Aribi & Gao, 2011). Also, Sharia 
emphasizes that Muslims are required to be truthful, honest, and careful of others at any 
time especially the time of business transactions (Ayub, 2007). For instance, the Holy 
Prophet says: “The truthful and honest merchant shall be with the Prophets, the truthful 
and the martyrs on the day of Resurrection.” Furthermore, Prophet Muhammad encourages 
the disclosure of all characteristics of traded commodities in which traders receive 
sufficient information about commodities and their prices in the market. For example, the 
Holy Prophet says: “The townsman should not sell for a man from the desert” (with a view 
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to taking advantage of his ignorance of the market conditions of the city).14 The holy 
prophet also says “It is not lawful for a Muslim to sell to his brother something defective 
without pointing out the defect”15. In addition, Prophet Muhammad says “O Allah, I seek 
refuge with you from all sins, and from being in debt.” Someone said: “O Allah’s Apostle! 
You very often seek refuge with Allah from being in debt”. He replied: “If a person is in 
debt, he tells lies when he speaks, and breaks his promise when he promises.”16 However, 
This does not mean that being in debt is forbidden; the emphasis in this Hadith is on being 
honest and telling the truth (Ayub, 2007). 
Additionally, Gharar (deceptive uncertainty) is forbidden in Islam and any contract 
that contains Gharar is invalid (Al-Saati, 2003). The main reason for prohibiting Gharar is 
because it involves a high level of Jahala (Ignorance). Likewise, Ayub (2007) states 
“Ghubn which means misappropriation or defrauding others in respect of specifications of 
the goods and their prices, is prohibited with the purpose of ensuring that the seller gives 
the commodity as per its known and apparent characteristics and charges the fair price.” 
It is also reported by Abu Hurayra that: 
The Holy Prophet once passed by a man who was selling grain. He asked him: 
“How are you selling it?” The man then informed him. The Prophet then put his hand in 
the heap of grain and found it wet inside. Then he said: “He who deceives other people is 
not one of us.”17 
The previous Hadith explains how Sharia confirms the need for the disclosure of 
relevant information and forbids such practices that might hide information about the 
quality and value of the goods to the other party since Sharia considers keeping silent and 
not telling the buyer any defect that is known by the seller as dishonesty (Ayub, 2007).  
Therefore, it is predicted that Islamic corporations would manage their activities in 
compliance with the principles of Sharia in order to be honest and fair (Hussain, 1999) 
cited by (Aribi & Gao, 2011) and to make transparent, true, fair, and timely disclosure to 
stakeholders (Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009; Albassam & Ntim, 2016) including the disclosure of 
 
14 Narrated by Imam Muslim in Sahih Muslim Book 10, Number 3628 
15 Narrated by Alhakim in Almostadrak 
16 Narrated by Imam Al-Bukhari in Sahih Al-Bikhari Volume1, Book12, Hadith795 
17 Abu Dawud, Sunan Abu Dawud, Kitab al-Ijarah Vol.2. p.982 
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risk-related information. Hence, the current study expects to find a positive relationship 
between Islamic values and risk disclosure among Saudi listed firms. 
Empirically, Albassam & Ntim (2016) study the effect of Islamic values on 
corporate governance disclosure using a sample of 76 Saudi listed firms over seven years. 
They find a robust significant influence of Islamic values over corporate governance 
disclosure. On the other hand, Al-Maghzom et al. (2016b) find that Islamic banks disclose 
a significantly lower level of risk disclosure than non-Islamic banks in Saudi Arabia.  
From the discussion above, the eleventh hypothesis to be tested is formulated as follows: 
H11: There is a significant and positive relationship between Islamic values and risk 
disclosure. 
3.5.4. Control variables 
3.5.4.1. Firm size and risk disclosure 
Firm size has been employed in the literature as a determinant of risk disclosure. 
Existing theories can explain the relationship between company size and the disclosure of 
risk-related information. For instance, Shrives and Linsley (2003) argue that political cost 
theory can be employed to provide an explanation of risk disclosure practices. Political 
cost theory suggests that some firms with higher concern by the public, media, and 
regulators are receiving high pressure (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986) and, therefore, the 
firms` managers decide to reveal voluntary information in order to deflect the unfavorable 
attention (Linsley & Shrives, 2000). Since large firms have a larger amount of stakeholders 
and shareholders, the political cost is expected to be higher in larger firms (Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1986). Also, larger firms draw a higher level of attention of the regulators, 
public, and media (Linsley & Shrives, 2000). Managers have the incentive to disclose more 
information in order to mitigate the political cost (Cooke, 1989). Therefore, larger firms` 
managers have the incentive to disclose more risk-related information since the political 
cost is higher for them. Hence, we expect that risk disclosure is positively related to firm 
size in accordance with the political cost theory.  
In addition, the association between firm size and corporate risk disclosure can be 
interpreted by information asymmetry between managers and shareholders. Investors 
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demand a high level of information; however, managers may not provide such information 
because of the costs associated with preparing, auditing, and publishing risk-related 
information. In this regards, there are two factors encourage large companies to produce a 
higher level of risk-related information. First, the operations of large firms are wider and 
more complex resulting in a high level of risk which leads to more risk disclosure since 
they have more information to reveal (Abraham & Cox, 2007). Second, larger companies 
tend to have lower costs of preparing, auditing and publishing information which 
encourage them to produce a larger amount of risk-related information (Mostafa Hassan, 
2009; Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007; Muzahhem, 2011). Hence, information asymmetry 
suggests a positive relationship between risk disclosure and firm size. 
Empirically, Abdallah et al. (2015); Al-shammari (2014); Amran, Bin, and Hassan 
(2008); Elshandidy et al. (2013), (2014); Linsley and Shrives (2005); Miihkinen (2012); 
Mohobbot (2005); Ntim, Lindop, and Thomas (2013) find a significant positive 
relationship between company size and risk disclosure which is in line with the theoretical 
expectations.  
3.5.4.2. Profitability and risk disclosure 
The signaling theory could be applied to explain the association between risk 
reporting and profitability. It could be assumed that managers of highly profitable firms 
have the incentive to disclose more information as a good signal with a view to attracting 
investors. High profitable firms` directors would be willing to disclose more detailed risk-
related information in order to signal to the market that they are professionals at managing 
their firms` risks (Konishi & Ali, 2007; Shrives & Linsley, 2003). In light of signaling 
theory, the correlation between the disclosure of risk-related information and profitability 
is expected to be positive.  
Empirically, Ntim et al. (2013) and Deumes and Knechel (2008) report a positive 
association between risk disclosure and profitability, whereas Alzead (2017) Elshandidy et 
al. (2014), Miihkinen (2012), and Neri (2010) find a negative relationship. However, other 
studies find this relationship insignificant (e.g. Al-shammari 2014; Elshandidy et al. 2013; 
Konishi and Ali 2007; Mohobbot 2005).  
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3.5.4.3. Liquidity and risk disclosure 
The association between risk reporting and liquidity could be explained by capital 
need theory. Liquidity represents the financial ability of a firm to meet its short-term 
obligations. Therefore, debtholders, shareholders, and stakeholders are concerned 
regarding firms` liquidity ratios. It could be argued that when a firm experiences a shortage 
of liquidity, managers would be willing to disclose more risk-related information in order 
to attract investors and meet their needs by providing a higher level of transparency. As a 
result, managers can raise more funds and overcome liquidity shortages issues. Thus, 
capital need theory suggests a negative relationship between liquidity and risk reporting. 
When a firm suffers from a shortage of liquidity, the firm`s managers would have 
incentives to disclose more risk-related information in order to overcome the shortage of 
fund.  
There is a lack of empirical evidence in the literature regarding the association 
between risk reporting and liquidity. However, Muzahhem (2011) finds a mixed result for 
the relationship between liquidity and risk disclosure in the UAE context using different 
regression methods.  
3.5.4.4. Firm risk and risk disclosure 
Leverage is used as a proxy for firm risk in the risk disclosure literature (e.g. Al-
shammari, 2014; Elshandidy et al., 2013; Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012; Hernández Madrigal 
et al., 2015; Linsley & Shrives, 2006; Muzahhem, 2011; Rajab & Schachler, 2009; 
Rodríguez Domínguez & Noguera Gámez, 2014; Semper & Beltrán, 2014). 
It is argued that a higher level of debt results in lowering the agency problem 
between managers and shareholders. Having more debt is beneficial in reducing the agency 
cost of free cash flow (Jensen, 1986). The agency cost of free cash flow arises when the 
firm holds and generates substantial cash flows available for spending at the discretion of 
managers. Firms` managers may have the incentive to reveal more risk-related information 
in order to mitigate the cost of monitoring by shareholders. In the same vein, a higher level 
of debt would lead to agency costs between equity holders and debtholders since the later 
would be disadvantaged when the firm invests in risky projects (Lopes & Rodrigues, 
2007). Therefore, it could be argued that risky firms` managers have the incentive to reveal 
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more information with a view to mitigating the agency cost (Linsley & Shrives, 2006). 
Hence, it is suggested that firm risk is positively related to risk disclosure.  
In terms of signaling theory, Linsley and Shrives (2006) and Shrives and Linsley 
(2003) assume that when a firm is risky, managers would have the incentive to provide a 
high volume of information with a view to signaling to investors and other stakeholders 
that they are professionals at managing the risks. Thus, this argument also suggests a 
positive relationship between firm risk and risk disclosure.  
On the other hand, Mohobbot (2005) argues that some firms may not choose to 
disclose detailed risk-related information since they do not want to draw the attention to 
their risks, so investors do not consider them high risky firms. In other words, managers 
may prefer to hide the firms` risk (i.e. Enron, Global Crossing, etc.). However, because the 
credibility of the disclosure can be easily recognized later, the market would penalize the 
company if the company send incorrect signals to the market (Morris 1987). Hence, only 
qualified firms can use signaling tools.  
Empirically, Ntim, Lindop, and Thomas (2013) and Miihkinen (2012) find a negative 
association between leverage and risk reporting which supports the argument of Mohobbot 
(2005). However, other prior studies find the relationship between firm risk and risk 
disclosure to be either significantly  positive (e.g. Abdallah et al., 2015; Abraham & Cox, 
2007; Deumes & Knechel, 2008; Elshandidy et al., 2014; Hassan et al., 2008; Mostafa 
Hassan, 2009) or insignificant (e.g. Abraham & Cox, 2007; Al-shammari, 2014; Amran et 
al., 2008; Konishi & Ali, 2007; Linsley & Shrives, 2005; Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007; Rajab 
& Schachler, 2009). In addition, Ntim et al. (2013) discover a positive relationship 
between risk disclosure and firm risk measured as the standard deviation of operating 
profits.  
3.5.4.5. Total disclosure 
This study argues that firms may disclose more about risk because they are good at 
disclosure in general. Hence, adding this variable to the model has the potential to control 
for this effect. Thus, the present study isolates the effect of the tendency of disclosure 
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practices from the specific disclosure on risks18. This is considered a significant 
improvement over previous works in disclosure studies. The current study employs the 
number of pages variable (LogPages, measured by the log of the total number of pages in 
the annual report) in order to control for total disclosure. 
3.5.4.6. Industry type and risk disclosure 
Firms in various sectors face different kinds of risks such as the degree of 
competition, regulation, and technological development. Therefore, these different 
environmental factors are expected to have significant impacts on firms` risks (Beretta & 
Bozzolan, 2004; Mostafa Hassan, 2009). Political costs theory could be applied to explain 
the correlation between industry type and risk disclosure. Political cost theory suggests that 
some firms which are concerned by the public, media, and regulators are receiving high 
pressure (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986) and, therefore, the firms` managers decide to reveal 
voluntary information in order to deflect the unfavorable attention (Linsley & Shrives, 
2000). Firms` managers operating in industries concern the public, media, and regulators 
might have the incentive to provide detailed risk information in order to deflect the 
unfavorable attention. Hence, risk disclosure is expected to vary between industries. 
Furthermore, the association between industry type and corporate risk disclosure 
can be also interpreted by institutional theory. The theory argues that managers imitate 
other firms` disclosure especially firms with a good reputation (Dillard et al., 2004). By 
doing so, firms signal that they have a risk management framework which is similar to the 
industry standard. Hence, firms` managers may choose to imitate the disclosure practices 
similar to other companies in the same industry regardless of the importance of the 
information provided which may result in significant variation among different industries 
(Hassan, 2009). 
In addition, the association between risk reporting and industry type could be 
explained by proprietary costs theory. The theory states that firms are discouraged to 
disclose detailed information to the public due to the costs associated with disclosing such 
valuable information that can be exploited by competitors (Darrough & Stoughton, 1990; 
 
18 Previous studies investigate risk disclosure without taking into account the variation of disclosure practices 
between firms. As a result, risk disclosure in these studies might be just a proxy for total disclosure. To 
overcome this issue, the present study adds total disclosure as a control variable in order to take into 
account the variation of disclosure practices between firms when investigating risk-related disclosure.    
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Dye, 1986; Marshall & Weetman, 2007; Prencipe, 2004; Verrecchia, 1983; Wagenhofer, 
1990). Therefore, companies may choose to not engage in voluntary disclosure since it 
might affect their competitiveness in the business. Verrecchia (2001) states that the 
proprietary costs of disclosure differ between industries. The high degree of competition in 
the industry may discourage directors to provide valuable risk-related information. 
Empirically, Abraham et al. (2007); Amran et al. (2008); Hassan (2009); Lopes and 
Rodrigues (2007); Rajab and Schachler (2009) find a significant relationship between 
industry type and corporate risk disclosure; whereas Abdallah et al. (2015), Al-shammari 
(2014), Beretta & Bozzolan (2004), Konishi & Ali (2007), Rodríguez Domínguez & 
Noguera Gámez (2014), Hernández Madrigal et al. (2015), and Mohd Ali & Taylor (2014) 
find the relationship insignificant. The present study aims to test whether there are 
significant differences in the level of risk disclosure between industries using a One-way 
ANOVA test which is discussed in section 4.4.2.4. Hence, the seventeenth hypothesis to be 
tested is formulated as follows: 
H12: There is a significant difference between the levels of risk disclosure among 
industries. 
3.6. The impact of the Loss-Making Firms Procedures (LMFPs) on 
risk disclosure 
In mid-2014, the Saudi Capital Market Authority introduced new procedures (i.e. 
the Loss-Making Firms Procedures) that apply to loss-making firms. Loss-making firms 
are firms with cumulative losses. According to the procedures` draft, the definition of 
cumulative losses is the sum of previous losses plus the losses of the current period. The 
cumulative losses are shown in a separate item under shareholders` equity in the financial 
statements as can be seen in Appendix 3.  
It is crucial to study the effect of introducing the procedures on risk disclosure 
practices for two reasons. First, the results will shed light on the effectiveness of the 
procedures given that other capital markets regulators may apply the same procedures once 
they are proven to be effective. For instance, Abu Dhabi Global Market announces that 
they will introduce some precautionary procedures for loss-making firms (Almanshawi, 
2018). Second, the results will investigate the exogenous impact of corporate governance 
on risk disclosure given that the current empirical literature may suffer from endogeneity. 
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It is argued that empirical results can be seriously influenced by endogeneity (Larcker & 
Rusticus, 2010). Hence, this research question has major applied and theoretical 
contributions. 
The procedures include several provisions. For instance, the board of director is 
required to create a plan and establish a new committee to implement the plan in order to 
mitigate firms` losses. The company is also required by the law to update and evaluate in 
details the progress of the implementation of the plan quarterly. In addition, the firm 
should disclose its expectation regarding the forward performance for the coming four 
quarters. The Saudi Capital Market Authority creates a flag next to the firm’s symbol on 
the exchange platform in order to draw the investors` attention that the company has 
accumulated losses. 
The procedures aim to put pressures on the boards of directors in order to improve 
the financial performance of their firms. It can be argued that the new procedures should 
also improve the corporate governance practices among Loss-Making firms. It should be 
noted that the procedures are irrelevant to the risk disclosure practices. Hence, the 
enforcement of the Loss-Making Firms Procedures can be considered a corporate 
governance mechanism that is exogenous to risk disclosure. Since the LMFPs are 
introduced in mid-2014, and the period of this study is 2012-2015, this enables this study 
to investigate the impact of the new procedures (LMFPs) on risk disclosure two years 
before the introduction of the procedures and two years afterward.  
 Political cost theory could be applied to explain the impact of the introduction of 
the LMFPs on risk disclosure practices. Upon the enforcement of the procedures, one 
would assume that unfavorable attentions have been paid to loss-making firms. Figure 3.1 
shows that the level of interest of the phrase “Loss-Making Firms” generated by Google 
Trends is the highest at the time of introducing the LMFPs on 21/06/2014. Additionally, 
the flags that have been put next to the loss-making firms` symbols on the exchange 
platform are also expected to draw the investors` attention. To deflect such undesirable 
attention, managers of such firms might disclose more risk-related information. Cooke 
(1989) claims that managers tend to disclose more information in order to mitigate the 
political cost. Firms` directors decide to reveal voluntary information with a view to 
deflecting the unfavorable attention (Linsley & Shrives, 2000). Thus, the present study 
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hypothesizes that loss-making firms disclose a higher level of risk-related information after 
the introduction of the Loss-Making Firms Procedures.  
Figure 3.1: The level of interest of the phrase: “Loss-Making Firms” 
Note: The figure shows the level of interest of the phrase: “Loss-Making Firms” generated by Google Trends. The 
keywords are in Arabic and the search is limited within the region of Saudi Arabia. The level of interest is an index where 
the value 100 represents the peak of interest. 
 
Other theories could also be applied to explain the effect of the introduction of the 
LMFPs on risk disclosure practices such as pecking order and capital need theories. 
Pecking order theory has been proposed by Donaldson (1961) and developed by Myers and 
Majluf (1984) in the purpose of interpreting firms` financing decisions. It states that firms 
prioritize to finance their operations by retained profits, debts, and lastly by issuing equity. 
This implies that, on average, profitable firms do not need to issue debt or equity since they 
can be financed internally. This also implies that loss-making firms are in need to issue 
debt and/or equity due to the scarce internal financing. Therefore, loss-making firms` 
managers may have incentives to engage in risk disclosure in order to raise capital.  
Capital need theory states that firms are motivated to disclose voluntarily since they 
desire to raise capital at a lower cost (Abd-Elsalam & Weetman, 2003; Craven & Marston, 
1999; Rajab, 2009). Hence, when a firm is not profitable, the firm might need to issue debt 
and/or equity in order to finance the operations. As a result, the firm`s directors would 
have the incentive to disclose more risk-related information in order to attract investors and 
raise capital at the lowest possible cost.  
From the discussion above, the eighteenth hypothesis to be tested is formulated as follows: 
H13: There is a significant and positive relationship between risk disclosure and loss-
making firms after the introduction of the Loss-Making Firms Procedures.   
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3.7. The impact of risk reporting on the cost of capital 
The fourth main issue of this study is to investigate the influence of risk disclosure 
on the cost of capital of sampled firms. The notion here is that when a firm discloses less 
risk-related information in its annual report, the financers would face more difficulties in 
predicting future cash flows. As a result, the financers ask for a higher rate of return 
because of the increased information risk. In other words, firms with a low level of risk 
disclosure (high information risk or uncertainty) are expected to have a higher cost of 
capital. Botosan (1997), Diamond and Verrecchia (1991), Healy and Palepu (2001), and 
Kim and Verrecchia (1994) argue that a higher level of disclosure leads to less uncertainty 
and, in turn, low estimation risk which results in lowering the cost of capital. In other 
words, providing a managerial perspective on the risks faced by the firm has the potential 
to reduce the cost of capital by lowering the level of uncertainty. This suggests a negative 
association between the level of disclosure and the cost of equity.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) state that one of the mechanisms for firms to mitigate 
investors’ uncertainties and information asymmetry is by applying good corporate 
governance principles. Any mitigation in information asymmetry would result in lowering 
the agency cost and the cost of equity by providing fair opportunities to small and large 
stockholders in obtaining information (Morris, 1987).  
When information asymmetry prevails, firms that are considered riskier would pay 
a higher rate of interest on debts and would have a lower valuation for their stocks. 
Additionally, capital providers would put a higher risk premium which raises the cost of 
capital. Thus, the theoretical review suggests a negative relationship between risk 
disclosure and the cost of capital. However, it is hard to determine the precise effect of risk 
reporting on the cost of capital (ICAEW, 1997) because these two variables cannot be 
observed straightway (Hail, 2002). Nevertheless, Botosan (1997) declares that there are 
two distinct streams of research that theoretically support the negative correlation between 
disclosure and cost of equity. The first line of research suggests that firms increase the 
level of disclosure in order to increase the share market liquidity by motivating potential 
investors to buy the firms` stocks (e.g. Amihud and Mendelson 1986; Copeland and Galai 
1983; Demsetz 1968; Diamond and Verrecchia 1991; Glosten and Milgrom 1985) cited by 
Botosan (1997). For instance, Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) claim that providing more 
information to the market would raise the incentives of investors to buy the firms` shares. 
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As a consequence, the stock liquidity would be increased resulting in less information 
asymmetry and, in turn, lower cost of equity (Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991). Similarly, 
Bloomfield and Wilks (2000) find that greater disclosure motivates investors to pay a high 
price which results in lowering the cost of equity and increasing the stock liquidity.  
The second line of research proposes that higher quality of disclosure minimizes 
the cost of capital through mitigating information risk or estimation risk (e.g. Barry and 
Brown 1985; Clarkson, Guedes, and Thompson 1996; Coles, Loewenstein, and Suay 1995; 
Coles and Loewenstein 1988; Handa and Linn 1993; Klein and Bawa 1976) cited by 
Botosan (1997). This means investors demand compensation for the additional risk when 
there is a high level of uncertainty regarding the “true” parameters resulting from the lack 
of information (Botosan, 1997). When executives report a high level of information, the 
information risk is reduced and hence, investors demand a lower rate of return (lower cost 
of capital) (Healy & Palepu, 2001). 
Other theories can also explain the proposed negative association between risk 
reporting and cost of capital such as pecking order and capital need theories. As discussed 
in the previous section, pecking order theory has been proposed by Donaldson (1961) and 
developed by Myers and Majluf (1984) in the purpose of explaining firms` financing 
decisions. It is a well-established theory in the literature on capital structure. It states that 
firms prioritize to finance their operations by retained profits, debts, and lastly by issuing 
equity. This implies that firms` managers may have the incentive to engage in risk 
disclosure just as they need to raise capital. In the same vein, capital need theory states that 
firms are encouraged to disclose voluntarily when they desire to raise capital at a lower 
cost (Abd-Elsalam & Weetman, 2003; Craven & Marston, 1999; Rajab, 2009). Hence, 
when firms experience shortages of liquidity, firms` directors would have the incentive to 
disclose more risk-related information in order to attract investors and raise capital at a 
lower possible cost. The above arguments suggest a negative relationship between risk 
disclosure and cost of capital. 
Empirically, Botosan (1997) finds a negative association between the level of 
disclosure and the cost of equity. Hail (2002) discovers a negative association between the 
level of disclosure and the cost of capital. Sengupta (1998) finds that disclosure is 
negatively related to the cost of debt. With regards to risk disclosure literature, there are, to 
the best of my knowledge, only two studies that investigate the impact of risk reporting on 
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the cost of equity. The first study is conducted by Semper and Beltrán (2014) in Spain. 
Their findings indicate that there is no significant relationship between risk reporting and 
the cost of equity. However, financial risk disclosure is found to be significantly and 
positively related to the cost of equity. This is in contrast to what is expected theoretically. 
The other study is a PhD thesis conducted by Rajab (2009) in the UK. He finds that there is 
no significant association between risk reporting and the cost of equity. 
From the discussion above, the nineteenth hypothesis to be tested is formulated as follows: 
H14: There is a significant and negative relationship between and risk disclosure 
and cost of capital. 
3.8. Chapter summary 
This chapter reviewed the previous literature on risk reporting. The key theories of 
risk disclosure have been discussed thoroughly (e.g. signaling theory, agency theory, 
proprietary cost theory, capital need theory, political cost theory, and institutional theory). 
The empirical studies conducted in the developed and developing markets have been 
reviewed. The determinants of risk disclosure are divided into four groups: (i) corporate 
governance mechanisms; (ii) ownership structure variables; and (iii) Islamic values. The 
reason for selecting these variables is based on prior research that explored the relationship 
between corporate governance and disclosure. The present study hypothesized that auditor 
type, board size, independent directors, non-executive directors, board education, risk 
management committee, institutional ownership, and Islamic values are significantly and 
positively related to risk disclosure. On the other hand, the present study hypothesized that 
government ownership, inside ownership, and block ownership are significantly and 
negatively related to risk disclosure. The current study expects that the introduction of the 
Loss-Making Firms Procedures (LMFPs) has a significantly positive relationship with risk 
disclosure. The theoretical and empirical review relating to the impact of risk reporting on 
the cost of capital has been also discussed. The present study hypothesized that risk 
disclosure has a significantly negative impact on the cost of capital. 
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Chapter 4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter discusses the sample and population for this study in addition to the 
specification of the empirical models used in the study. It also discusses the sensitivity 
analyses that are used. There are five sections in this chapter: Section 4.2 addresses the 
data collection process which includes the choice of the study`s sample and the source of 
risk disclosure, while section 4.3 discusses the descriptive statistics of the level of risk 
disclosure. Section 4.4 presents the research model of the impact of corporate governance, 
ownership structure, and Islamic values on risk disclosure. Section 4.5 presents the 
research model of the impact of Loss-Making Firms Procedures on risk disclosure. Section 
4.6 presents the research model of the impact of risk disclosure on the cost of capital. 
Finally, section 4.7 presents the summary of the chapter.  
4.2. Data Collection 
4.2.1. Sample and population of the study 
By the end of 2015, there were 173 listed firms on the Saudi Stock Exchange. 
Following Abraham & Cox (2007), Beretta & Bozzolan (2004), Elzahar & Hussainey 
(2012), Linsley & Shrives (2005 and 2006) financial firms (e.g. bank and insurance) are 
excluded from the sample because they operate differently from non-financial firms and 
they are exposed to different types of risk due to their diverse regulations (Linsley & 
Shrives 2005; 2006). The different rules for regulating financial firms are expected to 
result in significant differences in risk disclosure practices between financial and non-
financial firms. For instance, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) requires Saudi 
banks to comply with the requirements of Basel III and International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS). These regulations require financial firms to disclose risk-related 
information. Therefore, the compliance with these regulations is expected to result in a 
higher level of risk reporting given that non-financial firms are only required to comply 
with the Saudi Accounting Standards. Additionally, the operations of financial firms differ 
from the operations of non-financial firms which will result in the exposure to different 
types of risks (Muzahhem, 2011). The main product of banks is cash, while the products of 
non-financial firms would be goods or services such as books, food, tourism, etc. 
(Muzahhem, 2011).  Therefore, this study excludes financial firms since they have 
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different risk disclosure practices which may not be comparable with the risk disclosure 
practices of non-financial firms. 
As shown in Table 4.1, the final sample is made up of 122 non-financial firms. 
Details of the names of the selected companies are provided in Appendix1. The time 
horizon of this study is the four year period from 2012 to 2015. The year 2015 is the last 
year of the sample because it represents the most recent year at the time of data collection. 
The year 2012 is chosen as the earliest year for data collection for the current study. The 
year 2012 is chosen because of the time limit of conducting this research, and the reliance 
of this study on the content analysis which is labor intensive and requires reading carefully 
the whole annual reports. The content analysis for more than 26,620 pages has to be 
undertaken in the present study. This amount of observations seems to be sufficient given 
the constraints associated with data collection19. The data are collected manually from the 
annual reports of listed firms. The annual reports were obtained from the Tadawul website 
which is the official website of the Saudi Stock Exchange.  
Table 4.1: Data sampling 
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total No. of observations 
Total listed firms 158 163 169 173  
(-) Financial firms (Banks and Insurance) -44 -47 -48 -49  
(-) Missing reports -5 -1 -2 -3  
Non-financial firms (final sample) 109 115 118 122 463 
 
The sample size for the current study is considerably larger than most risk 
disclosure studies (e.g. Linsley & Shrives 2005; Linsley & Shrives 2006; Abraham & Cox 
2007; Rajab & Schachler 2009; Hassan 2009; Elzahar & Hussainey 2012; Miihkinen 2012; 
Semper & Beltrán 2014; Rodríguez Domínguez & Noguera Gámez 2014; Al-shammari 
2014). For example, Linsley & Shrives (2005 and 2006) use cross-sectional data of 79 
firms in the UK. Similarly, Abraham & Cox (2007) use cross-sectional data from 71 UK 
firms in 2002. Furthermore, Rajab & Schachler (2009) investigate risk disclosure in a 
sample of 52 UK firms during three separate years (1998, 2001 and 2004) resulting in 156 
observations. Hassan (2009) uses a cross-sectional data of 49 UAE listed firms in 2005. 
Elzahar & Hussainey (2012) use cross-sectional data from 72 UK listed firms. Miihkinen 
 
19 It is challenging to improve the sample size of the present study while using manual content analysis 
because of the associated costs (e.g. time and efforts). 
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(2012) uses 198 observations in Finland. Semper & Beltrán (2014) and Rodríguez 
Domínguez & Noguera Gámez (2014) employ 234 and 99 observations in Spain 
respectively. Al-shammari (2014) employs a cross-sectional data of 109 Kuwaiti listed 
firms in 2012. Thus, the sample of the present study is an enhancement on the existing risk 
disclosure studies since the number of observations is much more than the vast majority of 
risk disclosure studies. In the Saudi context, Al-Maghzom, Hussainey, & Aly (2016a) and 
Al-Maghzom, Hussainey, & Aly (2016b) employ 60 observations to examine the effect of 
corporate governance on risk disclosure among Saudi listed banks. Alzead (2017) 
investigate risk disclosure in a sample of 88 Saudi listed firms during the period 2010 – 
2014. 
4.2.2. Risk disclosure sources 
The present study depends on companies` annual reports as the source of disclosure. 
Knutson (1992, p.22) states that “the annual report is the major reporting document and 
every other report is in some respect subsidiary or supplementary to it”. There are further 
two reasons for relying on the annual reports: (i) Saudi firms are required by the Listing 
Rules (Article 27) and the Company Act (Article 89) to publish annual reports at the end of 
the fiscal year which contains financial statements and the board of directors` report. (ii) 
Saudi listed firms are also required to release and publish their annual reports on the 
Tadawul website. This implies that the researcher can access all the required data which 
helps in producing a dataset with the least possible missing values. Although most firms 
report a separate section on risk practices, the current study is based on risk information 
reported throughout the annual report. This process is in line with literature (e.g. Alzead, 
2017; Elshandidy et al., 2013, 2014; Elshandidy & Shrives, 2016; Elzahar & Hussainey, 
2012; Linsley & Crumpton, 2006; Linsley & Shrives, 2005; Ntim et al., 2013; Rajab & 
Schachler, 2009). The inclusion of the whole annual report is expected to increases the 
reliability of the results of the current study since it will not be limited to the risk reporting 
section only.  
4.3. Descriptive statistics of the level of risk disclosure 
The current study applies different statistical methods in order to answer the research 
questions and reach the research objectives. This study performs a descriptive analysis to 
answer the first research question. Specifically, descriptive statistics are used to investigate 
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the practices of risk reporting and explore the enhancement of risk disclosure for Saudi 
listed firms over the years 2012-2015. After performing content analysis, this piece of 
work identifies the average, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum of the total, 
financial, operational, and strategic risk disclosure. Additionally, this study illustrates the 
time-frame of risk sentences (forward-looking, or historical), the nature of risk sentences 
(qualitative, or quantitative), and the economic sign of risk sentences (positive, negative, or 
neutral) among Saudi listed firms.  
4.4. Model of the impact of corporate governance mechanisms, 
ownership structure, and Islamic values on risk disclosure 
This section investigates the constructed model that investigates the influence of 
corporate governance mechanisms, ownership structure, and Islamic values on the level of 
risk disclosure in Saudi listed firms. Table 4.2 contains definitions of the variables used in 
this model. Section 4.3.1 discusses the dependent variable. Section 4.3.2 discusses the 
explanatory variables.  
The definitions of each dependent and independent variable included in the model 
are briefly explained in Table 4.2. The dependent variable is a log of the total number of 
risk sentences disclosed in the annual report. Using the natural logarithms of the number of 
risk sentences helps in reducing the effect of outliers in addition to enhancing the 
distribution of the variable. Using a simple log or square transformation helps in resolving 
the issue of outlier values (Frecka & Hopwood, 1983). The definitions and measurement of 
independent variables will be discussed in the sub-section 4.4.2. 
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Table 4.2: Definition of variables 
Dependent Variables Variable description Variable measurement 
LogRD Total risk sentences Log of the total number of total risk sentences 
Independent Variables 
  
Corporate governance 
mechanisms 
  
BS Board size Log of the number of board members 
ID Independent directors independent directors/total board members 
NED Non-executive directors Non-executive directors/total board members 
BIG4 Auditor type 1 if the auditor is one of the big4 and 0 otherwise 
Ownership structure 
  
GOVOWN Government ownership Government-owned shares/ total shares 
INSTOWN Institutional ownership Institutional-owned shares/ total shares 
INSIDOWN Insiders ownership (e.g. board members, 
managers, and employees) 
Insiders-owned shares/ total shares 
BLOCKOWN Blockholders ownership Major shareholders owned shares/ total shares 
Islamic values   
IVI Islamic values index Total achieved scores/total scores 
Control variables   
LogSales Firm size Log of total sales 
ROE Profitability Return on Equity 
LIQ Liquidity Working capital ratio 
LVG Firm risk Total debt/(total assets) 
LogPages Total disclosure Log of the total number of the annual report`s pages 
     
 
4.4.1. The dependent variable: Risk disclosure index 
Risk disclosure index is developed and used as the dependent variable in the first 
model which is specified in section 4.4.2. The current study employs a content analysis 
approach in order to construct the risk disclosure index. The index categorizes risk to three 
categories (financial risk, operational, and strategic risk) following Ntim et al. (2013) as 
discussed in subsection 2.6. The non-financial risk is divided into operational and strategic 
risk. The detailed content of the risk disclosure index is shown in appendix 2. Detailed 
explanations for the construction of the index are provided in the following subsections. 
4.4.1.1. Content analysis 
As stated in the previous section, this study uses content analysis for measuring the risk 
disclosure index. The objective of using content analysis is to be able to perform statistical 
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analysis (Neuendorf, 2002) in order to answer the research questions. Weber (1990) 
defines content analysis as the approach to categorize and quantify a written content (or 
text) into different groups based on selected criteria. Krippendorff (2004) states that 
content analysis methods are considered scientific techniques that have the potential to 
generate valid results through allowing the researcher to achieve new insights, a great 
understanding of specific phenomena, or recognition of practical actions. Content analysis 
is also defined by Bell & Bryman (2007) as a method to analyze texts throughout 
recognizing and classifying the content in different groups in a way that can be 
systematically repeated and provide the same results each time it is repeated. Riff, Lacy, & 
Fico, (2014, p.25) provide a comprehensive definition of content analysis which is: 
 Quantitative content analysis is the systematic and replicable examination of symbols of 
communication, which have been assigned numeric values according to valid measurement 
rules and the analysis of relationships involving those values using statistical methods, to 
describe the communication, draw inferences about its meaning, or infer from the 
communication to its context, both of production and consumption. 
A conceptual framework is needed in order to perform the content analysis 
including the unit of analysis, type of text, codification mode and scheme, and validity and 
reliability tests (Weber, 1990). The unit code of content analysis can be the number of 
pages, lines, words, or sentences (Bowman, 1984). Milne & Adler (1999, p.243) states 
“using sentences for both coding and measurement seems likely therefore to provide 
complete, reliable and meaningful data for further analysis”. Additionally, using sentences 
has the advantages of categorizing the sentences to different categories such as forward-
looking, historical, positive, negative, or neutral. Therefore, and following previous studies 
(e.g. Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Linsley & Crumpton, 2006; Linsley & Shrives, 2005, 
2006; Muzahhem, 2011; Ntim et al., 2013; Rajab & Schachler, 2009), the current study 
uses the number of sentences as a measure for the level of risk disclosure for the purpose 
of discovering the level of risk disclosure in the Saudi context. The current study also uses 
annual reports as the text of the content analysis. The reason for using annual reports is 
discussed in section 4.2.2 above. 
The scoring mode of content analysis can be conducted manually or by using auto-
coding software. Auto-coding is more effective (less effort and time). However, there are 
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several difficulties in employing the automated method. For instance, most annual reports 
of the sample are scanned as a picture which makes it impossible for the auto-coding 
software to read. To overcome this issue, the current study tries an optical character 
recognition software to convert those pictures to texts20. However, the accuracy of the 
optical character recognition software is substantially low since the annual reports are 
written in Arabic. Therefore, and following previous studies (e.g. Linsley & Shrives 2006; 
Rajab & Schachler 2009; Muzahhem 2011; Elzahar & Hussainey 2012; Al-shammari 
2014; Abdallah et al. 2015; Lopes & Rodrigues 2007; Lajili & Zéghal 2005; Abraham & 
Cox 2007), the current study uses the manual approach to collect data due to the 
difficulties of using software in addition to the advantages of manual over automated 
scoring. The preference for employing manual coding is that human has the ability to 
identify the meaning of phrases and words within a context (Deumes, 2008). Another 
significant advantage is that the coder reads the content as the annual reports` readers 
would do (Abraham, Solomon, & Stevenson, 2007).  
Following Linsley & Shrives (2006), Muzahhem (2011), and Rajab & Schachler 
(2009), the current study employs a scoring scheme which involves several steps. The first 
step is the building of a self-constructed risk disclosure index. Using the risk disclosure 
index enhances the researcher`s ability to recognize the extent of risk reporting and to 
compare risk disclosure practices among different firms (Cooke & Wallace, 1989). The 
index power relies on the choice of risk types (Marston & Shrives, 1991). The lack of 
inclusive guidance on risk types that should be included in the index motivates the current 
study to build an original risk disclosure index. Several existing risk disclosure indices 
produced by risk disclosure studies are reviewed extensively in order to construct a self-
structured index with the most possible right items (e.g. Abdallah et al., 2015; Abraham & 
Cox, 2007; Al-shammari, 2014; Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012; Linsley & Crumpton, 2006; 
Linsley & Shrives, 2006; Muzahhem, 2011; Ntim et al., 2013; Rajab & Schachler, 2009). 
Additionally, a review of relevant risk disclosure regulations in the Saudi context such as 
the Saudi Accounting Standards, the Saudi Corporate Governance Code, and Registration 
and Listing Rules is made. Furthermore, a pilot study was conducted on 20 annual reports 
in order to review and identify possible risk items. After those extensive reviews, the 
 
20 The optical character recognition software is called ABBYY Arabic OCR. 
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current study believes that the self-constructed index does not ignore any relevant risk 
topic. 
The second step of the coding scheme is reading the text (annual reports) and 
classifying risk sentences in accordance with the appropriate risk type within the risk 
disclosure index. The third step is grouping risk sentences to quantitative or qualitative 
categories depending on whether the risk sentence contains numbers or only words. Fourth, 
the coder investigates the time orientation of the risk sentence (forward-looking, 
historical). Finally, a check is made of the news type of the risk sentence and classifies it as 
positive, negative or neutral. Figure 4.1 illustrates the coding scheme and Table 4.3 
indicates the disclosure checklist sheet. After conducting this process, the coder is able to 
generate the dependent variables listed in Table 4.2 in addition to examining the nature and 
practices of risk disclosure in Saudi Arabia. 
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Figure 4.1: Coding scheme 
  
Annual reports 
Risk-related sentences 
Classifying risk 
sentences to sub-
categories 
Nature of risk 
sentences 
Financial risk Operational risk Strategic risk 
Time-frame of risk 
sentences 
 
News type of risk 
sentences 
 
Qualitative Quantitative 
Historical Forward-looking 
Positive Negative Neutral 
Ignoring non-risk 
related sentences 
88 
 
 
Table 4.3: Risk disclosure checklist sheet 
Note: G denotes Good news, B denotes bad news, and N denotes neutral news 
Firm: ……………………………………………………………..        Year: ……… 
Category 
Qualitative Quantitative Qualitative Quantitative 
forward-looking forward-looking Historical Historical 
G B N G B N G B N G B N 
Financial risk 
            
  
          
….   
….   
….   
….   
Operational risk 
            
  
          
…   
…   
…   
…   
…   
Strategic risk 
            
  
          
…   
…   
…   
…   
Total risk                         
  
Subjectivity is considered a drawback of content analysis methods (Linsley & 
Shrives, 2006). The next sub-section discusses in details how the current study works in 
eliminating subjectivity and improving reliability and validity of the content analysis. 
4.4.1.2. Reliability and validity of the content analysis 
Subjectivity is considered a significant issue when conducting a manual content 
analysis. Marston & Shrives (1991) state that subjectivity can be mitigated by improving 
the reliability and validity of the content analysis. However, they argue that it is difficult to 
get rid of subjectivity completely. Reliability refers to whether different coders provide 
similar results (Beattie, McInnes, & Fearnley, 2004). Validity refers to whether the 
outcome of content analysis represents what the coder wanted them to represent (Weber, 
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1990). Following previous studies (e.g. Abraham & Cox, 2007; Linsley & Shrives, 2006; 
Muzahhem, 2011; Rajab & Schachler, 2009)  the current study lists a set of decision rules 
in order to enhance the reliability of the content analysis. Appendix 4 explains the decision 
rules in details.  
Prior to the main coding, the author reviewed several risk disclosure examples 
provided by previous studies. Additionally, a pilot study of 20 annual reports was coded in 
order to make the author more experienced in scoring which can enhance the reliability of 
content analysis results according to Weber (1990). Santhosh, Abraham & Cox (2007) 
state that the inter-coder reliability test is the most popular measurement of the reliability 
used in the literature. Scott’s pi test is the test employed by most previous studies for the 
purpose of testing the inter-coder reliability of the annual reports (e.g. Abraham & Cox, 
2007; Al-shammari, 2014; Beattie, McInnes, & Fearnley, 2004; Linsley & Shrives, 2006; 
Muzahhem, 2011). Scott’s pi evaluates to what extent the two coders agree. In other words, 
Scott’s pi measures the level of agreement between different coders. In order to calculate 
Scott’s pi, the current study uses free online statistical software called “ReCal”21.  
According to Lombard, Snyder-Duch, & Bracken (2010), the outcome of ReCal software 
is apparently valid. 
There is only one coder who gathers data and conducts scoring. The coder is the author 
of this thesis. In order to validate the reliability of the content analysis, a second coder who 
is an Assistant Professor in the field of accounting kindly volunteered to perform scoring 
for five annual reports22. The second coder is an expert in performing content analysis and 
has conducted several disclosure studies. The two coders scored one annual report 
independently. The Scott pi of the first report score was 66.5. To enhance the reliability, 
the two coders reread the text together and started discussing each score with emphasis on 
the disagreed scores. Furthermore, the decision rules were reviewed and modified. For 
instance, the two coders agreed to add a new rule which is that when a sentence contained 
both present and forward-looking information, it will be classified as forward-looking 
information. This is consistent with Rattanataipop (2013). Next, the two coders started 
coding four annual reports independently. The Scott’s pi scores were 79.6, 84.5, 86.1, and 
 
21 ReCal software can be reached using this link: http://dfreelon.org/utils/recalfront/ 
22 The author would like to thank Dr.Alaa Tawfiq for his volunteered assistance in conducting the reliability 
test. 
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83.7. According to Abraham & Cox (2007) and Beattie et al. (2004), a score of 75 is 
considered a reliable score. Hence, it could be argued that the results of the content 
analysis are reliable. 
Validity concerns whether we are measuring the right thing. Sekaran (2000, p.208) 
defines validity as "how well the results obtained from the use of a measuring instrument 
fit the theories around which the test is designed”. When a disclosure index is used to 
capture the level of disclosure, the usefulness of the index relies on the choice of the 
index`s items (Marston & Shrives, 1991). 
In order to construct a self-structured index with the most possible correct items, the 
present study follows three steps. First, an extensive review is made for many existing risk 
disclosure indices produced by previous risk disclosure studies (e.g. Abdallah et al., 2015; 
Abraham & Cox, 2007; Al-shammari, 2014; Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012; Linsley & 
Crumpton, 2006; Linsley & Shrives, 2006; Muzahhem, 2011; Ntim et al., 2013; Rajab & 
Schachler, 2009). Second, a review of relevant risk disclosure regulations in the Saudi 
context such as the Saudi Accounting Standards, the Saudi Corporate Governance Code, 
and Registration and Listing Rules is made. Third, a pilot study was conducted on 20 
annual reports in order to review and identify possible risk items. These extensive reviews 
help the current study in arguing that the self-constructed index does not ignore any 
relevant risk item. The current study further adopts the same categorization of risk by Ntim 
et al. (2013) as discussed in section 2.3. Risk disclosure index is divided into three 
categories (financial risk, operational risk, and strategic risk). The content of the risk 
disclosure index is shown in appendix 2.   
4.4.2. Explanatory variables 
In this section, the explanatory variables are discussed in details. There are several 
independent variables employed in this study in order to examine their relationships with 
risk reporting. The choice of those variables is motivated by historical risk disclosure 
studies (e.g. Abdallah et al., 2015; Abraham & Cox, 2007; Al-Maghzom, 2016; Al-
shammari, 2014; Alzead, 2017; Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012; Linsley & Crumpton, 2006; 
Linsley & Shrives, 2006; Muzahhem, 2011; Ntim et al., 2013; Rajab & Schachler, 2009). 
Thus, an extensive review of previous studies is made in order to select the variables that 
appeared to be relevant to risk disclosure.  
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However, the current study contributes to the literature by adding new variables 
that are perceived to have significant influences on risk disclosure as previously discussed 
in section 3.5. The new variables are the board`s education, the existing of a risk 
committee, and the Islamic values` index. The explanatory variables are classified into 
three different groups: corporate governance mechanisms, ownership structure, and Islamic 
values. 
4.4.2.1. Corporate governance mechanisms 
i. Auditor type 
The term “Big 4” refers to the four largest multinational companies that provide 
accountancy and professional services. Namely, the Big4 firms are 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst & Young, and 
KPMG. In the light of agency costs theory as discussed in 3.5.1.1, Big4 is expected to 
have a significant positive relationship with risk disclosure. Following previous studies 
(e.g. Al-shammari 2014; Ntim, Lindop, and Thomas 2013; Deumes and Knechel 2008; 
Neri 2010; and Lopes and Rodrigues 2007) auditor type is measured as a dummy 
variable which takes the value of 1 if the external auditor of the firm is one of the Big4, 
and 0 otherwise.  
ii. Board size 
As discussed in 3.5.1.2, agency theory suggests that a larger board impacts positively 
on disclosure, risk reporting, and performance because of the higher level of monitoring 
and the wider variety of expertise by the larger board (Bozec & Bozec, 2012; Elzahar & 
Hussainey, 2012; Singh et al., 2004). Thus, the current study expects a positive relationship 
between the size of the board and risk disclosure. Following previous studies (e.g. Al-
Maghzom, Hussainey, & Aly 2016a; Elshandidy & Neri 2015; and Elzahar & Hussainey 
2012) Board size is measured by the total number of directors on the board. 
iii. Independent directors 
In the light of agency theory as discussed in 3.5.1.3, independent directors are expected 
to play important roles in monitoring and controlling the managers` behaviors and hence, it 
is predicted that the more independent directors on the board, the higher the level of risk 
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disclosure (Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007). Thus, it is argued that the proportion of 
independent directors is positively associated with risk disclosure. The measurement of 
independent directors is the percentage of independent directors sitting on the board.  
4.4.2.2. Ownership structure 
i. Government ownership 
According to resource dependence and capital need theories as discussed in 3.5.2.1, 
government ownership is expected to have a negative relationship with risk disclosure. 
Firms with government ownership have better access to several sources of finance which 
might discourage managers to disclose risk-related information. Following previous studies 
(e.g. Al-Bassam, Ntim, Opong, & Downs, 2016; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013; Ramly, 2013), 
government ownership is measured as the number of shares held by the government 
divided by the total number of ordinary shares. 
ii. Institutional ownership 
As it was argued in section 3.5.2.2, institutional ownership is expected to be positively 
related to risk disclosure. Institutions are considered a monitoring mechanism due to their 
experience (Donnelly & Mulcahy, 2008). Following prior literature (e.g. Chung & Zhang, 
2011; Donnelly & Mulcahy, 2008; Ntim, Opong, Danbolt, & Thomas, 2012), institutional 
ownership is measured as the number of shares held by institutions divided by the total 
number of common shares.  
iii. Inside ownership 
Empirical studies find a significant negative relationship between inside ownership and 
voluntary disclosure (e.g.v Guan, Sheu, & Chu, 2007; Huafang & Jianguo, 2007; Laidroo, 
2009). As discussed in section 3.5.2.3, Shleifer & Vishny (1997) argue that managerial 
owners have the incentive to mitigate the level of disclosure in order to serve their best 
interest. Thus, the current study expects to find a negative association between inside 
ownership and risk disclosure. Inside ownership is defined as the number of shares held by 
executives and directors divided by the total number of common shares. 
iv. Ownership concentration 
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According to agency theory, ownership concentration is expected to be negatively 
associated with risk disclosure. Companies with concentrated ownership do not experience 
a high degree of separation between ownership and control. Therefore, owners of 
concentrated firms may not depend on public disclosure to monitor managers since they 
have better access to internal information. The association between the presence of block-
holders ownership and risk disclosure is suggested to be negative. Following prior 
literature (e.g. Chu & Cheah, 2010; Ramly, 2013), ownership concentration is defined as 
the number of shares held by major stockholders who own at minimum 5% of the total 
shares. The majority of stockholders can be institutions, government, or individuals.  
4.4.2.3. Islamic values 
To the best of the researcher`s knowledge, there are two studies that quantify 
Islamic values (e.g. Albassam & Ntim, 2016; and Canepa & Ibnrubbian, 2014) in the 
extant literature. First, Canepa & Ibnrubbian (2014) measure Islamic values using a 
classification provided by a Sharia scholar (i.e. Al-Osimi) that ranks the degree of firms` 
Sharia-compliance. In Sharia perspectives, there are three types of firms in terms of the 
compliance with Sharia: (i) Halal firms (ii) mixed firms, and (iii) Haram firms (Alosimi, 
2011). A firm is classified as Halal if the firm fully complies with the Islamic principles in 
terms of its investing and financing activities (Alosimi, 2011). A firm is classified as mixed 
if the firm partially complies with the Islamic principles in terms of its investing and 
financing activities (Alosimi, 2011). However, its non-Sharia compliant activities do not 
exceed a certain level. Alosimi (2011) explains the description of a mixed firm; the firm is 
considered mixed if it meets one of the following criteria (i) its Haram investing activities 
have not to exceed 33% of total assets, (ii) its Haram financing activities have not to 
exceed 33% of total assets, and (iii) its Haram revenue have not to exceed 5% of total 
revenue. A firm is classified as Haram when its non-Sharia compliant activities exceed the 
acceptable level stated above (Alosimi, 2011). According to the approach by Canepa & 
Ibnrubbian (2014), Halal firms score 1, while mixed and Haram firms score 0.5 and 0 
respectively. 
Another proxy for measuring Islamic values was proposed by Albassam & Ntim 
(2016). They construct an unweighted index which consists of 10 provisions as the 
following: 
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1.  Whether a ‘Sharia’ supervisory board/committee has been established. 
2. Whether the firm provides an explicit/formal statement regarding its willingness to 
voluntarily apply/incorporate Islamic values into business operations and/or investment 
transactions. 
3. Whether a narrative regarding the fact that the firm’s funds and loans are on the basis 
of interest-free (riba) is disclosed. 
4. Whether the firm discloses any Islamic and conventional finance separately on its 
financial accounts. 
5. Whether a firm`s directors provide a clear narrative as to whether the firms’ 
transactions are consistent with Islamic law. 
6. Whether a narrative regarding the appropriate calculation and payment of the Islamic 
religious tax (zakat) for the financial year is disclosed. 
7. Whether there is a due amount of Zakat for previous years. 
8. Whether the firm is classified as ‘Nagi’ (i.e., the firm’s business transactions and/or 
investments are ‘Sharia’ compliant) by Sharia scholars. 
9. Whether a narrative regarding the existence of a ‘Sharia’ review and monitoring unit 
that implements the Islamic values is disclosed. 
10. Whether the firm has a code of ethics. 
The present study employs both measurements. The index proposed by Canepa & 
Ibnrubbian (2014) is used in the main model while the index proposed by Albassam & 
Ntim (2016) is used as a robustness check.  
4.4.2.4. Firm characteristic variables 
i. Firm size 
According to the political cost and information asymmetry theories, the current 
research expects to find a significant positive relationship between firm size and risk 
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disclosure as has been discussed in subsection 3.5.4.1. This means that larger firms are 
expected to reveal more risk-related information. There are several measures of firm size 
employed in the literature. They are the log of total assets, the log of sales, and the log of 
market value. For instance, Elshandidy et al. (2013) use the log of market capitalization as 
a proxy for firm size. Al-shammari (2014), Elzahar & Hussainey (2012) and  Ntim et al. 
(2013) use the log of total assets. Abraham & Cox (2007) use the log of revenue as a proxy 
for company size. However, the findings of the studies mentioned above are consistent in 
spite of the fact that they use different measurements of firm size. They find a positive 
relationship between firm size and risk disclosure. Since this study finds no significant 
differences in the results between various measures, the current study uses the log of sales 
to capture the impact of company size on risk reporting. The natural logarithms of sales 
reduce the effect of outliers and enhance the distribution of the variable. Using a simple log 
or square transformation helps in resolving the issue of outlier values (Frecka & Hopwood, 
1983).   
i. Profitability 
In the light of the capital need and pecking order theories as discussed in chapter 3, 
this study predicts that profitable firms produce lower levels of risk-related information 
which suggests a negative association between profitability and risk disclosure. Lee (2007) 
explains that the profitability ratio can be used to assess a company’s management, and its 
success in attaining earnings in order to supply the funds required for the development of 
the company, as well as returns for shareholders. Profitability is measured by return on 
assets ratio (ROA), return on equity ratio (ROE) or Tobin Q. The present study does not 
find any significant differences in the results between the uses of different profitability 
proxies. According to Van Horne & Wachowicz (2008), return on equity (ROE) is a 
suitable measurement that can be used to evaluate a company’s profitability of 
investments. Therefore, and following Al-shammari (2014) and Elshandidy et al. (2013, 
2014), the current study uses ROE as a proxy for firm profitability. ROE is calculated as 
follows: 
ROE= Net income / Book value of equity 
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ii. Liquidity 
Liquidity represents the financial ability of a firm to meet its short-term obligations. 
The current ratio is the most common proxy employed by the literature to gauge liquidity 
(e.g. Al-Dohaiman, 2008; Deesomsak, Paudyal, & Pescetto, 2004; Naem, 2012; Ozkan, 
2001). The current ratio is calculated as: 
Current ratio = Current assets / Current liabilities 
As hypothesized in chapter 3, capital need theory suggests a negative relationship between 
liquidity and the level of risk reporting. 
iii. Firm risk 
Following previous studies (e.g. Al-shammari, 2014; Elshandidy et al., 2013; Elzahar 
& Hussainey, 2012; Madrigal et al., 2015; Linsley & Shrives, 2006; Muzahhem, 2011; 
Rajab & Schachler, 2009; Domínguez & Gámez, 2014; and Semper & Beltrán, 2014), the 
current study uses leverage as a proxy for firm’s risk. It is believed that the higher the 
gearing ratio, the higher the firm riskiness. In accordance with agency cost and signaling 
theories, the current study expects to find a positive relationship between leverage and risk 
disclosure. There are two measures of leverage. They are the debt to assets ratio and the 
debt to equity ratio. Following Abraham & Cox (2007), Al-shammari (2014), Hassan 
(2009) and Muzahhem (2011) the current study uses total debt to total assets as a proxy for 
leverage. 
iv. Industry type 
There are several ways of testing the association between risk reporting and industry 
type in the risk disclosure literature. For instance, (Al-shammari, 2014; Domínguez & 
Gámez, 2014) investigates whether there is a significant difference between manufacturing 
and non-manufacturing firms by employing a dummy variable in the model that takes a 
value of 1 if it is a manufacturing company and 0 otherwise (e.g. Al-shammari 2014) or 2 
for consumer goods and services (e.g. Rodríguez Domínguez & Noguera Gámez 2014). 
Other studies used the same method unless they distinguish between financial and non-
financial firms rather than manufacturing and non-manufacturing companies (e.g. Hassan 
2009; Abdallah et al. 2015). Likewise, Abraham & Cox (2007) and Beretta & Bozzolan 
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(2004) include all different industries in the statistical model in order to find the direction 
of the relationships between each sector and risk reporting.  
 Rajab & Schachler (2009), Hernández Madrigal et al. (2015), and Mohd Ali & 
Taylor (2014) employ one of the most meaningful ways of testing the relationship between 
risk reporting and industry type. They investigate whether there are significant differences 
in industries` means using a One-way ANOVA. Rajab & Schachler (2009) and Hernández 
Madrigal et al. (2015) find significant differences between industries in risk reporting 
among 52 UK and 32 Spanish listed firms. However, Mohd Ali & Taylor (2014) find no 
significant difference between industries in the disclosure of risk-related information. 
Similarly, the current study aims to conduct a One-way ANOVA test in order to 
investigate whether there are significant differences between sectors for Saudi listed firms. 
The results of the One-way ANOVA test are shown in section 5.7. Additionally, industry-
specific dummy variables are added to model 1 in order to take into account the industry 
effects on risk disclosure practices. 
Following the prior literature, the current study employs an ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression model in order to explore the determinants of risk reporting among Saudi 
listed firms. The model contains several explanatory variables such as corporate 
governance mechanisms, ownership structure, and the Islamic values` index as specified 
above. This study uses an OLS model because it assumes all relations are linear. However, 
Petersen (2009) argues that the OLS model has the possibility to be biased because of the 
correlation between firms and the error term. Petersen (2009, p.475) says that “The 
standard errors clustered by the firm are unbiased and produce correctly sized confidence 
intervals whether the firm effect is permanent or temporary”. Therefore, and following 
previous studies (e.g. Al-Bassam et al., 2016; Albassam & Ntim, 2016; Miihkinen, 2012; 
Zhang, Zhang, & Zhang, 2016), the present study uses the clustered standard error at the 
firm level in order to solve the problem of heteroscedasticity. Hence, the first regression 
equation to be estimated is: 
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Model 1 
LogRDi,t =  0 + β1 BSi,t + β2 IDi,t + β3 NED i,t + β4 BIG4i,t + β5 EDUCi,t + β6 
RMCOMi,t + β7 BLOCKOWNi,t + β8 GOVOWNi,t + β9 INSTOWNi,t + β10 
INSIDOWN,t + β11 IVIi,t + 
=
+
n
i
ititi
CONTROLS
1
      (equation 1) 
Where: 
LogRD  Risk disclosure  
BS  Board size 
ID  Independent directors 
NED  Non-executive directors 
BIG4  Auditor type 
EDUC  Board education 
RMCOM Risk management committee 
BLOCKOWN Block holder ownership 
GOVOWN Government ownership 
INSTOWN Institutional ownership 
INSIDOWN Inside ownership 
IVI  Islamic value  
CONTROLS Control variables for firm size (LogSales), profitability (ROE), liquidity 
(LIQ), leverage (LVG), Error term or residual 
 
4.5. Research model of the impact of Loss-Making Firms 
Procedures on risk disclosure 
The current study employs the difference-in-difference (DID) approach in order to 
examine the impact of the enforcement of the Loss-Making Firms Procedures (LMFPs) on 
risk disclosure. DID approach is considered an effective technique for solving the 
endogeneity issue (Roberts & Whited, 2013). In order to perform DID, there have to be 
two elements: (i) an exogenous shock such as the introduction of new regulation, and (ii) 
two groups where one group is affected by the shock and the other is not (Roberts & 
Whited, 2013). 
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The enforcement of the Loss-Making Firms Procedures in mid-2014 is a shock that 
results in two groups: (i) a treatment group (i.e. loss-making firms), and (ii) a control group 
(i.e. other firms). The Procedures apply to 17 loss-making firms whereas 99 non-loss-
making firms are not affected by such enforcement. Moreover, this study investigates the 
impact of the new procedures (LMFPs) on risk disclosure two years before the introduction 
of the procedures and two years afterward. To perform DID, the interaction term LOSSi,t * 
POSTi,t is used to find the changes in risk disclosure practices among loss-making firms 
after the enforcement of LMFPs. The variable LOSS is a dummy variable takes 1 if the 
firm has cumulative losses, and 0 otherwise. The variable POST is a dummy variable takes 
1 if the time is after the enforcement of LMFPs, and 0 otherwise. 
The specification of the DID model is as follows: 
Model 2 
LogRDi,t =  0 + β1 LOSSi,t * POSTi,t + β2 LOSSi,t + β3 POSTi,t + 
=
+
n
i
ititi
CONTROLS
1
  
(equation 2) 
 
Where: 
LogRD  Risk disclosure 
LOSS Loss-making firms (i.e. a dummy variable takes 1 if the firm has cumulative 
losses, and 0 otherwise). 
POST  The period after the enforcement of Loss-Making Firms Procedures (i.e.  
a dummy variable takes 1 if the time is after the enforcement of LMFPs, 
and 0 otherwise). 
LOSSi,t * POSTi,t   Loss-making firms after the enforcement of LMFPs. 
CONTROLS Control variables for firm size (LogSales), profitability (ROE), liquidity 
(LIQ), leverage (LVG), and error term. 
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4.6. Research model of the impact of risk disclosure on the cost of 
capital 
The third research question investigates the impact of risk disclosure on a company’s 
cost of capital. Table 4.4 contains definitions of the variables used in this model. Section 
4.6.1 explains the dependent variable; section 4.6.2 explains the independent variables, and 
4.6.3 explains the control variables. 
Table 4.4: Definition of variables of Model 3 
Dependent Variables Variable description Variable measurement 
WAAC Weighted average cost of capital Weighted average cost of capital 
Independent Variable 
  
LogRD Risk-related sentences Log of the number of risk sentences 
Control variables   
LogSales Firm size Log of total sales 
ROE Profitability Return on Equity 
LVG Leverage Debt/total assets 
GROWTH Firm`s growth Market to book ratio 
 
4.6.1. The dependent variable: Cost of capital  
Existing literature (e.g. Bierman, 1993; Bruner & Hensel, 1998; Meier & Tarhan, 
2007) support the proposition that the Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) is one 
of the best measurements used to measure a company’s cost of capital (Truong, Partington, 
& Peat, 2008). It represents the average rate of return a company should expect to pay its 
financers. WACC is a preferred measure because it indicates a discounted rate reflecting a 
certain risk associated with the cash flows within a given company. 
Several previous studies support the use of WACC as the measure of the cost of 
capital. For example, a survey of 127 companies conducted by Meier & Tarhan (2007) 
revealed that about 70% of all the respondents use WACC to discount their cash flows. A 
similar study involving 27 blue-chip companies revealed about 89% of the chief financing 
officers (CFOs) in these companies use WACC to value all interest-bearing liabilities 
relative to the company’s cash flows (Bruner & Hensel, 1998). Bierman (1993) finds that 
93% of Fortune 500 companies in the United States use WACC to measure the cost of 
capital.  Another study conducted in Australia by Truong et al. (2008) find that WACC is 
the most preferred method in discounting cash flows. Recent studies by Bozec, Laurin, & 
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Meier (2014) and Pham, Suchard, & Zein (2012) also find that WACC is consistently used 
by most companies in assessing different components of its capital structure. 
WACC measures each external financing relative to the company’s entire capital 
structure. The capital structure normally consists of debt and equity; where debt reflects the 
external sources of capital and equity reflects stocks and shares.  
Based on the empirical evidence provided in the above literature WACC is computed 
by the following formula: 
WACC = {(E/V)*Re} + {(D/V)* Rd}*{1-T} 
Where E = equity in terms of its market value 
D = debt in terms of its market value 
V= E+D 
Re = Cost of equity 
Rd = Cost of debt 
T = Tax Rate 
The following sections discuss further the cost of debt and cost of equity in addition to 
illustrating how these components are calculated. The discussion is based on the models 
advocated by existing literature and why those particular models are more ideal than 
others.  
4.6.1.1. Cost of equity capital  
Cost of Equity capital is the rate of return required by equity investors. The estimation 
of the cost of equity is challenging since it is not a directly observable variable. There are 
several financial models that have been proposed for estimating the cost of equity. The 
most popular models are the Gordon growth model (Gordon & Shapiro, 1956); Gordon 
model (Gordon, 1959); Capital Assets Pricing Model (Sharpe, 1964); and the Three-Factor 
Pricing Model (Fama & French, 1995). 
These models take into consideration different elements of an investment to determine 
which elements should be used in calculating the rate of return. For example, the Capital 
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Assets Pricing model suggests that the riskiest investment should be priced the lowest. The 
low price of the riskiest investment is meant to induce and compensate the investor for 
investing.  
There is no consensus on which is the best model to use (Fama & French, 1997). In this 
study, the Capital Assets Pricing Model (CAPM) is used to determine the cost of equity. 
This study chooses CAPM for several reasons. Firstly, CAPM appears to be one of the 
most used models by prior literature (Bozec et al., 2014). Secondly, CAPM is the model 
preferred by scholars in conducting similar studies. For instance, Pham et al. (2012), Bozec 
et al. (2014) and Khan (2016) employed CAPM in determining the relationship between 
corporate governance and the cost of capital. Finally, the available literature seems to 
suggest that most companies prefer the Capital Asset Pricing Model in estimating the cost 
of equity.  According to a study conducted by Kester & Chang (1999), 73% of the 
respondents employ CAPM in estimating their cost of equity in the Asia-Pacific Region 
(i.e. Australia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Singapore). A similar 
study conducted in Australia recently by Truong et al. (2008) reveals that 72% (53 
respondents) use CAPM in estimating the cost of equity. In the United States, Graham & 
Harvey (2001) report that 74% of companies prefer CAPM in computing the cost of equity 
for the purpose of capital budgeting. In a more recent study, Berk & van Binsbergen 
(2017) find empirically that investors use CAPM to compute the discount rate.  They 
further recommend investors to use CAPM as it is the most consistent with investors` 
behavior.  
The cost of equity is computed as follows using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM):  
Re = Rf + β (Rm − Rf) 
Where:  
Rf = rate of return for risk-free security 
 β= Beta of the asset 
Rm = expected rate of return at the broad market 
Having determined the cost of equity, the next step is to determine the cost of debt capital. 
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4.6.1.2. Cost of debt capital 
The cost of debt is the amount of interest a company pays in all its external debt. In 
calculating the cost of debt, there are several measurements that have been proposed. 
However, there is no consensus on the most suitable measure. There are three main 
measures used in calculating the cost of debt that includes credit rating, yield spread, and 
interest rate method.  
The absence of an active debt market and credit rating entities in Saudi Arabia makes it 
impossible for this study to use the credit ratings or the yield spread methods. Hence, the 
present study relies on the interest rate method. Additionally, the use of interest rate 
method is in line with the existing literature (e.g. Byun, 2007; Fields, Fraser, & 
Subrahmanyam, 2012; Khan, 2016; Piot & Missonier-Piera, 2007; Pittman & Fortin, 2004; 
Ramly, 2013). 
4.6.2. The independent variable: Risk disclosure 
To answer the fourth main question of this thesis, which is the impact of risk 
communication on the cost of capital, the current study uses a risk disclosure index as the 
independent variable. Discussion of the risk disclosure index and the framework of the 
index have already been provided in section 4.4.1.  
4.6.3. Control variables 
4.6.3.1. Firm size 
It is argued that there is an inverse relationship between the size of a company and its 
cost of capital. Larger companies are more stable and diversified and therefore have more 
reliable cash flows which reduce the cost of capital. This proposition is supported by 
empirical evidence provided by a study conducted by Botosan & Plumlee (2005). Also, 
Botosan (1997) argues that larger companies enjoy the benefit of high market valuation as 
well as a lower cost of external capital. In addition, Beiner, Drobetz, Schmid, & 
Zimmermann (2006) posit that larger companies also have better internal controls and 
governance structures which also work to lower the cost of capital. This is because the 
complex nature of its operation and the regulations imposed by external stakeholders 
require the company to have in place administrative and oversight structures which lead to 
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better governance. Larger companies have better corporate governance in place that 
provides more accountability and makes investors more likely to invest in these 
companies. Thus, this study predicts a negative relationship between firm size and the cost 
of capital. 
As discussed in section 4.4.2.4, the current study uses the log of sales to capture the 
impact of company size on risk disclosure. The natural logarithms of sales reduce the 
effect of outliers and enhance the distribution of the variable. 
4.6.3.2. Profitability 
Profitability is another important factor in forming capital budgeting and corporate 
policies decision. Profitable companies tend to depend less on external sources of capital in 
comparison to less profitable companies for capital investments since they have surplus 
earnings (Myers & Majluf, 1984). However, when firms require additional financing, they 
prefer to borrow rather than rising any additional equity (Myers & Majluf, 1984). Myers 
(1984) clarifies that the primary reason that companies choose to issue debt is to exploit 
the information asymmetry where lenders have a lower level of information compared to 
managers and major shareholders. Debt financing also provides tax protection havens for 
profitable companies by reducing the amount of pre-tax profit that is subject to taxation 
(Modigliani & Miller, 1963). In addition, more profitable companies also prefer to borrow 
as a way of enhancing corporate governance. It is argued when the surplus cash is 
mitigated by paying off loans, there are less available funds that can be misappropriated by 
managers (Jensen, 1986). Also, if a company is exceptionally profitable, creditors offer it 
favorable terms which induce the company even further to consider debt-financing 
(Peterson & Rajan, 1994). Thus, this study suggests a negative relationship between 
profitability and the cost of capital. 
As discussed above in section 4.4.2.4, the current study uses ROE as a proxy for firm 
profitability. ROE is calculated as follows: 
ROE= Net income / Book value of equity 
 
 
105 
 
4.6.3.3. Leverage 
There is increasing theoretical and empirical evidence to suggest a company’s 
capital structure can impact its performance (Myers, 1984). It is believed that the higher 
the gearing ratio, the higher the probability that the firm might default in debt repayment 
(Hail, 2002). An over-levered company is more prone to financial difficulties like 
bankruptcy and limited access to more credit. Limited access to credit because of the high 
level of debt means that the company might not be in a position to pursue other investment 
opportunities in the future (Myers, 1977). The current study controls for leverage and 
predicts a positive relationship between leverage and the cost of capital. 
As discussed in section 4.4.2.4, the current study uses total debt to total assets as a proxy 
for leverage. 
4.6.3.4. Firm`s Growth  
Growth is a fundamental control variable in determining the impact of risk disclosure 
on the cost of capital. The faster a company grows the more potential it increases its 
shareholders` wealth in the future and therefore the more valuable it is (Klapper & Love, 
2004). Firms with growth opportunities need to raise external fund. In doing so, firms need 
to enhance its internal controls mechanisms as well as instituting better corporate 
governance framework (Beiner et al., 2006). Based on these assertions, it is expected that 
the company’s growth is negatively related to the cost of capital (Henry, 2008). Following 
Carlson, Fisher, & Giammarino (2004); Cooper (2006); and La & Liberatore (2014), the 
current study calculates firm growth as the market to book ratio. 
Following prior studies, the current study employs an ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression model in order to explore the impact of risk reporting on the cost of capital for 
Saudi listed firms. The explanatory variable and the dependent variable are risk disclosure 
and cost of capital, respectively, as discussed above in section 4.6.1 and section 4.6.2. This 
study uses an OLS model because it assumes all relations are linear. However, Petersen 
(2009) argues that the OLS model has the possibility to be biased because of the 
correlation between firms and the error term. Petersen (2009, p.475) says that “The 
standard errors clustered by the firm are unbiased and produce correctly sized confidence 
intervals whether the firm effect is permanent or temporary”. Therefore, the present study 
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uses the clustered standard error at the firm level in order to solve the problem of 
heteroscedasticity. Hence, the second regression equation to be estimated is: 
Model 3 
WACC i,t =  0 + β1 LogRD i,t + 
=
+
n
i
ititi
CONTROLS
1
      (equation 3) 
Where: 
WACC  Cost of capital 
LogRD  Risk disclosure  
CONTROLS Control variables for firm size (LogSales), profitability (ROE), leverage 
(LVG), Firm`s Growth (GROW), and Error term or residual 
4.7. Chapter summary 
This chapter reviewed the research methodology of the present study. The sample of 
this study contains 463 firm-year observations. The present study depends on companies` 
annual reports as the source of disclosure. This chapter discussed the construction of the 
risk disclosure index and the employment of content analysis. The index categorizes risk to 
three categories (financial risk, operational, and strategic risk). To perform the content 
analysis, this thesis conducts a coding scheme, reliability and validity tests. There are five 
groups of the independent variables. They are the corporate governance mechanisms, the 
ownership structure variables, the Islamic values index, and the control variables. 
There are three empirical models to be conducted in the present study. The first model 
investigates the effect of corporate governance mechanisms, ownership structure, and 
Islamic values on risk reporting. The corporate governance mechanisms include auditor 
type, board size, independent directors, non-executive directors, board education, and the 
existence of a risk management committee. The ownership structure variables include 
government ownership, inside ownership, institutional ownership and block ownership. To 
measure the Islamic values, the present study built two Islamic values indices. The  first 
index proposed by Canepa & Ibnrubbian (2014) which is used in the main model. The 
other index is proposed by Albassam & Ntim (2016) which is used to check the robustness 
of the results.  
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The second model examines the impact of the Loss-Making Firms Procedures 
(LMFPs) on risk disclosure. The Loss-Making Firms Procedures have been introduced by 
the Saudi Capital Market Authority in 2014. These procedures apply to firms with 
cumulative losses with the aim to rectify the performance of those firms23. The third model 
investigates the impact of risk reporting on the cost of capital. The cost of capital is 
calculated as the Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC). 
Extensive descriptive statistics results of the practices of risk disclosure in the Saudi 
context are provided in the following chapter. 
  
 
23 For example, Loss-making firms were required to create a plan and establish a new committee to 
implement the plan in order to mitigate firms` losses. The Loss-Making Firms Procedures are discussed 
thoroughly in section 3.6.  
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Chapter 5 THE RESULTS OF CONTENT ANALYSIS 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of the content analysis. Specifically, this chapter 
attempts to achieve four main objectives. First, this chapter presents descriptive statistics of 
risk disclosure in order to explore the practices of risk disclosure among Saudi listed firms. 
Second, it reviews the trend of risk reporting over the sample years 2012-2015. Third, it 
discusses the various attributes of risk disclosure (i.e. qualitative, quantitative, forward-
looking, historical, good, bad, or neutral). Fourth, this chapter examines the industry effect 
on risk disclosure using a One Way ANOVA test. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 presents the summary statistics for 
the different types of disclosed risk. Section 5.3 reviews the trend of risk disclosure and 
section 5.4 presents the various attributes of risk disclosure. Section 5.5 discusses the effect 
of industry on risk reporting and finally, section 5.6 presents a summary of the entire 
chapter. 
5.2. Descriptive statistics of risk disclosure 
Table 5.1 reports the summary statistics for risk reporting for Saudi Arabian listed 
firms. The results show that Saudi firms report about 24 risk-related sentences on average. 
This number is much lower than that reported in other studies elsewhere. For instance, 
Greco (2012) and Beretta & Bozzolan (2004) report that the average number of risk 
disclosure is 65 and 75 sentences respectively for Italian firms.  
Muzahhem (2011) finds that UAE firms provide, on average, 97 risk sentences. 
Linsley & Shrives (2006), and Rajab & Schachler (2009) report that the mean of risk 
disclosure is 78 and 95 sentences for UK listed firms respectively. Konishi & Ali (2007) 
find that Japanese firms provide 47 risk sentences on average. Therefore, risk disclosure in 
the Saudi context appeared to be smaller compared to other studies.  
The low level of risk disclosure in Saudi Arabia can be mainly explained 
by the lack of enforcement. During the sample period, there were no mandatory 
requirements for Saudi listed firms to provide risk-related information in the 
annual reports. However, there have been several recent developments. For 
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instance, the Capital Market Authority (CMA) requires Saudi listed firms to 
comply with the requirement of the International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) from the beginning of 2017. The adoption of IFRS is expected to improve 
risk disclosure practices given that the IFRS requires the disclosure of risk. 
Bischof (2009) finds that the adoption of IFRS has improved the risk disclosure 
practices significantly in Europe. Another crucial development is the updated 
version of the Saudi Corporate Governance Code (SCGC). The updated version is 
issued on 13/02/2017. This updated version is the first version that asserts the 
importance of appointing a risk management committee. The existence of a risk 
management committee can possibly enhance the level of risk disclosure.
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Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics of risk sentences 
 
Total RS Financial RS Operational RS Strategic RS Qualitative RS Quantitative RS forward-looking RS Historical RS Positive RS Negative RS Neutral RS Number of pages 
Mean 24.37 9.95 10.18 4.24 20.49 3.89 15.39 9.00 11.57 8.53 4.29 57.49 
Median 23.00 9.00 9.00 3.00 20.00 3.00 14.00 8.00 10.00 7.00 4.00 54.00 
Maximum 72.00 35.00 51.00 33.00 60.00 23.00 50.00 32.00 54.00 38.00 27.00 133.00 
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 17.00 
Std. Dev. 11.32 6.60 6.37 3.78 9.60 3.50 8.24 5.08 7.10 6.17 4.11 20.19 
Obs. 463 463 463 463 463 463 463 463 463 463 463 463 
Notes: RS stands for the number of risk sentences. The number of pages refers to the number of pages of firms` annual reports. 
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The minimum risk disclosure is zero as shown in Table 5.1 where a firm does not 
provide any risk-related sentences in its annual report. The maximum risk disclosure is 72 
sentences. From the table, it can be seen that the greatest disclosure of risk category is the 
operational risk with 10.18 sentences and the financial risk with 9.98 sentences. However, 
the average of strategic risk is only 4.42 sentences. 35, 51, and 33 are the maximum 
sentences of financial, operational, and strategic risk disclosure respectively. The minimum 
risk disclosure for all risk categories is zero. 
Looking at Table 5.1, Saudi firms disclose much more qualitative than the 
quantitative risk with 20.49 compared to 3.89 risk sentences. This is consistent with 
previous studies (e.g. Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Konishi & Ali, 2007; Lajili & Zéghal, 
2005; Linsley & Shrives, 2006; Mokhtar & Mellett, 2013; Rajab & Schachler, 2009). The 
results of these studies are discussed in section 5.4.1. 
As can be also seen from Table 5.1 above, it is apparent that the forward-looking 
risk disclosure is reported significantly more than the historical risk disclosure. Saudi listed 
firms provide more forward-looking risk-related information with an average of 15.39 
sentences whereas the average of historical risk disclosure is only 9 sentences. This finding 
is consistent with Linsley & Shrives (2006) and Rajab & Schachler (2009) and it is in 
contrast to the results of studies by Konishi & Ali (2007) and Muzahhem (2011). More 
discussion is provided in section 5.4.2. 
From Table 5.1 above, it can also be seen that Saudi firms report more positive risk 
than negative and neutral risk disclosure. The mean of positive risk disclosure is 11.57 
sentences which is much greater than the average of negative and neutral risk disclosure of 
8.53 and 4.29 sentences respectively. The results are contradictory to the findings of 
previous studies (e.g. Buckby, Gallery, & Ma, 2015; Elshandidy & Shrives, 2016; Linsley 
& Shrives, 2006; Maffei, Aria, Fiondella, Spanò, & Zagaria, 2014; Muzahhem, 2011; 
Rajab & Schachler, 2009) and consistent with the findings by Mokhtar & Mellett (2013)24.  
 
 
24 Section 5.3.3 discusses those findings in details. 
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5.3. Trend of risk disclosure 
Figure 5.1 reports the trends of risk disclosure. It shows that there has been a 
gradual increase in the average number of risk disclosure by Saudi listed firms over the 
period 2012 – 2015. This finding is in line with previous studies that report risk disclosure 
increases over the sample period for several countries including Portugal (e.g. Oliveira, 
Rodrigues, & Craig 2011) and UAE (e.g. Muzahhem, 2011). Saudi banks have also 
increased risk disclosure over the years (see Al-Maghzom, Hussainey, & Aly 2016b). 
As can be seen from Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2, the rise in the number of risk-
related sentences is more pronounced in the year 2015 where risk disclosure grew from 24 
in 2014 to 30 in 2015. The increase of risk disclosure in 2015 can be explained by the 
increased risk in the Saudi economy due to the dramatic decline in oil prices which led to a 
financial crisis in Saudi Arabia. As a response to the sharp decline in oil prices, the Saudi 
government applied a widespread austerity plan including the cut of subsidies to firms and 
households. This finding is in line with prior research. Gulko, Hyde, & Seppala (2017) find 
that UK firms reported significantly more risk disclosures with enhanced quality during the 
financial crisis in 2008 than the time when the economy was stable. Abraham & Shrives 
(2014) argue that firms` directors disclose more risk information in the time of crisis in 
order to enhance the firms` reputation.   
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Figure 5.1: Trend of risk disclosure 
 
What also stands out in Figure 5.2 is the general pattern of the rise of different risk 
disclosure categories. For instance, financial, operational, and strategic risk disclosure 
increase from 8.68, 8.74, and 3.74 sentences in 2012 to 12.39, 12.11, and 5.08 sentences in 
2015 respectively. 
Figure 5.2: Trend of risk disclosure; categories-wise 
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Figure 5.3 illustrates what types of risk Saudi listed firms mostly disclose. The 
percentages of financial, operational, and strategic risk disclosure are 40.81%, 41.78%, and 
17.41%, respectively. Operational and financial risk disclosure appeared to be the most 
frequent disclosed risk while the strategic risk is significantly lower as can be seen from 
Table 5.2. This finding is consistent with prior studies by Lajili & Zéghal (2005), and 
Muzahhem (2011) where they find that the financial risk disclosure dominates over other 
categories in Canada, and the UAE, respectively.  
Table 5.2: Difference in Means of Risk Categories 
Mean of risk sentences         
Financial 
risk 
Strategic 
risk Difference in means 
t-
statistics degree of freedom 
p-
value 
9.95 4.24 5.70 16.547 462 0.000 
 
The increased financial and operational risk disclosure and the lack of strategic risk 
disclosure can be explained by the verifiability of information. Firms have a high degree of 
impact on the financial and operational risk which motivates the firms` managers to 
disclose more on these categories given that the disclosed information is verifiable 
(Dobler, 2008). On the other hand, it is challenging for the managers to assume that the 
information related to the strategic risk is verifiable (Miihkinen, 2013) given that the 
strategic risks are less controllable by firms such as risks related to society, economy, or 
politics. In fact, risk assessment is subjective and it relies on the managerial discretion. 
Mohobbot (2005) argues that firms managers have less incentive to disclose information 
that might put them at intense criticisms and possible legal actions if their estimation goes 
wrong (cited by Muzahhem 2011). 
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Figure 5.3: Risk disclosure by categories 
 
However, and in contrast to this study`s findings, Linsley & Shrives (2006), 
Amran, Bin, & Hassan (2008) and Greco (2012) discover that strategic risk disclosure is 
the most frequently disclosed risk among UK, Malaysian, and Italian firms, respectively. 
Nonetheless, the increase in strategic risk disclosure in other countries might be driven by 
country-specific factors. For instance, the reason for the domination of strategic risk 
disclosure in Malaysia is the requirements of Bursa Malaysia (Amran et al., 2008). Thus, 
regulatory authorities in Saudi Arabia are encouraged to require greater emphases of the 
disclosure of strategic risk-related information.  
5.4. Risk disclosure by attributes 
5.4.1 Nature of risk (qualitative or quantitative) 
In line with previous studies (e.g. Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Lajili & Zéghal, 2005; 
Linsley & Shrives, 2006; Mokhtar & Mellett, 2013; Muzahhem, 2011; Rajab & Schachler, 
2009), this study finds that most disclosed risk is qualitative in nature. On average, firms 
disclose 20.49 qualitative sentences compared to 3.89 quantitative sentences. Qualitative 
disclosure represents 84.05% of total disclosure while quantitative disclosure accounts for 
only 15.95% as shown in Figure 5.4. 
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Figure 5.4: Risk sentences by nature of risk 
 
 Table 5.3 shows that the difference in means of the qualitative and quantitative risk 
disclosure is statistically significant.  Saudi firms disclose more qualitative than 
quantitative risk. 
Table 5.3: Difference in Means of  the nature of risk 
Mean of risk sentences         
Qualitative Quantitative 
Difference in 
means t-statistics degree of freedom 
p-
value 
20.49 3.89 16.60 39.846 462 0.000 
 
 Mokhtar & Mellett (2013) find that 65 percent of risk disclosure in the annual 
reports of Egyptian firms is qualitative in nature. The result of Muzahhem (2011) also 
shows that UAE firms disclose more qualitative risk disclosure with 70 percent compared 
to 30 percent quantitative risk disclosure. Linsley & Shrives (2006) and Rajab & Schachler 
(2009) report that the percentage of qualitative risk disclosure in the UK context is 94.7% 
and 89.07% respectively. In Japan, the proportion of qualitative risk disclosure is 63.35% 
(Konishi & Ali 2007). Beretta & Bozzolan (2004) find that 84.5 percent of risk disclosure 
in the annual reports of Italian firms is qualitative in nature. However, Maffei, Aria, 
Fiondella, Spanò, & Zagaria (2014) discover that Italian banks produce more quantitative 
risk disclosure than qualitative in contrast to the mainstream of research. 
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 Linsley & Shrives (2006) argue that firms should disclose more quantitative risk-
related information in order to help stakeholders to assess the risk engaged in by firms.  
Cabedo & Tirado (2004) argue that the disclosure of quantitative risk information has the 
potential to assist annual report readers in making better-informed decisions. However, 
Mohobbot (2005) argues that it is difficult to measure and quantify risks (cited by 
Muzahhem 2011). Also, Mohobbot (2005) argues that firms managers have less incentive 
to estimate, quantify, and disclose forward-looking information because it might put them 
at intense criticisms and possible legal actions if their estimation goes wrong. This can be a 
possible explanation of the lack of quantitative risk disclosure. Hence, the difficulty in 
measuring risk and the potential criticisms and legal actions could be the reasons why 
Saudi listed firms report less quantitative risk disclosure. The present study, therefore, 
recommends Saudi regulators to encourage the disclosure of quantitative risk information. 
The recent adoption of the IFRS and the updated version of the SCGC might help in 
increasing the disclosure of quantitative risk-related information.  
As shown in Figure 5.5, qualitative and quantitative risk disclosures have been 
increasing over the period 2012 – 2015. Qualitative and quantitative risk disclosures 
increased from 17.66 and 3.52 in 2012 to 24.81 and 4.78 sentences in 2015 respectively.  
Figure 5.5: Trend of qualitative and qualitative 
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5.4.2. Time frame of risk disclosure (forward-looking or historical) 
It can be seen from Figure 5.6 that 63% of risk disclosure is forward-looking while 
historical disclosure accounts for about 37%. On average, Saudi companies disclose 15 
forward-looking risk sentences compared to 9 historical risk sentences. 
Figure 5.6: Time frame of risk disclosure 
 
To compare these findings with previous studies, Linsley & Shrives (2006) report 
that historical, forward-looking, and non-time disclosure were 25.98%, 35%, and 38.82%  
respectively in the UK context. Similarly, Rajab & Schachler (2009) find that historical, 
forward-looking, and non-time disclosure were 12.69%, 31.27%, and 56%  respectively in 
the UK context.  
 Aljifri & Hussainey (2007) and Linsley & Shrives (2005) argue that the disclosure 
of forward-looking information has the potential to assist investors in forecasting future 
cash flows which result in making better-informed investment decisions unlike the 
disclosure of historical information. However, it can be argued that forward-looking 
information has less reliability since it involves a high level of uncertainty in addition to 
the subjectivity issue associated with forward-looking information (Cabedo & Tirado, 
2004). Therefore, financial reports preparers might have less incentive to report forward-
looking information (Konishi & Ali, 2007). Also, the nature of forward-looking 
information is believed to be more valuable and can be exploited by competitors which 
might affect the competitive advantage of firms (Aljifri & Hussainey, 2007; ICAEW, 
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1999). The higher level of disclosure of forward-looking information by Saudi listed firms 
is a good sign and it may reflect the governance practices which will be investigated in the 
coming chapter25.  
As illustrated in Figure 5.7, there has been a steady growth in forward-looking and 
historical risk disclosure during 2012-2014. Forward-looking and historical risk disclosure 
increases from 13 and 8 in 2012 to 20 and 10 sentences in 2015 respectively. 
Figure 5.7: forward-looking and historical risk disclosure 
 
5.4.3. Economic sign (positive, negative, or neutral). 
Figure 5.8 shows the economic sign of risk disclosure for Saudi listed firms. 
Positive and negative risk disclosure appeared to be the most frequent disclosed risk while 
the neutral risk is substantially less. The percentages of positive, negative, and neutral risk 
disclosures are 47%, 35%, and 18% respectively. The average numbers of positive, 
negative, and neutral risk sentences are 12, 9, and 4 respectively. Table 5.4 shows that the 
difference in means of the positive and negative risk disclosure is statistically significant. 
 
 
 
25 The empirical results of the present study show that governance mechanisms play vital roles in enhancing 
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Table 5.4: Difference in means of the economic sign of risk 
Mean of risk sentences         
Positive 
risk Negative risk 
Difference in 
means t-statistics degree of freedom 
p-
value 
12 9 3.03 7.446 461 0.000 
 
Figure 5.8: Positive, negative, or neutral risk disclosure 
 
This finding is consistent with previous findings by Muzahhem (2011), Mohobbot 
(2005), and Beretta & Bozzolan (2004). Muzahhem (2011) and Mohobbot (2005) find that 
UAE and Japanese firms disclose more positive risk-related information respectively. 
According to a report by The Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (2014), 
analysts believe that most risk disclosure is biased toward positive tones. Kothari, Shu, & 
Wysocki (2009) argue that firms` managers have a higher tendency toward the disclosure 
of positive news while they are reluctant to disclose negative news. In the case of negative 
news, managers withhold and accumulate the news until they become certain (Kothari et 
al., 2009). Linsley & Shrives (2006) suggest that managers would not reveal bad news 
since they prefer to signal a bright image of their risk management performance to the 
market with a view to avoiding reputation costs. Therefore, Ibrahim and Hussainey (2019) 
and Schrand & Elliott (1998) argue that the requirements of risk disclosure should 
concentrate on bad risk since companies have less incentive to disclose such information. 
For exapmle, Basel Committee regulations and the German Accounting Standards (GAS 5) 
concentrate on the disclosure of bad risk-related information. To this end, the present study 
47%
35%
18%
Positive risk sentences Negative risk sentences Neutral risk sentences
121 
 
recommends Saudi policymakers to encourage the disclosure of bad risks when 
introducing legislation. Regulators are mindful of the importance of rules and guidance on 
how to improve risk disclosure practices. 
As shown in Figure 5.9, positive, negative, and neutral risk disclosure has been 
consistently increasing over the period 2012 – 2015. Good, bad, and neutral risk disclosure 
increased from 10.39, 7.23 and 3.56 in 2012 to 11.39, 8.32 and 4.38 sentences in 2014 
respectively.  
Figure 5.9: Trend of positive, negative, and neutral risk disclosure 
 
5.5 Examining the industry effect 
Firms in various sectors face different kinds of risks such as the degree of 
competition, regulation, and technological developments. These different environmental 
factors are expected to have significant impacts on firms` risks (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; 
Mostafa Hassan, 2009). It can be seen from Figure 5.10 that the telecommunication 
industry has the highest number of risk sentences with an average of 40 followed by the 
petrochemical industry with an average of 33. The lowest number of risk sentences was 
found in the real state and multi-investment industries with an average of 18 risk sentences. 
Similar results are found after controlling for total disclosure as illustrated in Figure 5.11 
by dividing the number of risk sentences by the number of pages in the annual report. This 
procedure distinguishes between the level of general disclosure of the industry from the 
specific disclosure on risks.   
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Figure 5.10: Average of risk disclosure; industry-wise 
 
Figure 5.11: Average of risk sentences/number of pages 
 
Figure 5.12 and Table 5. illustrate the average number of financial, operational, and 
strategic risk sentences among different industries. The telecommunication industry 
appeared to have the highest number of financial risk disclosure with an average of 20 risk 
sentences. The petrochemical industry has the highest number of operational risk 
disclosure with an average of 17 risk sentences. The telecommunication industry appeared 
again to have the highest number of strategic risk disclosure with an average of 7 risk 
sentences.  
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From the above discussion, it can be noticed that petrochemical and 
telecommunication firms provide the highest level of risk disclosure. A possible 
explanation could be the fact that petrochemical and telecommunication firms are 
substantially larger. The average total assets for Saudi petrochemical and 
telecommunication firms are 42.5 billion Saudi Riyals compared to 14.5 billion Saudi 
Riyals for the whole sampled firms. There are two possible factors which encourage large 
companies to produce a higher level of risk-related information. First, the operations of 
large firms are wider and more complex resulting in a high level of risk which leads to 
more risk disclosure since they have more information to reveal (Abraham & Cox, 2007). 
Second, larger companies tend to have lower costs of preparing, auditing and publishing 
information which encourage them to produce a larger amount of risk-related information 
(Mostafa Hassan, 2009; Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007; Muzahhem, 2011).   
Table 5.5: Risk disclosure categories; industry-wise 
  Financial risk sentences Operational risk sentences Strategic risk sentences 
Agriculture 11 9 4 
Building 10 11 4 
Cement 8 9 5 
Hotels & Tourism 10 9 5 
Industrial 7 9 3 
Media 14 9 1 
Multi-investment 7 8 4 
Petrochemical 11 17 4 
Power 7 14 3 
Real state 8 5 5 
retails 9 11 5 
Telecommunication 20 13 7 
Transportation 14 6 4 
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Figure 5.12: Risk disclosure categories; industry-wise 
 
The twelfth hypothesis of the present study is that there are significant differences 
in the levels of risk disclosure between industries. To test this hypothesis, this study 
conducts a one-way ANOVA test to examine the industry effect. Table 5. reports the result 
of the one-way ANOVA test. The results show significant differences in the levels of risk 
disclosure between industries in the Saudi context. Therefore, the twelfth hypothesis 
cannot be rejected. This finding is consistent with the findings by previous studies (e.g. 
Madrigal, Guzmán, & Guzmán, 2015; Rajab & Schachler, 2009). Several theories could 
explain this finding. For instance, Political cost theory suggests that when a firm operates 
in an industry that concerns the public, media, and regulators; the firm might have the 
incentive to provide detailed risk information in order to deflect the unfavorable attention. 
Also, the institutional theory suggests that firms` managers may choose to imitate the 
disclosure practices similar to other companies in the same industry regardless of the 
importance of the information provided which may result in significant variation among 
different industries (Hassan, 2009). Further, proprietary costs theory suggests that 
companies may choose to not engage in voluntary disclosure since it might affect their 
competitiveness in the business. Verrecchia (2001) states that the proprietary costs of 
disclosure differ between industries. Hence, risk disclosure varies between industries. 
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Table 5.6: One-way ANOVA test 
  N Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Cement 52 22.15 9.28 9 50 
Petrochemical 56 32.71 11.55 10 64 
retails 53 24.60 9.81 11 59 
Power 8 23.38 12.27 10 47 
Agriculture 58 24.07 12.24 8 72 
Telecommunication 16 40.38 6.23 32 59 
Multi-investment 28 18.43 13.35 0 50 
Industrial 57 19.56 9.79 3 51 
Building 63 25.08 9.26 7 48 
Real state 29 18.21 10.46 2 57 
Transportation 17 24.18 4.95 15 38 
Media 12 23.83 4.82 12 32 
Hotels & Tourism 14 23.71 10.40 9 39 
Total 463 24.37 11.32 0 72 
F 9.249 
Sig. 0 
 
5.6 Chapter summary 
This chapter discussed the level and practices of risk disclosure among Saudi listed 
firms in addition to shedding the lights on the trend of risk reporting over the sample 
period. The chapter also discussed the various attributes of risk disclosure (i.e. qualitative, 
quantitative, forward-looking, historical, good, bad, or neutral), and examined the industry 
effect on risk disclosure.  
The main findings of the content analysis are as follow. The descriptive results 
show that Saudi firms report 24 risk-related sentences on average. This finding indicates 
that risk disclosure is limited in Saudi Arabia since it is much lower than the risk disclosure 
in several different contexts. The low level of risk disclosure in Saudi Arabia can be 
mainly explained by the lack of enforcement. During the sample period, there were no 
mandatory requirements for Saudi listed firms to provide risk-related information in the 
annual reports. However, the recent developments in the Saudi context such as the 
adoption of IFRS and the updated version of the Saudi Corporate Governance code are 
expected to enhance the practices of risk disclosure. 
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The results show that there has been a gradual increase in the average number of 
risk disclosure among Saudi listed firms over the period 2012–2015. This implies that 
corporate governance reforms in Saudi Arabia have helped in enhancing risk disclosure 
practices. It also suggests that the introduction of governance regulations enables the 
improvement of corporate governance practices, including risk disclosure, in spite of the 
weak legal system in emerging markets. 
 Operational and financial risk disclosure appeared to be the most frequent 
disclosed risk while the strategic risk is significantly lower. The lack of strategic risk 
disclosure can be explained by the ambiguity of information. Strategic risks are less 
controllable by firms such as risks related to society, economy, or politics. In fact, risk 
assessment is subjective and it relies on the managerial discretion. Therefore, firms` 
managers have less incentive to disclose information that might put them at intense 
criticisms and possible legal actions if their estimation goes wrong. To overcome this 
issue, it is worthwhile for regulatory authorities in Saudi Arabia to require greater 
emphases of the disclosure of strategic risk-related information. Amran, Bin, & Hassan 
(2008) find that strategic risk is the most disclosed types of risk among Malaysian firms as 
a result of the requirements of Bursa Malaysia. 
 This study also finds that most disclosed risk in the Saudi context is positive in 
nature. Firms` managers have a higher tendency toward the disclosure of positive news 
while they are reluctant to disclose negative news. In the case of negative news, managers 
withhold and accumulate the news until they become certain (Kothari et al., 2009). Linsley 
& Shrives (2006) suggest that managers would not reveal bad news since they prefer to 
signal a bright image of their risk management performance to the market with a view to 
avoiding reputation costs. Therefore, regulators should concentrate on the enforcement of 
bad risk disclosure since companies have less incentive to disclose such information 
(Schrand & Elliott, 1998).  
Saudi firms disclose a significantly lower level of quantitative risk. Mohobbot 
(2005) proposes that it is challenging to measure and quantify risks (cited by Muzahhem 
2011). Also, he argues that firms` managers have less incentive to quantify risks with the 
view to avoiding intense criticisms and possible legal actions when their estimation goes 
wrong. Hence, the present study recommends Saudi regulators to encourage the disclosure 
of quantitative risk information. Linsley & Shrives (2006) argue that firms should disclose 
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more quantitative risk-related information in order to help stakeholders to evaluate the risk 
engaged in by firms.  Cabedo & Tirado (2004) argue that the disclosure of quantitative risk 
information has the potential to help annual report users in making better-informed 
decisions.  
Using a one-way ANOVA test, the results show significant differences between 
industries in the Saudi context. This finding is expected since firms in various sectors face 
different kinds of risks (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Mostafa Hassan, 2009). Hence, proper 
legislation should have two levels of disclosure: (i) general disclosures for all companies; 
and (ii) industry-specific disclosures where companies provide relevant information with 
regards to the firm’s status in relation to its industry (Albassam, 2014). 
Having discussed the level and practices of the disclosure of risk-related 
information of Saudi listed firms in this chapter, next chapter will present the determinants 
of corporate risk disclosure with particular attention to corporate governance mechanisms, 
ownership structure, Islamic values, and the Loss-Making Firms Procedures (LMFPs). 
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Chapter 6  EMPIRICAL RESULTS: THE IMPACT OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE, ISLAMIC VALUES, AND THE LOSS-MAKING 
FIRMS PROCEDURES ON RISK DISCLOSURE 
 6.1. Introduction 
The present chapter reviews descriptive statistics and correlation matrix, discusses 
the empirical results of the determinants of risk disclosure, and presents the robustness 
tests. This chapter seeks to achieve the following three objectives. First, it presents the 
descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of dependent and independent variables. 
Second, the chapter discusses the findings of the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation 
technique in investigating the effects of corporate governance, ownership structure, and 
Islamic values on risk disclosure in Saudi Arabia. Third, the chapter discusses the impact 
of introducing the Loss-Making Firms Procedures on risk disclosure using a difference-in-
difference model. Fourth, it tests how robust the results are and investigates the presence of 
endogeneity problems. 
 This chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 discusses the descriptive 
statistics. Section 6.3 reviews the correlation matrix in order to detect the presence of 
multicollinearity issues. Section 6.4 discusses the results of the impacts of corporate 
governance mechanisms, ownership structure, and Islamic values on the practices of risk 
disclosure in Saudi Arabia. Section 6.5 presents the results of the impact of the Loss-
Making Firms Procedures on risk disclosure using a difference-in-difference approach. 
Section 6.6 discusses the results of the robustness tests including a lagged structure model 
and a random effect model. Finally, section 6.7 presents the summary of the chapter. 
6.2 Descriptive statistics 
As reported in panel A of Table 6.1, the log of the number of risk sentences 
(LogRD) has an average of 1.33. There is a great variation in risk disclosure practices 
among Saudi listed firms where LogRD ranges from 0 to 1.86 with a standard deviation of 
0.25. The distribution of risk disclosure seems to be consistent with the literature. For 
instance, Linsley & Shrives (2006) find that the mean of risk disclosure is 78 sentences and 
the standard deviation is 55 sentences among UK listed firms. Similarly, Lajili & Zéghal 
(2005) find the average risk management disclosure is 10.1 sentences and the standard 
deviation is 7.23 for Canadian listed firms. A detailed explanation of the level of risk 
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disclosure and comparison to relevant studies has been discussed extensively in the 
previous chapter. Panel B shows that Islamic values (IV) range between 0 and 0.44, with 
an average of 0.19. This finding is slightly lower than the findings by Albassam & Ntim 
(2016) where they report a figure of 0.29. This difference can be explained by the different 
samples of the two studies. More precisely, the exclusion of financial firms by this study 
results in lowering the Islamic values scores given that financial firms score higher than 
non-financial firms. Financial firms tend to establish a ‘Shariah’ supervisory board, 
provide a narrative regarding the existence of a ‘Shariah’ review and monitoring unit, and 
provide an explicit statement regarding its willingness to voluntarily incorporate Islamic 
values into business operations.  
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Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics of model 1 variables 
Notes: The table displays the Descriptive statistics of model 1 variables. LogRD represents risk disclosure as log of the 
number of risk sentences, IV represents Islamic values, GOVOWN denotes government ownership, INSIDOWN denotes 
insiders ownership, INSTOWN denotes institutional ownership, BLKOWN represents block holders ownership, BS 
denotes board size, ID denotes the percentage of independent directors, NED denotes the percentage of non-executive 
directors, EDUC represents the education level of the board, RMCOM represents the existence of risk management 
committee, BIG4 represents the auditor type,  LSALES denotes firm size as log of sales, ROE denotes profitability as 
return on equity, LVG represents leverage, LIQ represents liquidity, and LPAGES represents the log of the annual 
reports` number of pages.   
Variables  Observations  Mean  Maximum  Minimum 
 Std. 
Dev. 
Panel A: Dependent variable 
LogRD 463 1.33 1.86 0.00 0.25 
Panel B: Independent variables 
IV 463 0.19 0.44 0.00 0.10 
GOVOWN 463 0.08 0.84 0.00 0.18 
INSIDOWN 463 0.16 0.96 0.00 0.20 
INSTOWN 463 0.16 0.75 0.00 0.20 
BLKOWN 463 0.36 0.95 0.00 0.24 
BS 463 8.33 12.00 4.00 1.52 
ID 463 0.49 1.00 0.00 0.17 
NED 463 0.38 0.71 0.00 0.19 
EDUC 463 0.54 1.00 0.00 0.50 
RMCOM 463 0.03 1.00 0.00 0.18 
BIG4 463 0.66 1.00 0.00 0.48 
Panel C: Control variables 
LogSales 463 3.00 5.28 0 0.80 
ROE 463 0.08 0.39 -0.10 0.58 
LVG 463 0.23 0.88 0 0.19 
LIQ 463 2.53 6.80 0.48 2.61 
LogPages 463 1.73 2.12 1.23 0.15 
 
Government ownership (GOVOWN), calculated as a percentage of the total 
number of outstanding shares, has a mean of 8% and ranges from 0 to 84%. This finding is 
in line with previous studies (e.g. Al-Janadi, Rahman, & Haj Omar, 2013). Panel B shows 
that insiders (INSIDOWN) own an average of 16% of the total outstanding shares. This 
result also is in line with the findings of relevant studies (e.g. Samaha, Dahawy, Hussainey, 
& Stapleton 2012). 
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Another finding reported in Table 6.1 is that the average institutional holding 
(INSTOWN) is 16% with a range between 0 and 75%. This finding is in line with previous 
studies. For example, Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, & Matos (2011) find that the means of 
institutional holding are 8%, 9% and 8% in Greece, New Zealand, and Hong Kong, 
respectively. On the contrary, Chung & Zhang (2011) note that institutional ownership 
represents, on average, 50% of the total shares for US companies. As shown in panel B, the 
mean of block ownership (BLKOWN) is 36%, with a floor of 0 and a cap of 95%. These 
findings are interesting as it appears that the proportion of block holders ownership in 
Saudi Arabia seems to be lower than other developing countries. For instance, Elghuweel 
(2015) and Khan (2016) find that the average block holder ownership is 55% both in the 
Omani and Pakistani contexts. Hence, the findings of the present study suggest that Saudi 
listed firms have more dispersed ownership structure.  
As reported in panel B in Table 6.1, board size (BS) value has an average of 8.33, 
and a range from 4 to 12 members. This is consistent with previous studies. For instance, 
Al-Maghzom, Hussainey, & Aly (2016a) finds that the average board size of Saudi listed 
banks is 9.55 members. Albassam & Ntim (2016), Al-Nodel & Hussainey (2010), and Al-
Janadi et al. (2013) report that the average board size of Saudi non-financial companies is 
8.4, 7.9, and 8.4 respectively. It is also in line with other findings in the developed markets. 
As an example, Elzahar & Hussainey (2012) finds that the mean value of board size in the 
UK is 10.74. 
From Table 6.1, it can be noted that the average percentage of independent 
directors (ID) setting on the board is 49%. This finding is in line with other findings in the 
developing markets. For instance, Rozaini Mohd Haniffa & Cooke (2002) and Ntim, 
Lindop, & Thomas (2013) report that 45% and 47% of the Malaysian and South African 
firms` boards, respectively, are dominated by independent directors.  
As reported in panel B of Table 6.1, the proportion of non-executive directors 
(NED) that sit on the board of Saudi listed firms is 38% on average. This finding is in line 
with the literature. For example, Haniffa & Cooke (2005) find that non-executive directors 
account for 43% of the board among Malaysian firms. It appears that the vast majority of 
board members among Saudi listed firms are either independent or non-executive directors. 
This is consistent with the best practices of corporate governance. 
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Looking also at panel B, board education (EDUC) has a mean of 54%. Francis, 
Hasan, & Wu (2014) and Martikainen, Miihkinen, Kinnunen, & Trober (2015) report that 
the average board education is 40% and 48% among US and Finnish listed firms 
respectively. Hence, this finding is consistent with the best practices of corporate 
governance given the vital roles that higher educated personnel plays as suggested by 
previous empirical studies (e.g. Francis, Hasan, & Wu, 2014; Jiang & Murphy, 2007; 
Martikainen, Miihkinen, Kinnunen, & Trober, 2015). 
Surprisingly the average of the existence of a risk management committee 
(RMCOM) is only 3%. This low mean is in contrast to the finding by Muzahhem (2011) 
and Subramaniam, McManus, & Zhang (2009) where they report averages of 47% and 
44% for UAE and Australian firms. However, the Capital Market Authority in Saudi 
Arabia has recently issued a new version of the Saudi Corporate Governance Code where it 
encourages the establishment of risk management committees on boards. Therefore, this 
figure is expected to increase in the near future. Further details are shown in subsection 
3.4.1.6. 
The auditor type (BIG4) is measured as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 
if the audit firm is one of the big 4 firms and zero otherwise. The average value is 66% for 
Saudi listed firms. To compare it with the literature, Ntim et al. (2013) find that the 
average value of auditor type is 87% for South African listed companies. Saudi listed firms 
seem to be relatively less reliant on Big4 audit firms. However, the reliance on Big4 audit 
firms by Saudi listed firms increased compared to the historical percentage which is 58% 
found by Al-Bassam, Ntim, Opong, & Downs (2016) during the period 2004 – 2010.  
Regarding control variables, Table 6.1 shows that firm size (measured by the log of 
total sales, LogSales) has an average of 3 and rages between 0 and 5.28. Profitability 
(ROE) has an average of 8% with a range between 39% and -10%. Another finding is that 
the average leverage (LVG) is 23% with a range between 0 and 88%. This finding is in line 
with the finding by Alzead (2017) where he finds that the average leverage for Saudi listed 
firms is 24%. Liquidity (LIQ) has a mean of 2.53 and ranges from 0.48 to 6.80. Total 
disclosure (measured by the log of a total number of pages, LogPages) has an average of 
1.73 with a range between 1.23 and 2.12. 
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6.3. Correlation matrix 
There are two reasons for employing the correlation matrix. First, employing the 
correlation matrix helps in examining the existence of multicollinearity problem between 
independent variables. According to Gujarati & Porter (2003) when the correlation 
coefficient between two variables exceeds 80%, this suggests the existence of the 
multicollinearity issue. Looking at Table 6.2, it is obvious that there is no concern of the 
multicollinearity issue since the highest correlation coefficient is the correlation between 
board size (BS) and non-executive directors (NED) which equals 0.52. 
Second, the correlation matrix can be used to test whether the explanatory variables 
exhibit correlations with the dependent variable. One unanticipated finding is that Islamic 
values variable (IV) has a negative correlation with risk disclosure (LogRD) which equals 
0.14. Although the correlation is low, it is significant at 1% level. This finding is contrary 
to what the current study hypothesized. However, this finding is in line with previous 
empirical work. For example,  Al-Maghzom et al. (2016b) and Abdallah, Hassan, & 
McClelland (2015) find that Islamic banks disclose a significantly lower level of risk 
disclosure than non-Islamic banks in Saudi Arabia. Abdallah et al. (2015) justify this 
finding by referring to the more conservative principles that guide Islamic financial 
institutions which hinder the risk disclosure practices. Hence, Islamic firms provide less 
risk-related information. 
The results of Table 6.2 indicate that risk disclosure is positively and significantly 
correlated with institutional ownership (INSTOWN), block holder ownership (BLKOWN), 
board size, non-executive directors, risk management committee (RMCOM), and auditor 
type (big4). On the other hand, inside ownership (INSIDOWN) is negatively and 
significantly correlated with risk disclosure. These findings suggest that firms with a risk 
management committee, higher institutional and block holder ownership, larger board size, 
higher proportion on non-executive directors, less Islamic, less inside ownership, and big 4 
audited produce higher level of risk reporting.  
Regarding control variables, firm size (LogSales), profitability (ROE), and total 
disclosure (i.e. measured as the number of the annual report pages, LogPages) have a 
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significant positive correlation with risk disclosure as can be seen in the table. This 
suggests that larger and profitable firms report more risk-related information.  
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Table 6.2: Correlation matrix of dependent and independent variables: Determinants of RD 
Notes: The table displays the correlation matrix between the variables. LogRD represents risk disclosure as log of the number of risk sentences, IV represents Islamic values, GOVOWN denotes government ownership, INSIDOWN 
denotes insiders ownership, INSTOWN denotes institutional ownership, BLKOWN represents block holders ownership, BS denotes board size, ID denotes the percentage of independent directors, NED denotes  the percentage of non-
executive directors, EDUC represents the education level of the board, RMCOM represents the existence of risk management committee, BIG4 represents the auditor type,  LSALES denotes firm size as log of sales, ROE denotes 
profitability as return on equity, LVG represents leverage, LIQ represents liquidity, and LPAGES represents the log of the annual reports` number of pages.  ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. * Correlation is significant at the 
0.05 level. 
  LogRD IVI2 GOV INSID% INST BLOCK BS ID NED EDUC RMCOM Auditor_type LogSales ROE Leverage2 WC ratio logpages 
LogRD 1 
                
IV -.139** 1 
               
GOVOWN 0.059 -.059 1 
              
INSIDOWN -.117* -.026 -.001 1 
             
INSTOWN .180** -.065 -.176** 0.084 1 
            
BLCKOWN .147** -.145** .420** .349** .484** 1 
           
BS .141** -.168** .177** 0.078 .194** .226** 1 
          
ID -.001 0.044 -.043 -.105* -.163** -.291** .340** 1 
         
NED .303** -.177** .314** 0.048 .288** .376** .521** -.400** 1 
        
EDUC 0.074 -.133** .139** 0.043 -.017 .107* .259** 0.058 .156** 1 
       
RMCOM .222** -.039 .136** -.001 0.082 .162** .177** -.027 .192** 0.037 1 
      
BIG4 .235** -.164** .168** .177** .298** .411** .245** -.167** .337** .116* .128** 1 
     
LogSales .431** -.271** .318** 0.086 .235** .462** .286** -.190** .415** 0.065 .316** .470** 1 
    
ROE .244** -.034 0.047 0.088 0.036 .136** 0.066 .118* 0.079 -.002 0.023 .144** .200** 1 
   
LVG 0.001 -.170** -.021 -.048 0.031 0.052 -.001 -.001 0.003 0.038 0.008 0.081 0.065 .181** 1 
  
LIQ -.032 .095* 0.029 -.050 -.049 -.115* -.056 0.013 -.033 -.067 -.085 -.154** -.168** 0.037 -.079 1 
 
Logpages .496** -.133** .200** 0.01 .098* .300** .330** -.025- .298** .241** .259** .336** .396** .154** 0.004 -.186** 1 
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6.4. Regression analysis 
 The following subsections present the results for the determinants of risk disclosure 
in Saudi Arabian firms. As discussed in Section 4.3 of Chapter 4, Model 1 explores the 
impact of corporate governance, ownership structure, and Islamic values on risk disclosure. 
The model is re-stated as: 
LogRDi,t =  0 + β1 BSi,t + β2 IDi,t + β3 NED i,t + β4 BIG4i,t + β5 BLOCKOWNi,t + β6 
GOVOWNi,t + β7 INSTOWNi,t + β8 INSIDOWN,t + β10 IVIi,t + 

=
+
n
i
ititi
CONTROLS
1
      (equation 1) 
Table 6.3 presents the results of the OLS regression where the log of the number of 
risk sentences is regressed against corporate governance, ownership structure, Islamic 
values, and firm characteristics.  The present study uses the clustered standard error at the 
firm level in order to solve the problem of heteroscedasticity as discussed in section 4.5.3. 
The adjusted R2 is 0.55 which suggests that 55% of the variation of risk disclosure in Saudi 
Arabia is explained by the independent variables listed in Table 6.3.  
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Table 6.3: The OLS regression:  CG and IV on RD 
Notes: The table shows the results for OLS regression results with clustered standard errors to correct for heteroscedasticity. The 
dependent variable for all models is LogRD which represents risk disclosure calculated as a log of the number of risk sentences. The 
independent variables are corporate governance variables (i.e. board size, the proportion of independent directors, the proportion of non-
executive directors, board education, the existence of a risk committee, and audit type), ownership variables (government ownership, 
inside ownership, institutional ownership, and block ownership), Islamic values, and control variables (firm size, profitability, leverage, 
liquidity, and total disclosure). BS denotes board size, ID denotes the percentage of independent directors, NED denotes the percentage 
of non-executive directors, EDUC represents the education level of the board, RMCOM represents the existence of risk management 
committee, BIG4 represents the auditor type, GOVOWN denotes government ownership, INSIDOWN denotes insiders ownership, 
INSTOWN denotes institutional ownership, BLKOWN represents block holders ownership, IV represents Islamic values,  LogSALES 
denotes firm size measured as log of sales, ROE denotes profitability measured as return on equity, LVG represents leverage calculated 
as total debt to total assets, LIQ represents liquidity measured as current ratio, and LPAGES represents the log of the annual reports` 
number of pages.  The asterisks *, ** and *** denote the 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance respectively. 
Dependent variable: LogRD 
    1 2 3 4 
Variable expected sign Coeff. t-Stat Coeff t-Stat Coeff t-Stat Coeff t-Stat 
Panel A: Corporate governance variables   
BS + -0.060*** -6.374   
  -0.065*** -6.734 
ID + 0.048*** 5.560   
  0.051*** 5.751 
NED + 0.048*** 5.844   
  0.052*** 6.251 
EDUC + 0.010 0.576   
  0.024 1.406 
RMCOM + 0.057 1.076   
  0.056 1.083 
BIG4 + -0.016 -0.767 
  
    -0.010 -0.457 
Panel B: Ownership variables 
GOVOWN - 
 
 -0.129 -1.907 
  
-0.254*** -3.784 
INSIDOWN - 
 
 -0.144*** -3.041 
  
-0.127*** -2.812 
INSTOWN + 
 
 0.080 1.349 
  
0.022 0.372 
BLKOWN -     -0.030 -0.508   
0.066 1.138 
Panel C: Islamic values variable 
IV + 
  
    0.050 1.628 0.036 1.237 
Panel C: Control variables 
LogSALES 0.061*** 4.159 0.055*** 3.811 0.049*** 3.587 0.066*** 4.449 
ROE 
 
0.058*** 3.784 0.035** 2.297 0.054*** 3.485 0.035** 2.301 
LVG 
 
-0.002 -1.089 -0.002 -0.750 -0.001 -0.579 -0.002 -0.915 
LIQ 
 
0.012*** 3.512 0.011*** 3.356 0.012*** 3.428 0.012*** 3.734 
LOGPAGES 0.646*** 9.393 0.683*** 9.623 0.653*** 9.335 0.682*** 9.805 
C   0 0.004 0.065 0.563 -0.072 -0.618 0.042 0.352 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.498 0.521 0.474 0.550 
N   463 463 463 463 
 
6.4.1. Empirical findings on corporate governance mechanisms 
The first hypothesis of the present study is that there is a significant and positive 
relationship between auditor type and risk disclosure. As can be seen in panel A of Table 
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6.3, the coefficient on auditor type (BIG 4) is negative in relation to the level of risk 
disclosure. Also, the relationship is statistically insignificant. Thus, the present study 
rejects the first hypothesis. 
These results are in line with other empirical studies that find the association 
between auditor type and risk disclosure is insignificant (e.g. Al-shammari 2014; Deumes 
and Knechel 2008; and Neri 2010). For instance, Al-shammari (2014) reports an 
insignificant relationship between auditor type and risk disclosure among banks in the 
GCC. On the other hand, this study is in contrast to the finding of Ntim, Lindop, and 
Thomas (2013) and Lopes and Rodrigues (2007) where they find a significant positive 
relationship between auditor type and the level of risk disclosure in South Africa and 
Portugal respectively. Theoretically, Agency costs theory could explain the association 
between risk reporting and auditor type. Auditing is considered a monitoring mechanism 
that mitigates the agency costs between agents and shareholders and increases firm value 
(Watts & Zimmerman, 1983). It is also assumed that corporations with high agency costs 
tend to hire well-known audit firms in order to decrease agency costs (Inchausti, 1997). 
Large audit firms are expected to put pressure on their clients to reveal a high level of 
disclosure since the large auditors care more about their reputations (Watts & Zimmerman, 
1986). However, recent auditing scandals (e.g. Arthur Andersen, Parmalat, etc.) do not 
support these theoretical assertions. Similarly, the empirical finding of the present study 
finds that the relationship between auditor type and risk disclosure is insignificant. In 
accordance with the present study`s results, Alsaeed (2006) reports an insignificant 
relationship between audit firm size and voluntary corporate disclosure in the Saudi 
context. The insignificant relationship between auditor type and risk disclosure might be 
explained by the Saudi Corporate Governance Code (SCGC) for not addressing the role of 
audit firms in enhancing the level of disclosure in firms’ annual reports. 
As reported in panel A of Table 6.3, board size has a negative coefficient and is 
statistically significant at 1% level. This implies that companies with larger board size 
report less risk-related information. This finding is in line with H2b hypothesis. Thus, the 
second hypothesis cannot be rejected. Several previous empirical studies such as Al-
shammari (2014); Elshandidy et al. (2013); Muzahhem (2011); and Ntim et al. (2013) 
report a positive association between the level of risk disclosure and board size. These 
finding can be explained by agency theory. Agency theory suggests that a larger board 
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impacts positively on disclosure, risk reporting, and performance because of the higher 
level of monitoring and the wider variety of expertise by the larger board (Bozec & Bozec, 
2012; Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012; Singh, Mathur, & Gleason, 2004). On the other hand,  
Jensen (1993) suggests that large board size might suffer from the deficiency of group 
cohesion,  resulting in communication and cooperation difficulties, which might hinder the 
operation of the company. Beasley (1996) discovers that large boards are associated with 
fraudulent financial practices. Xie, Davidson III, & DaDalt (2003)  argue that smaller 
boards are better at functioning and providing a higher level of financial reporting. The 
Saudi Corporate Governance Code requires the size of the board to be less than twelve 
directors. Given the results of the present study, the above discussions, and the requirement 
of the Saudi Corporate Governance Code (SCGC), the present study supports the view that 
smaller boards are more effective regarding risk disclosure in the Saudi context. 
The third hypothesis of the present study is that there is a significant and positive 
relationship between independent directors and risk disclosure. As can be seen in panel A 
of Table 6.3, the proportion of independent directors shows a significant positive 
relationship with risk disclosure at a 1% level of significance. This implies that firms with 
a higher level of board independence disclose more risk-related information. This result is 
in line with the current study's expectations. Hence, the third hypothesis cannot be rejected 
at the 1% level of significance. This result broadly supports previous studies (e.g. Abraham 
and Cox 2007; Elshandidy et al. 2013; Muzahhem 2011; Ntim et al. 2013). Agency theory 
suggests that independent directors play an important role in monitoring and controlling 
the managers` behaviors and hence, it is expected that the more independent directors on 
the board, the higher the level of risk disclosure (Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007). Independent 
directors can mitigate managerial opportunistic behaviour which might, in turn, reduce the 
agency problem (Fama, 1980). Independent directors tend to put more pressure on 
executives to provide a higher level of disclosure and transparency since independent 
directors care more about their personal reputations (Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007). The Saudi 
Corporate Governance Code states that two members or one-third of the board directors 
shall be independent, at a minimum. Also, the he Saudi Corporate Governance Code 
requires a sufficient number of independent directors to be present in the board sub-
committees. The present study supports the view that independent directors have vital roles 
in promoting risk disclosure practices in Saudi Arabia. 
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The fourth hypothesis of the present study is that there is a significant and positive 
relationship between non-executive directors and risk disclosure. The proportion of non-
executive directors has a significant positive relationship with risk disclosure at a 1% level 
of significance as can be seen in panel A of Table 6.3. Firms with a larger number of non-
executive directors tend to reveal more risk disclosure. The results provide strong support 
to not reject the fourth hypothesis at the 1% level of significance. One of the mechanisms 
that can mitigate the agency cost is by reducing the proportion of executive directors 
(Abraham & Cox, 2007; Al-Janadi et al., 2013; Solomon, 2007). Decreasing the proportion 
of executive directors is important since it can mitigate the issue of information 
asymmetry, which in turn, has the potential to improve the board effectiveness (Abraham 
& Cox, 2007; Fama & Jensen, 1983). Non-executive directors with various experience and 
knowledge are more capable of enhancing the level of risk disclosure (Ntim & 
Soobaroyen, 2013). In this case, non-executive directors provide the necessary checks and 
balances required to make the board of directors more effective. This finding is in line with 
the finding by Abraham & Cox (2007); and Elshandidy, Fraser, & Hussainey, (2013) 
where they report a positive relationship between non-executive directors and risk 
disclosure in the UK. Similarly, Ntim et al. (2013) report a significant positive relationship 
among South African firms. The Saudi Corporate Governance Code requires the majority 
of board members to be non-executives. The present study supports the view that non-
executive directors play important roles in promoting risk disclosure practices in Saudi 
Arabia. 
The fifth hypothesis of the present study is that there is a significant and positive 
relationship between board education and risk disclosure. As can be seen in panel A of 
Table 6.3, board education demonstrates a positive but insignificant relationship with risk 
disclosure. However, previous empirical studies find that the relationship is positive and 
significant. For instance, Martikainen et al. (2015) find that boards with a higher level of 
education, provide more risk-related information and the result is statistically significant. 
Jiang & Murphy (2007) find that firms with business professor executives perform 
significantly better than their peers with no academics. Francis et al. (2014) report that the 
presence of academics on boards is significantly and positively related to stock prices 
informativeness. It is argued that board members with a higher level of education play a 
vital role in monitoring, consulting, and implicating corporate governance rules (Francis, 
Hasan, & Wu, 2014). Martikainen, Miihkinen, Kinnunen, & Trober (2015) argue that 
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directors with a higher level of education have more ability to report more risk-related 
information since they are more able to provide critical judgments regarding the content of 
disclosed information. However, board members might have the experience that may 
equate to a higher level of education which could be a possible explanation why higher-
educated directors do not exhibit a significant and positive relationship with the level of 
risk disclosure. Another possible explanation is the lack of independence. As can be seen 
from Table 6.2, the correlation between board education and board independence is 0.058 
which is weak. Less independent directors are perceived to be less effective monitors 
which less likely results in a higher level of risk disclosure. This finding does not support 
the upper echelons theory which claims that organizational outputs are partially predicted 
by managerial background characteristics.  
The sixth hypothesis of the present study is that there is a significant and positive 
relationship between risk management committee and risk disclosure. As can be seen in 
panel A of Table 6.3, the existence of a risk management committee has a positive 
relationship with risk disclosure. However, the relationship is insignificant. Hence, the 
sixth hypothesis is rejected. Neri (2010) argues that the existence of a risk committee on 
the board of director would be viewed as a sign of proper risk management and risk 
reporting. Risk reporting is considered a fundamental task of risk management systems. 
Agency theory can explain the positive relationship between the existence of a risk 
management committee and risk disclosure. The Saudi Corporate Governance Code states 
that the chairperson and majority of the risk management committee members shall be 
non-executive directors. The major responsibility of non-executive directors is monitoring 
the board actions with a view to protecting shareholders` interests. Empirically, Al-Hadi 
(2015) finds that the existence of a risk committee is significantly and positively related to 
market risk disclosure in the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries. Similarly, Hassan et al. 
(2008) report a significant positive relationship between the existence of a risk committee 
and financial instruments disclosure among Malaysian listed firms.  
The present study could not confirm that the risk management committee plays a 
vital positive role in risk disclosure practices in Saudi Arabia. However, what remains 
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unclear is whether or not the finding of the present study is a true representation given the 
small number of firms that have risk committees of the current study`s sample26.  
To sum up, the findings of the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on risk 
disclosure reveal that board size is negatively and significantly related to risk disclosure. 
Large board size might suffer from the deficiency of group cohesion, resulting in lower 
level of risk disclosure. Independent and non-executive directors are positively and 
significantly related to risk disclosure. Independent directors tend to put more pressure on 
executives to provide a higher level of disclosure and transparency. However, auditor type, 
board education, and risk management committee have no statistically significant 
relationships with risk reporting.   
6.4.2. Empirical findings on ownership structure 
Regarding the ownership structure, the seventh hypothesis of the present study is 
that there is a significant and negative relationship between government ownership and risk 
disclosure. As can be seen from panel B, the coefficient on government ownership is 
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting that there is a negative 
association between government ownership and risk disclosure. This result is in line with 
the current study's expectation. Hence, the seventh hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 1% 
level of significance.  
This finding is in line with previous studies. For instance, Alzead (2017) find a 
significant negative relationship between risk disclosure and government ownership in 
Saudi Arabia. Samaha, Dahawy, Hussainey, & Stapleton (2012) also discover a significant 
negative association between corporate governance voluntary disclosure and state holdings 
among Egyptian listed firms. Al-Janadi, Rahman, & Haj Omar (2013) report a significant 
negative association between voluntary disclosure and state ownership in Saudi Arabia. 
Ghazali & Weetman (2006) argue that government ownership has the potential to 
encourage firms to reveal less information. Capital need theory can explain the negative 
association between government ownership and risk disclosure. Firms with a higher level 
of government ownership may lose the incentive to disclose more risk-related information 
 
26 Only 4% of the sample`s firms establish risk committees (five firms out of 122 firms). 
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since they do not have the need for attracting capital. These firms enjoy easy access to 
various forms of capital (Ghazali & Weetman, 2006).  
The eighth hypothesis of the present study is that there is a significant and positive 
relationship between institutional ownership and risk disclosure. Table 6.3 illustrates that 
institutional ownership has a positive, but insignificant, relationship with risk disclosure. 
This finding is different from what the present study has hypothesized where institutional 
ownership is assumed to be significantly associated with risk disclosure. Thus, the eighth 
hypothesis is rejected. This finding is in contrast to the findings of previous studies (e.g. 
Guan et al., 2007; Healy et al., 1999; Khan, 2016; Laidroo, 2009; Ntim et al., 2012). It is 
argued that institutional investors have a higher ability for monitoring companies since 
they have the required resources such as efficiency, experience, and robust employment of 
voting rights (Donnelly & Mulcahy, 2008). They are motivated to protect their investment 
which, in turn, encourages them to monitors management in order to mitigate the agency 
conflict between owners and executives (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). Hence, firms are 
encouraged to reveal more risk-related information to fulfill the pressure imposed by 
institutional investors. However, the findings of the present study show that institutional 
investors in Saudi Arabia do not have a significant influence on risk reporting. 
Nevertheless, this finding is in line with the results of Albassam (2014). In fact, Albassam 
(2014) reports, in a qualitative study, that the institutional investment in Saudi listed firms 
concentrates on short-term investments. Myopic institutional investors would not put more 
pressure on management to disclose more risk-related information. 
The ninth hypothesis of the present study is that there is a significant and negative 
relationship between inside ownership and risk disclosure. As can be seen from panel A, 
the relationship between inside ownership and risk disclosure is negative and statistically 
significant at 1% level. This suggests that there is a negative association between inside 
ownership and risk disclosure. Hence, the ninth hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 1% 
level of significance. This finding broadly supports the findings of previous empirical 
findings  (e.g. Eng & Mak, 2003 and Ghazali & Weetman, 2006). Ghazali & Weetman 
(2006) find that Malaysian listed firms with higher inside ownership reveal less voluntary 
disclosure. Similarly, Eng & Mak, (2003) find a significant and negative relationship 
between inside ownership and voluntary disclosure in Singapore. Shleifer & Vishny (1997) 
argue that if directors` ownership is large, they might have incentives to maximize their 
144 
 
own interest by lowering the level of transparency. In the same vein, firms with a lower 
level of inside ownership are expected to disclose more risk-related information in order to 
assure outsiders that they are working in the best interest of them (Mokhtar, 2010). Thus, 
the level of monitoring by outside investors can be reduced if managers provide more risk-
related information.  
Table 6.4 reports that block ownership has a positive, but insignificant, relationship 
with risk disclosures. However, the tenth hypothesis of the present study is that there is a 
significant and negative relationship between block ownership and risk disclosure. Thus, 
the tenth hypothesis is rejected. The findings of the present study is different from the 
findings of previous studies (e.g. Deumes & Knechel, 2008; Ntim et al., 2013). Deumes 
and Knechel (2008) discover a negative relationship between ownership concentration and 
internal control disclosure in Netherland. Ntim, Lindop, and Thomas (2013) find a 
significant negative association between risk reporting and ownership concentration among 
South African firms. Nevertheless, Konishi and Ali (2007) and Mohobbot (2005) find no 
significant relationship between risk reporting and ownership concentration which is in 
line with the findings of the present study. Additionally, Alzead (2017) finds that the 
relationship between block ownership and risk reporting is insignificant among Saudi 
listed firms. The result indicates that concentrated ownership might play a limited role in 
influencing the practices of risk reporting in Saudi Arabia (Alzead, 2017). Firms with 
dispersed ownership experience higher degree of agency problem because of the separation 
between ownership and control which motivates shareholders to put more pressure on 
managers to reveal a higher level of risk disclosure (Muzahhem, 2011). Companies with 
concentrated ownership do not experience a separation between ownership and control. In 
fact, block owners do not depend on public disclosure to monitor managers since they have 
access to internal information. Hence, firms with concentrated ownership would 
experience a lower degree of agency problem because of the less degree of separation 
between ownership and control given the monitoring ability of by block shareholders. 
However, principle-principle problem between controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders would arise (Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton & Jiang, 2008) which might 
result in lowering the level of risk disclosure since block owners do not depend on public 
disclosure. 
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In summary, the findings of the impact of ownership structure on risk disclosure 
reveal that government ownership have significant and negative relationship with risk 
disclosure. Firms with a higher level of government ownership may lose the incentive to 
disclose more risk-related information since they do not have the need for attracting 
capital. In the same vein, inside ownership is negatively and significantly related to risk 
disclosure. When directors` ownership is large, they might have incentives to maximize 
their own interest by lowering the level of transparency. The present study also finds that 
institutional ownership and block ownership have no statistically significant relationships 
with risk reporting.   
6.4.3. Empirical findings on Islamic values 
The eleventh hypothesis of the present study is that there is a significant and 
positive relationship between Islamic values and risk disclosure. As discussed previously 
in section 3.4.3, the present study uses two proxies for measuring Islamic values. The 
result shown in Table 6.3 is the result of using the Islamic values` index suggested by 
Canepa & Ibnrubbian (2014). As can be seen from Table 6.3, this Islamic values` (IV) 
proxy is found to be insignificantly related to risk disclosure. Although the coefficient is 
positive as expected, the result is statistically insignificant. Using the other proxy 
suggested by Albassam & Ntim (2016), the present study finds the coefficient is negative 
(-0.016) and insignificant where the t-statistics equals -0.153. This result is puzzling and in 
contrast to the current study's expectation. Hence, the eleventh hypothesis is rejected. 
These findings are also in contrast with previous empirical findings. For instance, 
Albassam & Ntim (2016) study the effect of Islamic values on corporate governance 
disclosure using a sample of 76 Saudi listed firms over seven years. They find a robust 
significant and positive influence of Islamic values over corporate governance disclosure. 
It is predicted that Islamic corporations would manage their activities in compliance with 
the principles of Sharia in order to be honest and fair (Hussain, 1999) cited by (Aribi & 
Gao, 2011). Thus, Islamic corporations are expected to make transparent, true, fair, and 
timely disclosure to stakeholders (Albassam & Ntim, 2016) including the disclosure of 
risk-related information as discussed in section 3.4.3. However, Al-Maghzom et al. 
(2016b) and Abdallah, Hassan, & McClelland (2015) find that Islamic banks disclose a 
significantly lower level of risk disclosure than non-Islamic banks in Saudi Arabia and the 
Gulf Cooperation Council respectively. Abdallah et al. (2015) justify this result by 
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referring to the more conservative principles that guide Islamic financial institutions which 
hinder the risk disclosure practices.  
The possible justifications for the insignificant relationship between Islamic values 
and risk disclosure as found in this thesis are as follows. First, the empirical results of 
previous studies on the association between Islamic values and risk disclosure are 
contradictory as the above discussion suggests. Second, Abu-Tapanjeh (2009) compares 
the OECD principles with the Islamic principles and discovers that both are similar in 
relation to transparency and disclosure. The empirical results of the present study support 
this view. Third, an interviewee by Bindabel (2017) argues that the limited disclosure 
among Islamic firms can be explained by the lack of awareness by these firms` officials of 
the Islamic exhortation on the necessity of disclosure. 
 
6.4.4. Empirical findings on control variables 
 Regarding the control variables, the coefficient on firm size (LogSales) is positively 
and statistically significant at 1% level as can be seen in Panel C. This suggests that firm 
size has a significant relationship with risk disclosure. Larger firms are disclosing more 
risk-related information.  
This finding is also in line with previous findings of other studies (e.g. Abdallah, 
Hassan, & McClelland, 2015; Al-shammari, 2014; Alzead, 2017; Amran, Bin, & Hassan, 
2008; Elshandidy et al., 2013; Elshandidy, Fraser, & Hussainey, 2014; Linsley & Shrives, 
2005; Miihkinen, 2012; Mohobbot, 2005; and Ntim et al., 2013). Political cost theory 
suggests that some firms with higher concern by the public, media, and regulators are 
receiving high pressure (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986) and, therefore, the firms` managers 
decide to reveal voluntary information in order to deflect the unfavorable attention (Linsley 
& Shrives, 2000). Since large firms have a larger amount of stakeholders and shareholders, 
the political cost is expected to be higher in larger firms (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). 
Hence, larger firms disclose more risk-related information in order to deflect the 
undesirable attention. 
 As can also be noted in panel C of Table 6.3, profitability (ROE) is found to be 
significantly and positively related to risk disclosure. This positive relationship is 
significant at 5% level. This result is in line with the current study's expectation. 
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The result also supports the empirical evidence by previous studies (e.g. Deumes & 
Knechel, 2008; Ntim et al., 2013). According to signaling theory, it could be assumed that 
managers of highly profitable firms have the incentive to disclose more information as a 
good signal with a view to attracting investors. High profitable firms` directors would be 
willing to disclose more detailed risk-related information in order to signal to the market 
that they are professionals at managing their firms` risks (Konishi & Ali, 2007; Shrives & 
Linsley, 2003).  
 The coefficient on liquidity (LIQ) is positive and statistically significant at 1% 
level, suggesting that there is a positive association between liquidity and risk disclosure. 
This finding is in contrast to what the present study has expected where liquidity is 
assumed to be negatively associated with risk disclosure. According to capital need theory, 
it is expected that when a firm experiences a shortage of liquidity, managers would be 
willing to disclose more risk-related information in order to attract investors and meet their 
needs by a higher level of transparency. However, the result of the present study does not 
support this view where the coefficient on liquidity (LIQ) is positive and statistically 
significant at 1% level. This finding can be interpreted using signaling theory where firms` 
directors have more incentive to reveal more risk-related information when their liquidity 
ratios are high in order to signal to outsiders that they are capable of managing liquidity 
risks (Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012). This finding of the present study confirms the findings 
by Elshandidy et al. (2013); and Marshall & Weetman (2007) where they note the 
relationship between liquidity and risk disclosure is significantly positive. However, 
Alzead (2017) and Elzahar & Hussainey (2012) find the relationship is insignificant in the 
Saudi and UK context respectively.  
Table 6.3 illustrates that firm risk (measured by leverage, LVG) has an insignificant 
relationship with risk disclosures. This result is consistent with that of Alzead (2017) who 
finds that the relationship is insignificant in the Saudi context. Several other previous 
studies find the relationship is also insignificant (e.g. Abraham & Cox, 2007; Al-shammari, 
2014; Amran et al., 2008; Konishi & Ali, 2007; Linsley & Shrives, 2005; Lopes & 
Rodrigues, 2007; Rajab & Schachler, 2009).  
The current study employs the number of pages variable (LogPages, measured by the 
log of a total number of pages in the annual report) in order to control for total disclosure. 
This study argues that firms may disclose more about risk because they are in general good 
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at disclosure. Hence, adding this variable to the model has the potential to control for this 
effect. Thus, the present study succeeds to isolate the effect of the natural habits of firms 
with regards to disclosure practices from the specific disclosure on risks. This is considered 
a significant improvement over previous works in risk disclosure studies. As can be seen 
from panel C, the coefficient on LogPages is positive and statistically significant at 1% 
level, suggesting that there is a significant positive association between total disclosure and 
risk disclosure.  
6.5. Robustness Check 
It is argued that empirical results can be seriously influenced by endogeneity 
(Larcker & Rusticus, 2010), which happens if one or several variables are related to the 
error term (Wooldridge, 2015). The causes of endogeneity can be due to errors with the 
measurements, omitting of some variables, or simultaneity (Larcker & Rusticus, 2010). 
These causes of endogeneity are discussed as follows. First, measurement errors are 
considered the main cause of endogeneity (Börsch‐Supan & Köke, 2002; Larcker & 
Rusticus, 2010). The present study constructs a risk disclosure index following a careful 
procedure that has been discussed in section 4.4.1 in order to eliminate the issue of 
measurement errors. For instance, the current study employs a scoring scheme and 
performs validity and reliability tests. Second, the omission of control variables is also 
considered another cause of endogeneity. To eliminate this issue, the present study 
employs several control variables. Third, simultaneity is another major cause of 
endogeneity. Simultaneity arises when the independent variable is simultaneously affected 
by the dependent variable and/or a vital control variable is not included in the model 
(Ntim, Opong, & Danbolt, 2012; Wooldridge, 2015). In the case of the present study, it can 
be argued that firms with good risk disclosure practices are more likely to have better 
corporate governance framework. Hence, it is likely that the causality direction of risk 
disclosure and corporate governance can go either way. It can be also argued that risk 
disclosure and corporate governance variables are determined simultaneously by an 
omitted variable. To mitigate the problem of simultaneity, this thesis uses panel data, a 
difference-in-difference model, a lagged structure model, and a random effect model.  
 This study uses relevant statistical approaches and econometric models to address 
the problem of endogeneity. First, panel data is used rather than cross-sectional or time-
series data to deal with the problem of simultaneity (Börsch‐Supan & Köke, 2002). 
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Second, the current study also uses a difference-in-difference approach as discussed in 
section 6.6. It examines the impact of the enforcement of the Loss-Making Firms 
Procedures (LMFPs) on risk disclosure. The findings of the difference-in-difference model 
support the robustness of the results. Third,  a one-year lag between the dependent variable 
and the independent variables is used in order to address the issues of omitted variables 
and simultaneity (Ntim, Opong, & Danbolt, 2012). Employing lagged independent 
variables is a useful technique to address reverse causality. The reason is that the 
independent variables (corporate governance mechanisms) may affect risk disclosure in the 
next period. However, it is not theoretically possible that the dependent variable (i.e. risk 
disclosure) affects the independent variable of the previous year. Hence, the present study 
employs the following model: 
LogRDi,t =  0 + β1 BSi,t-1 + β2 IDi,t-1 + β3 NED i,t-1 + β4 BIG4i,t-1 + β5 BLOCKOWNi,t-
1 + β6 GOVOWNi,t-1 + β7 INSTOWNi,t-1 + β8 INSIDOWNi,t-1 + β10 IVIi,t-1 + 

=
−−
+
n
i
titii
CONTROLS
1
1,1,
      (equation 4) 
 Except for the one year lag of corporate governance, ownership structure, Islamic 
values, and control variables, all variables are the same as defined in equation 1 in section 
4.4. As a result of the use of lagged structure, the present study excludes the first year 
(2012) which results in reducing the sample from 463 to 340 firm-year observation.  
 Table 6.4 presents the results of the lagged structure as well as the results of the 
main regression model (un-lagged). As can be seen from the table, adjusted R2 is 0.51 for 
the lagged model and 0.49 for the un-lagged model suggesting that the results are similar.   
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Table 6.4: Lagged structure:  The impact of corporate governance on risk disclosure 
Notes: The table shows results for lagged-structure and un-lagged structure. The dependent variable for all models is LogRD which 
represents risk disclosure calculated as a log of the number of risk sentences. The independent variables are corporate governance 
variables (i.e. board size, the proportion of independent directors, the proportion of non-executive directors, board education, the 
existence of a risk committee, and audit type), ownership variables (government ownership, inside ownership, institutional ownership, 
and block ownership), Islamic values, and control variables (firm size, profitability, leverage, liquidity, and total disclosure). BS denotes 
board size, ID denotes the percentage of independent directors, NED denotes the percentage of non-executive directors, EDUC 
represents the education level of the board, RMCOM represents the existence of risk management committee, BIG4 represents the 
auditor type, GOVOWN denotes government ownership, INSIDOWN denotes insiders ownership, INSTOWN denotes institutional 
ownership, BLKOWN represents block holders ownership, IV represents Islamic values,  LogSALES denotes firm size measured as log 
of sales, ROE denotes profitability measured as return on equity, LVG represents leverage calculated as total debt to total assets, LIQ 
represents liquidity measured as current ratio, and LPAGES represents the log of the annual reports` number of pages.  The asterisks *, 
** and *** denote the 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance respectively. 
Dependent variable: LogRD 
    Un-lagged structure Lagged-structure 
Variable expected sign Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
Panel A: Board and audit firm 
variables 
        
BS + -0.065*** -6.734 -0.035*** -3.356 
ID + 0.051*** 5.751 0.020** 2.067 
NED + 0.052*** 6.251 0.018** 2.048 
EDUC + 0.024 1.406 0.042** 2.177 
RMCOM + 0.056 1.083 0.054 0.872 
BIG4 + -0.010 -0.457 0.004 0.147 
Panel B: Ownership variables        
GOVOWN - -0.254*** -3.784 -0.174** -2.336 
INSIDOWN - -0.127*** -2.812 -0.081 -1.605 
INSTOWN + 0.022 0.372 0.110* 1.678 
BLKOWN - 0.066 1.138 0.022 0.343 
Panel C: Islamic values variable        
IV + 0.036 1.237 0.007 0.2 
Panel C: Control variables        
LOGSALES 0.066*** 4.449 0.073*** 4.342 
ROE   0.035** 2.301 0.050*** 3.696 
LVG   -0.002 -0.915 -0.004** -2.017 
LIQ   0.012*** 3.734 0.007** 1.965 
LOGPAGES 0.682*** 9.805 0.501*** 6.564 
C   0.042 0.352 0.346*** 2.621 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.49 0.512 
Observations: 463 340 
 
 
The results of the lagged model are consistent with the main model. For instance, 
government ownership, block ownership, board size, board independence, non-executive 
directors, risk management, auditor type, Islamic values, firm size, profitability, liquidity, 
and total disclosure have similar magnitude and levels of significance in both models. 
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However, the level of significance for inside ownership is changed from the 1% level in 
the un-lagged model to become insignificant in the lagged model. The magnitude of 
institutional ownership increases from 0.022 to 0.11 and the level of significance becomes 
significant at the 10% level in the lagged model. Board education becomes statistically 
significant at the 5% level in the lagged-model. These findings suggest that institutional 
holders and higher-educated directors take longer time to influence the level of risk 
disclosure. Institutional holders are encouraged to protect their investment which, in turn, 
motivates them to monitor management in order to mitigate the agency conflict between 
owners and executives (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). However, the effects of Institutional 
holders on risk disclosure in the Saudi context are found to be delayed by one year. 
Similarly, the higher the education level of the board, the higher the level of risk disclosure 
which is in line with this study's expectations and consistent with previous empirical 
studies. However, the effect of board education on risk disclosure is also found to be 
delayed by one year in the Saudi context.  
Regarding firm risk, the level of significance for leverage becomes significant at 
the 5% level. This finding is consistent with the findings by Ntim, Lindop, and Thomas 
(2013) and Miihkinen (2012) where they find a negative association between leverage and 
risk reporting. Mohobbot (2005) argues that some firms may not choose to disclose 
detailed risk-related information since they do not want to draw attention to their risks, so 
investors do not consider them high risky firms. In other words, managers may prefer to 
hide the firms` risk (i.e. Enron, Global Crossing, etc.). However, the impact of firm risk on 
risk disclosure is found to be delayed by one year among Saudi listed firms.  
This study uses OLS as the main model to analyze the determinants of risk 
disclosure. However, Gujarati & Porter (2003) argue that OLS estimation might not 
capture the heterogeneous characteristics among different companies that do not change 
over time. To overcome this issue, it is recommended to test the existence of heterogeneity 
among firms by using fixed-effect or random effect models. Hausman test is employed in 
order to choose which of the two models is suitable. The first step for applying this test is 
to estimate OLS regression using the random effect model. The null hypothesis states that 
the random effect model is more suitable in taking control of the differences in attributes 
among firms. The alternative hypothesis would support the use of the fixed-effect model.  
The result of the Hausman test suggests that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected since 
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the coefficient is insignificant. Hence, the present study uses the random effect model in 
order to overcome the issue of heterogeneity among firms. 
Table 6.5 presents the results of the main model using OLS in addition to the 
results generated by the random effect model. As can be seen from the table, adjusted R2 is 
0.50 for the random effect model and 0.49 for the OLS model suggesting that the results 
are similar.  
The results of the random effect model are consistent with the main model. The 
coefficients of corporate governance variables, Islamic values, and control variables have 
similar magnitudes and levels of significance. The only exceptions are inside ownership 
and firm risk. The coefficient of inside ownership drops and becomes insignificant in the 
random effect model. Firm risk becomes significant at the 5% level whereas it was 
insignificant in the OLS model.  
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Table 6.5: Random effect model:  The impact of corporate governance on risk disclosure 
The table displays the results of the random effect model. The dependent variable for all models is LogRD which represents risk 
disclosure calculated as a log of the number of risk sentences. The independent variables are corporate governance variables (i.e. board 
size, the proportion of independent directors, the proportion of non-executive directors, board education, the existence of a risk 
committee, and audit type), ownership variables (government ownership, inside ownership, institutional ownership, and block 
ownership), Islamic values, and control variables (firm size, profitability, leverage, liquidity, and total disclosure). BS denotes board 
size, ID denotes the percentage of independent directors, NED denotes the percentage of non-executive directors, EDUC represents the 
education level of the board, RMCOM represents the existence of risk management committee, BIG4 represents the auditor type, 
GOVOWN denotes government ownership, INSIDOWN denotes insiders ownership, INSTOWN denotes institutional ownership, 
BLKOWN represents block holders ownership, IV represents Islamic values,  LogSALES denotes firm size measured as log of sales, 
ROE denotes profitability measured as return on equity, LVG represents leverage calculated as total debt to total assets, LIQ represents 
liquidity measured as current ratio, and LPAGES represents the log of the annual reports` number of pages.  The asterisks *, ** and *** 
denote the 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance respectively. 
Dependent variable: LogRD 
    OLS Random-effect 
Variable Expected sign Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
Panel A: Ownership and board 
variables 
        
BS + -0.065*** -6.734 -0.07*** -3.74 
ID + 0.051*** 5.751 0.059*** 5.068 
NED + 0.052*** 6.251 0.06*** 3.974 
EDUC + 0.024 1.406 0.019 0.864 
RMCOM + 0.056 1.083 0.034 0.494 
BIG4 + -0.01 -0.457 -0.009 -0.41 
Panel B: Ownership variables        
GOVOWN - -0.254*** -3.784 -0.277*** -7.04 
INSIDOWN - -0.127*** -2.812 -0.078 -1.194 
INSTOWN + 0.022 0.372 -0.023 -0.831 
BLKOWN - 0.066 1.138 0.067 0.84 
Panel C: Islamic values variable        
IV + 0.036 1.237 0.027 1.039 
Panel C: Control variables        
LOGSALES 0.066*** 4.449 0.068*** 3.522 
ROE   0.035** 2.301 0.035*** 3.888 
LVG   -0.002 -0.915 -0.002** -2.025 
LIQ   0.012*** 3.734 0.008*** 2.646 
LOGPAGES 0.682*** 9.805 0.701*** 7.327 
C   0.042 0.352 0.019 0.128 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.49 0.498 
Total panel observations: 463 463 
 
Overall, and after performing several robustness tests, the results of the present 
study can be described as robust. More precisely, the results of the OLS model, the 
difference-in-difference model, the lagged structure model, and the random-effect model 
suggest that corporate governance mechanisms have significant impacts on risk disclosure 
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in Saudi Arabia. Additionally, all models suggest that the impact of Islamic values on risk 
disclosure is insignificant.  
6.6. Additional analysis: The impact of the Loss-Making Firms 
Procedures on risk disclosure 
6.6.1. Difference-in-difference model 
The current study employs the difference-in-difference (DID) approach in order to 
examine the impact of the enforcement of the Loss-Making Firms Procedures (LMFPs) on 
risk disclosure and solve the problem of endogeneity27.  
In mid-2014, the Saudi Capital Market Authority introduces new procedures that 
apply only to one group of firms. The procedures are called the Loss-Making Firms 
Procedures (LMFPs). The procedures apply only to firms with cumulative losses. The 
enforcement of the procedures results in two groups: (i) a treatment group (i.e. loss-making 
firms), and (ii) a control group (i.e. other firms). The procedures apply to 17 loss-making 
firms whereas 99 non-loss-making firms are not affected by such enforcement. Most 
importantly, since the period of this study is 2012-2015, this enables this study to 
investigate the impact of the new procedures (LMFPs) on risk disclosure two years before 
the introduction of the procedures and two years afterward.  
As discussed in Section 4.4 of Chapter 4, Model 2 explores the impact of the enforcement 
of the Loss-Making Firms Procedures on risk disclosure. The model is re-stated as: 
 (equation 2) 
LogRDi,t =  0 + β1 LOSSi,t * POSTi,t + β2 LOSSi,t + β3 POSTi,t + 
=
+
n
i
ititi
CONTROLS
1
  
Where: 
LogRD  Risk disclosure 
LOSS Loss-making firms (i.e. a dummy variable takes 1 if the firm has cumulative 
losses, and 0 otherwise). 
POST  The period after the enforcement of Loss-Making Firms Procedures (i.e.  
 
27 The problem of endogeneity is discussed in the previous section. 
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a dummy variable takes 1 if the time is after the enforcement of LMFPs, 
and 0 otherwise). 
LOSSi,t * POSTi,t   Loss-making firms after the enforcement of LMFPs. 
CONTROLS Control variables for firm size (LogSales), profitability (ROE), liquidity 
(LIQ), leverage (LVG), and error term. 
 
 As can be seen from Figure 6.1 and Table 6.6, the number of risk sentences 
disclosed by loss-making-firms increased sharply after the introduction of LMFPs. The 
number of risk sentences disclosed by loss-making-firms increased from 19.18 in 2013 to 
22 and 28.12 in 2014 and 2015 respectively. The risk disclosure gap between loss-making 
and non-loss making firms decreases from 3.52 risk sentences in 2013 to become 1.7 in 
2015. This descriptive finding suggests that the introduction of LMFPs has a significant 
role in enhancing the practices of risk disclosure. 
Figure 6.1: Risk disclosure comparison between Loss-making and Non-loss-making firms 
 
Looking at risk disclosure practices for loss-making firms, it can be noticed that 
risk disclosure was decreasing before the introduction of LMFPs and reversed to be 
gradually increasing afterward. This finding also supports the robustness of the results 
where the enforcement of corporate governance mechanisms leads to a higher level of risk 
disclosure.   
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Table 6.6: Average number of risk sentences 
Year Non-loss-making firms Loss-making firms 
2012 21.41 19.82 
2013 22.70 19.18 
2014 24.44 22.00 
2015 29.82 28.12 
 
Table 6.7 presents the results of the DID model with a view to confirming the 
robustness of the impact of corporate governance on risk disclosure. Hypothetically, the 
variable LOSS*POST has to be significantly positive in order to confirm the robustness of 
the results of the present study. As defined above, LOSS*POST represents the risk 
disclosure practices of loss-making firms after the enforcement of LMFPs. Table 6.7 shows 
that the coefficient of LOSS*POST is positively and significantly related to risk disclosure. 
This indicates that loss-making firms reveal significantly more risk-related information 
after the introduction of LMFPs in comparison with non-loss-making firms. The result is 
statistically significant at the 5% level. Therefore, the thirteenth hypothesis cannot be 
rejected at the 5% level of significance. Further, this finding supports the robustness of the 
presents study`s results after solving the problem of endogeneity. Also, the results suggest 
that the enforcement of Loss-Making Firms Procedures play an important role in 
enhancing risk disclosure practices for Saudi listed firms. Hence other capital markets 
regulators are encouraged to apply the same procedures.  
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Table 6.7: Difference-in-difference model 
Notes: The table shows the results of the difference-in-difference model. The dependent variable for all models is LogRD which 
represents risk disclosure calculated as a log of the number of risk sentences. The independent variables are as follows: LOSS*POST 
represents the loss-making firms after the introduction of the LMFPs, LOSS represents the loss-making firms, POST represents the 
period after the introduction of the LMFPs, LogSALES denotes firm size measured as log of sales, ROE denotes profitability measured 
as return on equity, LVG represents leverage calculated as total debt to total assets, LIQ represents liquidity measured as current ratio, 
and LogPAGES represents the log of the annual reports` number of pages.  The asterisks *, ** and *** denote the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level of significance respectively. 
Dependent variable: LogRD 
    1 2 3 
Variable expected sign Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
LOSS*POST +       0.052** 2.016 
LOSS - -0.003 -0.147    -0.030* -1.707 
POST +    0.084*** 2.660 0.108*** 22.285 
Control variables:           
LogSALES  0.041*** 2.983 0.046*** 3.874 0.045*** 3.640 
ROE  0.058*** 8.061 0.053*** 7.008 0.053*** 8.520 
LVG  -0.002** -2.146 -0.002*** -4.217 -0.002** -1.987 
LIQ  0.012*** 3.543 0.011*** 3.279 0.010** 2.331 
LogPAGES 0.695*** 10.106 0.662*** 11.981 0.671*** 17.876 
C  0.002 0.019 -0.022 -0.297 -0.014** -0.203 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.446 0.461 0.49 
N 463 463 463 
 
Possible explanations of this finding could also be derived from pecking order and 
capital need theories. Pecking order theory states that firms prefer to finance their 
operations by retained profits, debts, and lastly by issuing equity (Donaldson, 1961; Myers 
& Majluf, 1984). This implies that loss-making firms are in need to issue debt and/or 
equity due to the scarce internal financing. Hence, loss-making firms` managers may have 
incentives to disclose more risk-related information in order to raise capital. Similarly, 
capital need theory states that firms are motivated to disclose voluntarily since they need to 
raise capital at a lower cost (Abd-Elsalam & Weetman, 2003; Craven & Marston, 1999; 
Rajab, 2009). Hence, when a firm is committing losses, the firm might need to issue debt 
and/or equity in order to finance the operations. As a result, the firm`s directors would 
have the incentive to disclose more risk-related information with a view to attracting 
investors and raise capital at the lowest possible cost. Another possible explanation the 
positive impact of LMFPs on risk disclosure can be derived from the political cost theory. 
Once the procedures are enforced, managers of loss-making firms might disclose more 
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risk-related information in order to deflect the undesirable attention after the introduction 
of the LMFPs. As pointed out in section 3.6, there were higher attentions paid to loss-
making firms after the introduction of the LMFPs measured by the level of interest of the 
phrase “Loss-Making Firms” generated by Google Trends as can be seen in Figure 3.1. 
Cooke (1989) argues that firms` managers tend to disclose more information in order to 
mitigate the political cost. Managers of such firms would like to reveal voluntary 
information with a view to deflecting the unfavorable attention (Linsley & Shrives, 2000). 
Hence, managers of loss-making firms might have the incentive to disclose more risk-
related information in order to deflect the unfavourable attention. 
The present study expects that loss-making firms (LOSS) reveal a lower level of 
risk disclosure since they are expected to have poor corporate governance practices. Hence, 
this variable is expected to be negatively related to risk reporting. As can be seen from 
Column 3 of Table 6.7, the variable (LOSS) has a negative relationship with risk 
disclosure. This negative relationship is significant at the 10% level. The variable (POST) 
is expected to have a positive relationship with risk disclosure since there was a gradual 
uptrend of risk disclosure in Saudi Arabia as previously discussed in section 5.3. 
Consistent with this expectation, the coefficient on POST is positive and statistically 
significant at 1% level. The results of control variables are similar with the results of the 
main model except that the firm risk variable (LVG) is found to be significant at the 5% 
level whereas it was insignificant in the main model.  
6.6.2. Placebo test 
 
The results of the DID model depend on the premise that there is no prominent 
shock in 2014, other than the introduction of the LMFPs. From the investigation of the 
political economy of Saudi Arabia through media coverage and previous empirical 
research, no such economy-wide shock is found. However, it is possible that the results are 
simply a reflection of the continuation of the pre-existing trend (Koirala, Marshall, 
Neupane, & Thapa, 2018). To address this, the current study uses placebo-controlled trials 
that have been heavily used in medical research. The placebo-controlled trials are better 
explained by Chiodo, Tolle, & Bevan (2000): 
The placebo-controlled clinical trial has a long history of being the standard for 
clinical investigations of new drugs. By blindly and randomly allocating similar patients to 
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a control group that receives a placebo and an experimental group, investigators can 
ensure that any possible placebo effect will be minimized in the final statistical analysis.  
To conduct the Placebo test, two false shocks have been assumed. The year 2012 
and 2015 are chosen to have false shocks. The interaction coefficients of these two shocks 
have to be insignificant in order to confirm the results of the DID model. The results of the 
two false shocks are, indeed, insignificant as can be seen in Table 6.8. Specifically, the 
variables LOSS*POST2012 and LOSS*POST2015 are insignificant. This finding confirms 
the robustness of the results of the DID model. 
Table 6.8: Placebo test 
Notes: The table shows the results for the difference-in-difference model using two false shocks. False shock 1 is where POST2012 
represents the period after the year 2012. False shock 2 model is where POST2015 represents the period after the year 2015. The 
dependent variable for all models is LogRD which represents risk disclosure calculated as a log of the number of risk sentences. 
LOSS*POST2012 represents the loss-making firms after the year 2012, LOSS*POST2015 represents the loss-making firms after the 
year 2015, LOSS represents the loss-making firms, LogSALES denotes firm size measured as log of sales, ROE denotes profitability 
measured as return on equity, LVG represents leverage calculated as total debt to total assets, LIQ represents liquidity measured as 
current ratio, and LogPAGES represents the log of the annual reports` number of pages.  The asterisks *, ** and *** denote the 10%, 
5% and 1% level of significance respectively. 
Dependent variable: LogRD 
    False shock 1 False shock 2 
Variable   Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
Panel A: Loss-making firms 
procedures 
       
LOSS*POST2012 0.000 -0.004    
LOSS   -0.003 -0.059    
POST2012   0.069*** 3.103    
LOSS*POST2015    0.071 1.541 
LOSS      -0.021 -0.683 
POST2015      0.093*** 5.337 
Panel B: Control variables       
LOGSALES 0.042*** 2.908 0.044*** 3.296 
ROE   0.057*** 3.527 0.054*** 3.165 
LVG   -0.002 -0.93 -0.002 -0.901 
LIQ   0.012*** 3.347 0.010*** 2.929 
LOGPAGES 0.694*** 9.742 0.683*** 10.177 
C   -0.075 -0.657 -0.019 -0.18 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.444 0.488 
Observations 463 463 
 
6.7. Chapter summary 
This chapter presented the empirical results on the impact of corporate governance 
and Islamic values on risk disclosure. The main findings are as follows. Table 6.9 
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illustrates the summary of hypotheses on the determinants of risk disclosure. Overall, the 
regression analysis shows that board independence, non-executive directors, firm size, 
profitability, liquidity, and total disclosure are positively and significantly related to risk 
disclosure. On the other hand, board size, government ownership, and inside ownership 
have significant and negative relationships with risk disclosure. However, auditor type, 
board education, risk management committee, institutional ownership, block ownership, 
Islamic values, and firm risk have no statistically significant relationships with risk 
reporting.  
The results show that board size is negatively associated with risk disclosure. The 
present thesis supports the view that smaller boards are more efficient regarding risk 
disclosure in the Saudi context. Consistent with agency theory, the results also show 
positive relationships between independent and non-executive directors with risk 
disclosure. Independent and non-executive directors play important roles in motivating 
managers to disclose a higher level of risk-related information. Consistent with capital 
need theory, the findings reveal that there is a significant negative relationship between 
state ownership and risk disclosure. This study also discovers a significant and negative 
relationship between inside ownership and risk disclosure. Insiders might have incentives 
to maximize their own interest by lowering the level of transparency. To this end, it is 
worthwhile for Saudi policymakers to distinguish between firms with higher government 
and inside ownership and firms with lower government and inside ownerships when 
passing new legislation. For instance, the setting of specific thresholds for risk disclosure 
can be dependent on the level of state or inside ownership. 
It is argued that the existence of a risk management committee on the board would 
be viewed as a sign of proper risk management and risk reporting (Neri, 2010). However, 
the results of the present study could not confirm such assertion among Saudi listed firms. 
Given that the recently updated version of the Saudi Corporate Governance Code 
recommends the establishment of a risk management committee, Saudi regulators are 
advised to require that all members of the risk management committee be independent28 in 
addition to exhibiting the required experience and knowledge in relation to risk 
management to ensure the effectiveness of the risk management committee. 
 
28Currently, the Saudi Corporate Governance Code requires that all members of the risk management 
committee to be non-executive directors.  
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Table 6.9: Summary of hypotheses and findings: Determinants of risk disclosure 
Note: H represents hypothesis. 
           
Dependent variable: Risk disclosure 
Independent variable 
H. 
No 
H. 
Sign 
Sign  Statistical significance  Conclusion (H.) 
      of result of result   
Auditor type  1 + - Insignificant Reject 
Board size  2 +/- - Significant (1%) Do not reject 
Independent directors  3 + + Significant (1%) Do not reject 
Non-executive directors  4 + + Significant (1%) Do not reject 
Board education  5 + + Insignificant Reject 
Risk management committee  6 + + Insignificant Reject 
  Government ownership 7 - - Significant (1%) Do not reject 
    Institutional ownership 8 + + Insignificant Reject 
   Inside ownership 9 - - Significant (1%) Do not reject 
    Block ownership 10 - + Insignificant Reject 
Islamic values  11 + + Insignificant Reject 
Industry type 12   Significant Do not reject 
Loss-Making Firms Procedures 13 + + Significant (5%) Do not reject 
 
 
The present study does not find a positive relationship between Islamic values and 
risk disclosure. This finding contradicts with the established Islamic literature that 
encourages disclosure practices as discussed in section 3.4.3. However, several possible 
justifications for the insignificant relationship between Islamic values and risk disclosure 
as found in this thesis are as follows. First, the empirical results of previous studies on the 
association between Islamic values and risk disclosure are contradictory. Second, Abu-
Tapanjeh (2009) discovers that the OECD principles and Islamic principles are similar in 
relation to transparency and disclosure. Third, an expert argues that the limited disclosure 
among Islamic firms can be explained by the lack of awareness by these firms` managers 
of the Islamic exhortation on the importance of disclosure (Bindabel, 2017). 
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The current study uses relevant statistical approaches and econometric models to 
increase the robustness of the results and to eliminate the problem of endogeneity. The 
present study uses a difference-in-difference approach to examine the impact of the 
enforcement of the Loss-Making Firms Procedures (LMFPs) on risk disclosure. Further, 
this thesis uses a lagged structure model and a random effect model to ensure the 
robustness of the results. The results of these models reveal that corporate governance 
mechanisms have significant impacts on risk disclosure in Saudi Arabia. Additionally, all 
models suggest that the impact of Islamic values on risk disclosure is insignificant. Thus, 
the results of the present study can be described as robust. 
Having discussed the determinants of corporate risk disclosure with particular 
attention to corporate governance mechanisms, ownership structure, Islamic values, and 
the Loss-Making Firms Procedures (LMFPs), next chapter will discuss the impact of risk 
disclosure on the cost of capital to provide an insight into the implications of corporate risk 
disclosure. 
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Chapter 7 EMPIRICAL RESULTS: THE IMPACT OF RISK 
DISCLOSURE ON THE COST OF CAPITAL 
 7.1. Introduction 
The present chapter discusses the empirical results of the impact of risk disclosure 
on the cost of capital among Saudi listed firms. This chapter seeks to achieve the following 
three objectives. First, it presents the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of 
dependent and independent variables. Second, the chapter reviews the empirical results of 
the impact of risk disclosure on the cost of capital using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
estimation technique. Third, it tests how robust the results are and investigates the presence 
of endogeneity problems. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.2 discusses the descriptive statistics. 
Section 7.3 reviews the correlation matrix in order to detect the presence of 
multicollinearity issue. Section 7.4 discusses the results of the impact of risk disclosure on 
the cost of capital in Saudi Arabia. Section 7.5 discusses the robustness tests such as a 
lagged structure model and a random effect model. Lastly, section 7.6 presents a summary 
of the chapter. 
7.2. Descriptive statistics 
 As reported in panel A of Table 7.1, the average of the cost of capital is 5% with a 
standard deviation of 2.56%. Panel B shows that the log of the number of risk sentences 
(LogRD) has an average of 1.33. There is a great variation in risk disclosure practices 
among Saudi listed firms where LogRD ranges from 0 to 1.86 with a standard deviation of 
0.25. A detailed explanation of the level of risk disclosure and comparison to relevant 
studies has been discussed extensively in section 5.2.  
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Table 7.1: Descriptive statistics of model 3 variables 
Notes: The table displays the Descriptive statistics of model 3 variables. COC denotes the cost of capital, LogRD 
represents risk disclosure as a log of the number of risk sentences, LogSALES denotes firm size as a log of sales, ROE 
denotes profitability as return on equity, LVG represents leverage, and GROWTH represents firms` growth. 
Variable  Observations  Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum 
 Std. 
Dev. 
Panel A: Dependent variable 
COC 463 0.0506 0.0478 0.1952 -0.0168 0.0256 
Panel B: Independent variable 
LogRD 463 1.3317 1.3617 1.8573 0.0000 0.2463 
Panel C: Control variables 
LogSALES 463 2.9996 3.0199 5.28 0 0.80 
ROE 463 0.0769 0.0989 0.39 -0.10 0.58 
LVG 463 0.2306 0.3087 0.88 0 0.19 
GROWTH 463 2.9284 2.2900 27.77 -6.46 2.55 
 
Panel C displays the descriptive statistics of control variables. Firm size (measured 
by the log of total sales, LOGSALES) has an average of 3 and ranges between 5.28 and 0. 
Profitability (ROE) has an average of 8% with a range between 39% and -10%. Another 
finding is that the average leverage (LVG) is 23% with a range between 0 and 88%. This 
finding is in line with the finding by Alzead (2017) where he finds that the leverage among 
Saudi listed firms is 24%. Firms` growth has a mean of 2.93 with a standard deviation of 
2.55. 
7.3. Correlation matrix 
As previously discussed in section 6.3, there are two reasons for employing the 
correlation matrix. First, employing the correlation matrix helps in examining the existence 
of multicollinearity problem between independent variables. Looking at Table 7.2, it is 
obvious that there is no concern of the multicollinearity issue since the highest correlation 
coefficient is the correlation between LogSales and LogRD which equals 0.43. 
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Table 7.2: Correlation matrix: Risk disclosure and cost of capital model 
Notes: The table displays the correlation matrix between the variables. COC denotes the cost of capital, LRD represents 
risk disclosure as a log of the number of risk sentences, LogSALES denotes firm size as a log of sales, ROE denotes 
profitability as return on equity, LVG represents leverage, and GROWTH represents firms` growth. ** Correlation is 
significant at the 0.01 level. * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
  COC LRD LogSales ROE LVG GROWTH 
COC 1 
     
LRD -.132** 1 
LogSales -.254** .431** 1 
ROE -.190** .244** .200** 1 
LVG -.037 0.001 0.065 .181** 1 
 
GROWTH 0.046 0.041 -0.081 0.204** -0.015 1.000 
 
Second, the correlation matrix can be used to test whether the explanatory variables 
exhibit correlations with the dependent variable. As can be seen from Table 7.2, the 
Pearson correlation coefficient suggests a significant negative relationship between LogRD 
and COC. This result is significant at the 1% level and confirms the main hypothesis of 
this model. It suggests that risk-transparent firms enjoy lower costs of capital.   
The results of Table 7.2 indicate that COC is negatively and significantly correlated 
to firm size and profitability. This indicates that larger and profitable firms have lower 
costs of capital. This finding is in line with the literature. 
7.4. Regression analysis 
This section presents the results for the impact of risk disclosure on the cost of 
capital in Saudi Arabian listed firms. As discussed in Section 4.5 of Chapter 4, Model 3 
explores the relationship between risk disclosure and cost of capital. The model is re-stated 
as: 
WACC i,t =  0 + β1 LogRD i,t + 
=
+
n
i
ititi
CONTROLS
1
      (equation 3) 
Table 7.3 presents the results of the OLS regression where the cost of capital 
(COC) is regressed against the log of the number of risk sentences (LogRD) and control 
variables.  The present study uses the clustered standard error at the firm level in order to 
solve the problem of heteroscedasticity as discussed in section 4.5.3. The adjusted R2 is 
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0.51 which suggests that 51% of the variation of cost of capital in Saudi Arabia is 
explained by the independent variables listed in Table 7.3. 
 
Table 7.3: The OLS regression: Risk disclosure and cost of capital 
Notes: The table shows the results for OLS regression results with clustered standard errors to correct for 
heteroscedasticity. The dependent variable for all models is WACC represents the cost of capital measured by the 
weighted average cost of capital. LogRD represents risk disclosure calculated as a log of the number of risk sentences, 
LogSALES denotes firm size as a log of sales, ROE denotes profitability as return on equity, LVG represents leverage, 
and GROWTH represents firms` growth.  The asterisks *, ** and *** denote the 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance 
respectively. 
Dependent variable: WACC 
    1 2 
Variable 
expected 
sign 
Coefficient 
t-
Statistic 
Coefficient 
t-
Statistic 
LogRD - -0.013*** -3.484 -0.009** -2.228 
Control variables:   
  
LogSALES    -0.007*** -5.774 
ROE    -0.005*** -3.045 
LVG    0 -1.485 
GROWTH    -0.001 -1.543 
C  0.033*** 6.447 0.084*** 13.232 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.477 0.509 
Observations 463 463 
 
The fourteenth hypothesis of the present study is that there is a significant and 
negative relationship between risk disclosure and cost of capital. As can be seen in Table 
7.3, Model 1 is where the cost of capital is regressed against risk disclosure (one 
independent variable). Model 2 adds a list of control variables that affect the cost of 
capital. Model 1 and 2 show that risk disclosure is negatively and significantly associated 
with the cost of capital. The results demonstrate that firms that report more risk disclosure 
have a lower cost of capital. The present study, therefore, cannot reject the fourteenth 
hypothesis. An increase by 1% risk disclosure decreases the cost of capital by 0.009%29. 
According to this finding, Saudi listed firms are encouraged to disclose more risk-related 
information due to the potential rewards in the lower required rate of return by investors 
and creditors. Botosan (1997), Diamond and Verrecchia (1991), Healy and Palepu (2001), 
and Kim and Verrecchia (1994) argue that a higher level of disclosure leads to less 
 
29 The unit of risk disclosure is presented in percentage, instead of the number of sentences, because the 
variable is log-transformed. 
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uncertainty and, in turn, low estimation risk which results in lowering the cost of capital. 
This implies that investors demand compensation for the additional risk when there is a 
high level of uncertainty regarding the “true” parameters resulting from the lack of 
information (Botosan, 1997). Any mitigation in information asymmetry would result in 
lowering the agency cost and the cost of equity by providing fair opportunities to small and 
large stockholders in obtaining information (Morris, 1987). When executives report a high 
level of information, the information risk is reduced which makes the investors demand a 
lower rate of return (lower cost of capital) (Healy & Palepu, 2001). Providing a managerial 
perspective on the risks faced by the firm has the potential to reduce the cost of capital by 
lowering the level of uncertainty. Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) claim that providing 
more information to the market would raise the incentives of investors to buy the firms` 
shares. Consequently, the stock liquidity would be increased resulting in less information 
asymmetry and, in turn, lower cost of equity (Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991). 
Moreover, pecking order and capital need theories can also explain the negative 
association between risk reporting and cost of capital. Pecking order theory states that 
firms prioritize to finance their operations by retained profits, debts, and lastly issuing 
equity (Myers and Majluf 1984). This implies that firms` managers may have the incentive 
to engage in risk disclosure as they need to raise capital. In the same manner, capital need 
theory states that firms are encouraged to disclose voluntarily when they desire to raise 
capital at a lower cost (Abd-Elsalam & Weetman, 2003; Craven & Marston, 1999; Rajab, 
2009). Hence, when firms are short of money, firms` directors would have the incentive to 
disclose more risk-related information in order to attract investors and raise capital at the 
lowest possible cost. 
 Regarding control variables, the coefficient on firm size (LogSales) is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level as can be seen from panel B. Larger companies are 
more stable and diversified and therefore have more reliable cash flows which reduce the 
cost of capital. This proposition is supported by empirical evidence provided by a study 
conducted by Botosan & Plumlee (2005). In addition, Beiner, Drobetz, Schmid, & 
Zimmermann (2006) posit that larger companies also have better internal controls and 
governance structures which also results in lowering the cost of capital. Profitability (ROE) 
is found to be significantly and negatively related to cost of capital at the 1% level. 
Profitable companies tend to depend less on external sources of capital in comparison to 
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less profitable companies for capital investments since they have surplus earnings (Myers 
& Majluf, 1984). The coefficient of leverage (LVG) is negative and insignificant. This 
finding suggests that there is no significant impact of leverage on the cost of capital in 
Saudi Arabia. The coefficient on firms` growth is also negative and insignificant, 
suggesting the absence of significant association between firms` growth and cost of capital.  
7.5. Robustness check 
The empirical results of the present study can be seriously influenced by endogeneity. 
The issue of endogeneity has been discussed in section 6.5. In the case of the present 
chapter, it can be argued that firms with a lower cost of capital are more likely to have 
better risk disclosure practices. Hence, it is likely that the causality direction of the cost of 
capital and risk disclosure can go either way. It can be also argued that the cost of capital 
and risk disclosure is determined simultaneously by an omitted variable. To mitigate the 
problem of simultaneity, this thesis uses panel data and a lagged structure model as 
explained below.  
The present study uses relevant statistical approaches and econometric models to 
eliminate the problem of endogeneity and to increase the robustness of this chapter`s 
findings. First, panel data is used rather than cross-sectional or time-series data to deal with 
the problem of simultaneity (Börsch‐Supan & Köke, 2002). Second, the present study 
employs a lagged structure model. Third, the current study employs a random effect model 
in order to capture the heterogeneous characteristics among different firms that do not 
change over time.  
To address the problem of endogeneity, a one-year lag between the dependent 
variable and the independent variables is used in order to address the issues of omitted 
variables and simultaneity (Ntim, Opong, & Danbolt, 2012). Employing lagged 
independent variables is a useful technique to address reverse causality. The reason is that 
the independent variable (risk disclosure) may affect the forward year cost of capital. 
However, it is not theoretically possible that the dependent variable (i.e. cost of capital) 
affects the independent variable of the previous year (risk disclosure). Hence, the present 
study employs the following model: 
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WACCi,t =  0 + β1 LogRDi,t-1 + 
=
−−
+
n
i
titii
CONTROLS
1
1,1,
      (equation 5) 
 Except for the one year lag of risk disclosure and control variables, all variables are 
the same as defined in equation 3 of section 4.5. As a result of the use of the lagged 
structure, the present study excludes the first year (2012) which results in reducing the 
sample from 463 to 340 firm-year observations.  
Table 7.4 presents the results of the lagged structure as well as the results of the 
main regression model (un-lagged). As can be seen from the table, the results of the lagged 
model are consistent with the main model. For instance, risk disclosure demonstrates a 
significant negative relationship with the cost of capital with the same magnitude in both 
models.  However, the level of significance increased from 5% in the un-lagged model to 
1% in the lagged model. Regarding control variables, the results of the two models are 
similar with the exception of firms` growth variable where it becomes significant at the 1% 
level.  
Table 7.4: Lagged model:  The impact of risk disclosure on the cost of capital 
Notes: The table displays the results of the lagged model where the independent variables are one year lagged (t-1). The dependent 
variable for all models is WACC represents the cost of capital measured by the weighted average cost of capital. LogRD represents risk 
disclosure as a log of the number of risk sentences, LogSALES denotes firm size as a log of sales, ROE denotes profitability as return on 
equity, LVG represents leverage, and GROWTH represents firms` growth. The asterisks *, ** and *** denote the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
of significance respectively. 
Dependent variable: WACC 
    Un-lagged structure Lagged-structure 
Variable 
expected 
sign 
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
Panel A: risk disclosure         
LogRD - -0.009** -2.228 -0.009*** -2.951 
Panel B: control variables         
LogSALES   -0.007*** -5.774 -0.009*** -5.990 
ROE   -0.005*** -3.045 -0.006** -2.454 
LVG   -0.000 -1.485 -0.000 -0.680 
GROWTH   -0.001 -1.543 -0.001*** -3.134 
C   0.084*** 13.232 0.090*** 15.668 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.509 0.362 
Observations: 463 340 
 
Since this study uses OLS as the main model to analyze the impact of risk 
disclosure on the cost of capital, Gujarati & Porter (2003) argue that OLS estimation might 
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not capture the heterogeneous characteristics among different companies that do not 
change over time. To overcome this issue, it is recommended to test the existence of 
heterogeneity among firms by using fixed-effect or random effect models. Hausman test is 
employed in order to choose which of the two models is suitable. The first step for 
applying this test is to estimate OLS regression using the random effect model. The null 
hypothesis states that the random effect model is more suitable in taking control of the 
differences in attributes among firms. The alternative hypothesis would support the use of 
a fixed-effect model.  The result of the Hausman test suggests that the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected since the coefficient is insignificant. Hence, the present study uses the 
random effect model in order to overcome the issue of heterogeneity among firms. 
Table 7.5 presents the results of the main model using OLS in addition to the 
results generated by the random effect model. As can be seen from the table, adjusted R2 is 
0.58 for the random effect model and 0.51 for the OLS model suggesting that the results 
are similar.  
Table 7.5: Random effect model:  The impact of risk disclosure on the cost of capital 
Notes: The table displays the results of the random effect model. The dependent variable for all models is WACC represents the cost of 
capital measured by the weighted average cost of capital. LogRD represents risk disclosure as a log of the number of risk sentences, 
LogSALES denotes firm size as a log of sales, ROE denotes profitability as return on equity, LVG represents leverage, and GROWTH 
represents firms` growth. The asterisks *, ** and *** denote the 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance respectively. 
Dependent variable: WACC 
    OLS Random-effect 
Variable 
expected 
sign 
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
LogRD - -0.009** -2.228 -0.012*** -2.669 
Control variables:       
LogSALES   -0.007*** -5.774 -0.007*** -4.356 
ROE   -0.005*** -3.045 -0.001 -0.710 
LVG   -0.000 -1.485 -0.000 -1.748 
GROWTH   -0.001 -1.543 -0.001 -1.421 
C   0.084*** 13.232 0.052*** 7.287 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.509 0.583 
Observations 463 463 
 
The results of the random effect model confirm the findings of the main model. The 
coefficients of risk disclosure variable increased slightly from 0.009 to 0.012. The level of 
significance increased from 5% in the OLS model to 1% in the random-effect model. The 
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results of control variables have similar magnitudes and levels of significance with the 
exception of the profitability variable where it becomes insignificant.  
Taken together the several robustness tests, the results of the present study can be 
described as robust. More precisely, the results of the OLS model, the lagged structure 
model, and the random-effect model suggest that risk disclosure has a significant and 
negative impact on the cost of capital in Saudi Arabia.  
7.6. Chapter summary 
This chapter discusses the empirical results of the impact of risk disclosure on the 
cost of capital among Saudi listed firms. The present chapter begins by reviewing the 
descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix. It then goes on to discuss the results of the 
impact of risk disclosure on the cost of capital in Saudi Arabia. A discussion on the 
robustness tests is then followed.  
The current study uses several statistical approaches and econometric models in 
order to examine the impact of risk disclosure on the cost of capital. The present study uses 
an OLS model with a robust-standard error, a lagged structure model, and a random effect 
model. Consistent with the theoretical expectations, the results of these models show that 
risk disclosure is negatively and significantly associated with the cost of capital. An 
increase by 1% risk disclosure decreases the cost of capital by 0.009%.  It is believed that 
the information risk is reduced when firms` managers report a high level of information, 
and hence, investors demand a lower rate of return (Healy & Palepu, 2001). Moreover, 
firms` managers may have the incentive to engage in risk disclosure as they need to raise 
capital at the lowest possible cost as suggested by pecking order and capital need theories. 
The results of the present study have the potential to convince firms` managers to boost the 
disclosure of risk-related information in order to benefit from the reduction in the cost of 
capital.  
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Chapter 8 CONCLUSION 
8.1 Introduction 
The main objective of this thesis was to investigate the practices of risk disclosure 
among Saudi listed firms. To achieve this objective, this thesis presents three main 
empirical chapters as follows: (i) the level, trend, and attributes of risk disclosure, (ii) the 
effects of corporate governance, ownership structure, Islamic values, and the Loss-Making 
Firms Procedures on risk disclosure, and (iii) the effect of risk disclosure on cost of capital. 
This chapter presents the conclusions of these empirical studies. Specifically, this chapter 
aims to achieve the following objectives. First, it presents a summary of the findings of this 
thesis. Second, it discusses the policy implications. Third, it highlights the contributions of 
the thesis. Fourth, it presents the limitations of this thesis. Fifth, it provides suggestions for 
future research avenues. Hence, the chapter is organized as follows. Section 8.2 presents a 
summary of the findings. Section 8.3 discusses policy implications and recommendations. 
Section 8.4 presents the contributions of the thesis. Section 8.5 presents the limitations of 
this thesis. Section 8.6 highlights the potential paths for future research. 
8.2 Summary of findings 
The present study sought to achieve four objectives. The first aim was to explore 
corporate risk disclosure level and practices within the annual report of Saudi listed firms 
over four years (2012 - 2015). Section 8.2.1 provides an overview of the findings on risk 
disclosure level and practices in Saudi Arabia. The second aim was to identify the main 
factors that drive risk disclosure practices with emphasis on corporate governance 
mechanisms, ownership structure, and Islamic values. Section 8.2.2 provides an overview 
of the findings on the impact of corporate governance, ownership structure, and Islamic 
values on risk disclosure. The third aim was to examine the impact of the introduction of 
the Loss-Making Firms Procedures (LMFPs) on risk disclosure. Section 8.2.3 represents a 
summary of the findings on the impact LMFPs on risk disclosure. The fourth aim of the 
present study was to examine whether the higher level of risk disclosure would result in 
lowering the cost of capital. Section 8.2.4 provides an overview of the findings on the 
impact of risk disclosure on the cost of capital.  
173 
 
8.2.1 The practices of risk disclosure in Saudi Arabia 
Using the data of 122 Saudi listed firms for four years (2012 – 2015), this thesis has 
answered the research questions as follows. The first question was to determine the level, 
trend, and practices of the disclosure of risk-related information by Saudi listed firms. This 
section represents a summary of the findings of the content analysis on risk disclosure 
practices among Saudi listed firms. The main findings of the content analysis are as follow. 
The descriptive results show that Saudi listed firms report 24 risk-related sentences on 
average. This finding reveals that risk disclosure is limited in Saudi Arabia since it is much 
lower than the risk disclosure in several different contexts. For example, Greco (2012) and 
Beretta & Bozzolan (2004) find that the average number of risk disclosure is 65 and 75 
sentences respectively for Italian firms in their studies. Muzahhem (2011) reports that 
UAE firms provide, on average, 97 risk sentences. Linsley & Shrives (2006), and Rajab & 
Schachler (2009) find that the mean of risk disclosure is 78 and 95 sentences for UK listed 
firms respectively. Konishi & Ali (2007) discover that Japanese firms provide 47 risk 
sentences on average. Therefore, risk disclosure in the Saudi context appeared to be limited 
in comparison to other countries.  
The low level of risk disclosure in Saudi Arabia can be explained mainly by the 
lack of enforcement. There were no mandatory requirements for Saudi listed firms to 
provide risk-related information in the annual reports during the sample period. However, 
the recent developments in the Saudi context such as the updated version of the Saudi 
Corporate Governance Code and the adoption of IFRS are expected to enhance the 
practices of risk disclosure. 
The results show that there has been a progressive increase in the average number 
of risk disclosure among Saudi listed firms over the years 2012 – 2015. The increase in the 
number of risk-related sentences is more pronounced in the year 2015 due to the increased 
risk in the Saudi economy resulting from the dramatic decline of oil prices which led to a 
financial crisis in Saudi Arabia. As a response to the dramatic decline of oil prices, the 
Saudi government applied a widespread austerity plan which includes the cut of subsidies 
to firms and households. This finding is compatible with prior research. Gulko, Hyde, & 
Seppala (2017) discover that UK firms provide significantly more risk disclosure with 
enhanced quality during the financial crisis in 2008 than the time when the economy is 
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stable. Abraham & Shrives (2014) suggest that firms` directors disclose more risk 
information in the time of crisis with a view to enhancing the firms` reputation.   
Operational and financial risks are the most frequent disclosed risks while the 
strategic risk is significantly lower. The limited strategic risk disclosure can be explained 
by the ambiguity of information. Strategic risks are beyond the firms` control such as the 
risks related to society, economy, or politics. In fact, risk assessment relies on managerial 
discretion. Therefore, firms` managers have less incentive to disclose information that 
might put them at possible legal actions or intense criticisms if their estimation goes wrong 
(Mohobbot, 2005). 
In line with previous studies (e.g. Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Lajili & Zéghal, 2005; 
Linsley & Shrives, 2006; Mokhtar & Mellett, 2013; Muzahhem, 2011; Rajab & Schachler, 
2009), the present study finds that most disclosed risk is qualitative in nature. On average, 
Saudi firms disclose 20.49 qualitative sentences compared to 3.89 quantitative sentences. 
Linsley & Shrives (2006) argue that companies should disclose more quantitative risk-
related information in order to help stakeholders to assess the risk engaged in by firms.   
The present study finds that 63% of risk disclosure is future disclosure while 
historical disclosure accounts for about 37%. On average, Saudi companies disclose fifteen 
forward-looking risk sentences compared to nine historical risk sentences. Aljifri & 
Hussainey (2007) and Linsley & Shrives (2005) argue that the disclosure of forward-
looking information has the potential to help investors in forecasting future cash flows 
which result in making better-informed investment decisions as opposed to the disclosure 
of historical information. the nature of forward-looking information is believed to be more 
valuable and can be exploited by competitors which might affect the competitive 
advantage of firms (Aljifri & Hussainey, 2007; ICAEW, 1999). However, it can be argued 
that forward-looking information is less reliable since it involves a high level of 
uncertainty in addition to the subjectivity issue associated with forward-looking 
information (Cabedo & Tirado, 2004). 
 This study also finds that the majority of risk disclosure in the Saudi context is 
positive in nature. The average numbers of positive and negative risk sentences are 12 and 
9 respectively. Firms` directors have a higher tendency toward the disclosure of positive 
news while they are hesitated to disclose negative news. In the case of bad news, managers 
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withhold and accumulate the news until they become definite (Kothari et al., 2009). 
Linsley & Shrives (2006) argue that managers would not disclose negative news since they 
prefer to signal a bright image of their risk management performance to the market in order 
to avoid reputation costs. Hence, regulators should pay more attention to the enforcement 
of bad risk disclosure since companies have less incentive to disclose such information 
(Schrand & Elliott, 1998).  
The present study uses a one-way ANOVA test to examine the differences in risk 
disclosure between industries. The results show significant differences between industries 
in the Saudi context. This finding is expected given that firms in various sectors face 
different types of risks. These different environmental factors are expected to have 
significant effects on firms` risks (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Mostafa Hassan, 2009). 
Moreover, firms` managers usually mimic the disclosure practices of other companies in 
the same industry regardless of the relevance of the provided information which may result 
in significant variation among different industries (Hassan, 2009). 
8.2.2 The impact of corporate governance, ownership structure, and 
Islamic values on risk disclosure 
The second question of the present study was to identify the main factors that drive 
risk disclosure practices with emphasis on corporate governance mechanisms, ownership 
structure, and Islamic values. This section presents a summary of the empirical results on 
the impact of corporate governance, ownership structure, and Islamic values on risk 
disclosure. The main findings are as follows. The results reveal that the relationship 
between auditor type and risk disclosure is statistically insignificant. This result is in line 
with other empirical studies that find the association is also insignificant (e.g. Al-shammari 
2014; Deumes and Knechel 2008; and Neri 2010). This is incompatible with the theoretical 
assumption where large audit firms are believed to put pressure on firms` managers to 
reveal a high level of disclosure given that the large auditors care more about their 
reputations. The results also show that board size is negatively and significantly related to 
risk disclosure. Jensen (1993) argues that larger boards might suffer from the deficiency of 
group cohesion which results in communication and cooperation difficulties, which in turn, 
might hinder the operation of the company. For instance, Beasley (1996) discovers that 
large boards are associated with fraudulent financial practices. 
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The results also show a significant and positive relationship between the proportion 
of independent directors and risk disclosure. Agency theory proposes that independent 
directors play a vital role in monitoring and controlling the managers` behaviors which 
increases the level of risk disclosure (Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007). Non-executive directors 
are also found to be significantly and positively associated with risk disclosure. 
Knowledgeable and experienced non-executive directors are more capable of enhancing 
the level of risk disclosure (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013).  
The findings also reveal that board education has a positive but insignificant 
relationship with risk disclosure. However, previous empirical studies find the relationship 
is significant. For instance, Martikainen et al. (2015) find a positive and significant 
relationship between board education and risk disclosure. They propose that directors with 
a higher level of education have higher abilities to report more risk-related information 
since they are more able to provide critical judgments regarding the content of disclosed 
information. However, the results of the present study do not confirm this assertion. 
The results also show that the existence of a risk management committee is 
positively but insignificantly related to risk disclosure. Neri (2010) suggests that the 
existence of a risk committee on the board of director would be viewed as a sign of better 
risk management and risk reporting. However, the present study could not confirm that the 
risk management committee plays an important and positive role in risk disclosure 
practices in Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, what is not yet clear is whether or not this finding 
study is a true representation given that only a few firms of the sample have risk 
committees. 
The results also show that state ownership is negatively and significantly associated 
with risk disclosure. Capital need theory proposes that firms with a higher level of state 
ownership may lose the incentive to disclose more risk-related information given that they 
do not have the need for attracting capital. These companies enjoy easy access to various 
forms of capital (Ghazali & Weetman, 2006). The present study also finds a significant and 
negative relationship between inside ownership and risk disclosure.  Shleifer & Vishny 
(1997) suggest that if directors` ownership is large, they might be motivated to maximize 
their own interest by lowering the level of transparency.  
177 
 
The findings also show that the relationship between institutional ownership and 
risk disclosure is insignificant. It is argued that institutional investors have a higher ability 
for monitoring companies given that they possess the required resources such as 
experience, efficiency, and robust employment of voting rights (Donnelly & Mulcahy, 
2008). Nevertheless, this argument is not supported by the results of the present study. This 
is in line with the results of a qualitative study conducted by Albassam (2014) where he 
finds that the institutional investment in Saudi listed firms concentrates on short-term 
investments. The results also reveal that block ownership is insignificantly related to risk 
disclosure. Firms with concentrated ownership do not experience a separation between 
ownership and control. In fact, block owners do not depend on public disclosure since they 
have access to internal information. This finding indicates that concentrated ownership 
might play a limited role in influencing the disclosure of risk-related information in Saudi 
Arabia.  
The present study does not find a positive relationship between Islamic values and 
risk disclosure. This finding is a bit puzzling because of the established Islamic literature 
that encourages disclosure practices. For instance, Sharia emphasizes that Muslims are 
obligated to be honest, truthful, and careful of others at any time especially the time of 
business transactions (Ayub, 2007). The Holy Prophet Muhammad encourages the 
disclosure of all attributes of traded commodities in which traders receive enough 
information about commodities and their prices in the market. However, the empirical 
results of previous studies on the relationship between Islamic values and risk disclosure 
are inconclusive. For example, Albassam & Ntim (2016) discover a significant and 
positive effect of Islamic values over corporate governance disclosure whereas Al-
Maghzom et al. (2016b) and Abdallah, Hassan, & McClelland (2015) find a significant and 
negative effect of Islamic values over risk disclosure. Moreover, Abu-Tapanjeh (2009) 
compares the OECD principles with the Islamic principles and discovers that both are 
similar in relation to transparency and disclosure. The empirical results of the present study 
support this view. 
The present study uses various statistical approaches and econometric models to 
increase the robustness of the results and to mitigate the problem of endogeneity. First, the 
current study uses a difference-in-difference approach. Details of the results of this model 
are presented in the subsequent section. 
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Second, the present study employs another approach to address the problem of 
endogeneity. A one-year lag between the dependent variable and the independent variables 
is used in order to address the issues of omitted variables and simultaneity (Ntim, Opong, 
& Danbolt, 2012). The results of the lagged model are compatible with the main model.  
Third, the current study uses OLS as the main model to analyze the determinants of 
risk disclosure, hence, Gujarati & Porter (2003) argue that OLS estimation might not 
capture the heterogeneous characteristics among different companies that do not change 
over time. To overcome this issue, it is recommended to test the existence of heterogeneity 
among firms by a random effect model. The results of the random effect model are also 
compatible with the results of the main model. Thus, the results of the current study can be 
described as robust. 
8.2.3. The impact of the Loss-Making Firms Procedures on risk 
disclosure 
The third question was to examine the impact of the introduction of the Loss-
Making Firms Procedures (LMFPs) on risk disclosure. This section presents a summary of 
the empirical results on the impact of LMFPs on risk disclosure. In mid-2014, the Saudi 
Capital Market Authority enforces new procedures that apply only to one group of firms. 
The procedures are named the Loss-Making Firms Procedures (LMFPs). The procedures 
apply only to firms with cumulative losses. The enforcement of the procedures results in 
two groups: (i) a treatment group (i.e. loss-making firms), and (ii) a control group (i.e. 
other firms). Since the period of this study is 2012-2015, this enables this study to examine 
the effect of the new procedures (LMFPs) on risk disclosure two years before the 
introduction of the procedures and two years afterward using the difference-in-difference 
model.  
It is vital to study the effect of introducing the Loss-Making Firms Procedures on 
risk disclosure practices for two reasons. First, the results will evaluate the effectiveness of 
the procedures given that other capital markets regulators may apply the same procedures 
once they are proven to be effective30. Second, the results will investigate the exogenous 
impact of corporate governance on risk disclosure given that the current empirical 
 
30 For instance, Abu Dhabi Global Market announces that they will introduce some precautionary procedures 
for loss-making firms (Almanshawi, 2018). 
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literature may suffer from endogeneity. Hence, this research question has major practical 
and theoretical contributions. 
The results show that loss-making firms reveal significantly more risk-related 
information after the introduction of LMFPs in comparison with non-loss-making firms. 
This finding is statistically significant at the 5% level which supports the robustness of the 
presents study`s results.  
8.2.4 The impact of risk disclosure on the cost of capital 
The fourth question of the present study was to examine whether the higher level of 
risk disclosure would result in lowering the cost of capital. This section sheds some lights 
on the empirical results of the impact of risk disclosure on the cost of capital among Saudi 
listed firms. The results show that the relationship between risk disclosure and the cost of 
capital is negative and significant at the 5% level. Botosan (1997), Diamond and 
Verrecchia (1991), Healy and Palepu (2001), and Kim and Verrecchia (1994) argue that a 
higher level of disclosure leads to lower estimation risk through the mitigation of 
uncertainty which results in reducing the cost of capital. When information asymmetry 
prevails, risky companies would pay a higher rate of interest on debts and would have a 
lower valuation for their stocks. It is argued that the information risk is reduced when a 
high level of information is reported, and hence, investors can accept a lower rate of return 
(Healy & Palepu, 2001). Moreover, pecking order and capital need theories can also 
explain the negative association between risk reporting and cost of capital. When firms are 
in need of liquidity, they would have the incentive to disclose more risk-related 
information in order to attract investors and raise capital at the lowest possible cost. 
The present study uses various statistical approaches and econometric models in 
order to increase the robustness of the results and to eliminate the problem of endogeneity. 
First, the present study uses a one-year lag between the dependent variable and the 
independent variables in order to address the issues of omitted variables and simultaneity 
(Ntim, Opong, & Danbolt, 2012). Employing lagged independent variables is a helpful 
technique for addressing reverse causality. The results of the lagged model are compatible 
with the results of the main model. Second, the present study uses a random effect model 
in order to capture the heterogeneous characteristics among different firms that do not 
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change over time. The results of the random effect model are also in line with the results of 
the main model. Thus, the results of the current study can be described as robust. 
8.3 Policy implications 
This section discusses the implications for policy-makers based on the findings of 
the present study. Investigating the practices of the current risk disclosure has the potential 
to help to improve the practices in the future. This potential improvement is expected to 
benefit financial reports` users (investors, creditors, suppliers, etc.) in assessing the level of 
risk engaged in by firms and how it is being managed.  
As discussed in the findings, the level of risk disclosure demonstrates a progressive 
increase among Saudi listed firms over the years 2012 – 2015. This finding has the 
following implication. Corporate governance reforms in Saudi Arabia have helped in 
enhancing risk disclosure practices. This suggests that the introduction of governance 
regulations enables the improvement of corporate governance practices, including risk 
disclosure, in spite of the weak legal system in emerging markets. Moreover, the recent 
enhancement in the Saudi context such as the adoption of IFRS and the updated version of 
the Saudi Corporate Governance Code is expected to provide further enhancement of the 
practices of risk disclosure. Similarly, the introduction of the Loss-Making Firms 
Procedures in 2014 has a significant and positive impact on risk disclosure as can be seen 
from the results of the difference-in-difference model. This can be viewed as a wise move 
by the Capital Market Authority.  
However, the disclosure of strategic risk is found to be limited. This can be 
explained by the vagueness of information. it is challenging for managers to assume that 
the information related to strategic risk is verifiable (Miihkinen, 2013) given that strategic 
risks are less controllable by firms such as risks related to society, economy, or politics. 
This explains why companies disclose more about the financial and operational risks given 
that they have a high degree of impact on these categories where the disclosed information 
can be verified (Dobler, 2008). To overcome this issue, regulatory authorities in Saudi 
Arabia are encouraged to require greater emphases of the disclosure of strategic risk-
related information. Amran, Bin, & Hassan (2008) find that strategic risk is the most 
disclosed types of risk among Malaysian firms as a result of the requirements of Bursa 
Malaysia. 
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Similarly, Saudi firms disclose a significantly lower level of quantitative risk. 
Quantitative disclosure represents only 16% of total disclosure. Mohobbot (2005) proposes 
that it is challenging to measure and quantify risks (cited by Muzahhem 2011). Also, He 
argues that firms` managers have less incentive to provide quantitative risk disclosure in 
order to avoid intense criticisms and possible legal actions when their estimation goes 
wrong. Hence, the present study recommends Saudi regulators to encourage the disclosure 
of quantitative risk information. Linsley & Shrives (2006) argue that firms should disclose 
more quantitative risk-related information in order to help stakeholders to evaluate the risk 
engaged in by firms.  Cabedo & Tirado (2004) argue that the disclosure of quantitative risk 
information has the potential to help annual report users in making better-informed 
decisions. 
 As can be seen from the findings, Saudi listed firms disclose less bad-news risk. 
Linsley & Shrives (2006) suggest that firms` managers would not reveal bad news since 
they prefer to signal a bright image of their risk management performance to the market in 
order to avoid the reputation costs. According to a report by The Association of Chartered 
Certified Accountants (2014), financial analysts believe that most disclosed risk is biased 
toward positive disclosure. Kothari, Shu, & Wysocki (2009) argue that firms` managers 
have a higher propensity toward the disclosure of good news while they are reluctant to 
disclose bad news. In the case of negative news, managers withhold and accumulate the 
news until they become certain (Kothari et al., 2009). Hence, Saudi policymakers are 
encouraged to pay more attention to the disclosure of bad risks when introducing 
legislation. Regulators are mindful of the necessity of rules and guidance on how to 
improve risk disclosure practices. Schrand & Elliott (1998) argue that the requirements of 
risk disclosure should concentrate on bad risk since firms are motivated to withhold such 
information. 
As can be seen from the results, state and inside ownerships are found to be 
significantly and negatively related to risk disclosure. The business environment in Saudi 
Arabia is characterized by government ownership concentration where the Saudi 
government owns 42% of the total market value. Ghazali & Weetman (2006) suggests that 
government ownership has the potential to discourage firms from engaging in disclosure. 
Similarly, McConnell & Servaes (1990) argue that insiders might use inside information to 
maximize their own wealth which makes the outside owners worse off. Thus, when 
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insiders own a small proportion of shares, they might lose the incentive to promote 
financial performance, and in turn, they might provide limited disclosure to externals (Eng 
& Mak, 2003). Shleifer & Vishny (1997) argue that if directors` ownership is large, they 
might have incentives to maximize their own interest by lowering the level of 
transparency. Thus, it is worthwhile for Saudi policymakers to distinguish between firms 
with higher government and inside ownership and firms with lower government and inside 
ownerships when passing new legislation. For example, the setting of specific thresholds 
for risk disclosure can be dependent on the level of state or inside ownership. 
As can be also seen from the findings, there are significant variations in the level of 
risk disclosure based on industry type. The environmental factors that vary between sectors 
are expected to have significant impacts on firms` risks (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; 
Mostafa Hassan, 2009). Hence, proper legislation should have two levels of disclosure: (i) 
general disclosures for all companies; and (ii) industry-specific disclosures where 
companies provide relevant information with regards to the firm’s status in relation to its 
industry (Albassam, 2014). 
It is argued that the existence of a risk management committee on the board would 
be viewed as a sign of proper risk management and risk reporting (Neri, 2010). Risk 
reporting is a fundamental task of risk management committees. Since the risk 
management committee is obligated by the law to manage risk and report appropriate 
disclosure to the owners, the level of risk disclosure is expected to be higher for firms that 
appoint a risk management committee (Hassan, Saleh, & Abd-Rahman, 2008). The 
recently updated version of the Saudi Corporate Governance Code recommends the 
establishment of a risk management committee. However, the results of the present study 
could not confirm that risk management committee plays a positive role in risk disclosure 
practices in Saudi Arabia. To ensure the effectiveness of the risk management committee, 
Saudi regulators are advised to require that all members of the risk management committee 
be independent in addition to exhibiting the required experience and knowledge in relation 
to risk management. It is also essential to ensure that all the risk committee members have 
complete independence. Albassam (2014) argues that the mechanism for appointing 
independent directors is not apparent in Saudi companies since large shareholders retain 
the power to appoint independent directors. 
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The present study finds that there is a negative and significant association between 
risk disclosure and cost of capital. This implies that Saudi listed firms with higher levels of 
risk disclosure enjoy a lower cost of capital than their counterparts. This is considered an 
essential implication for Saudi investors, regulatory authorities and any other interested 
agents on the importance of risk disclosure in relation to lowering the cost of capital. The 
results of the present study have the potential to convince firms` managers to promote the 
disclosure of risk-related information in order to benefit from the reduction in the cost of 
capital.  
78.4 limitations 
 The present study discusses intensively the practices, determinants, and 
consequences of risk disclosure in Saudi Arabia. However, this study is not in isolation 
from having a number of limitations. The limitations are as follow. First, the sample of the 
present study is limited to listed firms. However, there are thousands of other companies 
that deserve to be included in this study given their significant contribution to the Saudi 
economy. The decision of excluding these firms is a result of the difficulties in obtaining 
data for non-listed firms.  
 Second, the present study relies on firms` annual reports as the source of disclosure. 
Although the annual report is considered the main reporting document where other reports 
are considered supplementary to it (Knutson 1992), other risk-related information can also 
be found in other resources such as press-releases, firms` conference proceedings, 
websites, and social networking. The exclusion of these documents might have a 
considerable impact on the results of the present study. However, this study depends 
merely on the annual reports due to the accessibility of all the required data which helps in 
producing a dataset with the least possible missing values. Saudi listed companies are 
requested by the Listing Rules (Article 27) and the Company Act (Article 89) to publish 
annual reports at the end of the fiscal year which contains financial statements and the 
board of directors` report. They are also requested to release their annual reports on the 
Tadawul website. This gives the researcher full access to the required data resulting in a 
balanced panel with the least possible missing values. Third, the current study uses content 
analysis in order to measure the level of risk disclosure. Although the content analysis is 
considered a scientific technique that has the potential to generate valid results 
(Krippendorff, 2004), subjectivity is a major drawback of this method (Linsley & Shrives, 
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2006). However, the present study performs validity and reliability tests in order to 
mitigate this limitation31.  
 Fourth, the generalisability of the results of the present study can be further 
improved by using larger dataset in spite of the fact that the sample size for the current 
study is relatively larger than most disclosure studies in the Saudi context (e.g. Al-Bassam, 
Ntim, Opong, & Downs, 2016; Al-Janadi, Rahman, & Omar, 2013; Al-Maghzom, 2016; 
Al-Moataz & Hussainey, 2012; Albassam & Ntim, 2016; Alsaeed, 2006; Alzead, 2017; 
Hussainey & Al-Nodel, 2008) and existing risk disclosure studies (e.g. Linsley & Shrives 
2005; Linsley & Shrives 2006; Abraham & Cox 2007; Rajab & Schachler 2009; Hassan 
2009; Elzahar & Hussainey 2012; Miihkinen 2012; Semper & Beltrán 2014; Rodríguez 
Domínguez & Noguera Gámez 2014; Al-shammari 2014).  It is challenging to improve the 
sample size of the present study while using manual content analysis because of the 
associated costs (e.g. time and efforts) given that the researcher of the present study 
conducts the manual coding for more than 26,620 pages. Thus, the implementation of auto-
coding software would enable this study to enhance the number of observations. Hence, 
the generalisability of the results can be further improved. The present study could not 
employ the automated method for two reasons: (i) most annual reports of the sample are 
scanned as a picture which makes it impossible for the auto-coding software to read, and 
(ii) the accuracy of optical character recognition software for recognizing texts is 
significantly low since the annual reports are written in Arabic32. 
 Fifth, although the present study employs various corporate governance variables, 
there are other corporate governance variables that have been omitted.  For instance, the 
present study did not consider the board leadership structure (i.e. CEO duality). Moreover, 
the audit committee quality (i.e. the presence of committee members with financial 
expertise) is also ignored. The employment of those governance variables has the potential 
to improve the specification of the statistical models. It would also help in understanding 
the roles these variables play in reducing the agency costs and improving risk disclosure 
practices. However, these variables could not be examined because of the unavailability of 
data. Specifically, the Saudi Corporate Governance Code prohibits CEO duality. Also, the 
 
31 The process of conducting the validity and reliability tests has been discussed extensively in section 
4.4.1.3. 
32 Further details are discussed in section 4.4.1.2. 
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vast majority of Saudi firms do not disclose the biographies of committees` members 
which make it difficult to identify their financial expertise. 
Sixth, the present study measures the quantity of risk disclosure instead of 
measuring the quality of risk disclosure. This is in line with the vast majority of risk 
reporting studies where they consider the quantity of provided information as a proxy for 
disclosure quality (e.g. Linsley & Shrives 2006; Rajab & Schachler 2009; Muzahhem 
2011; Elzahar & Hussainey 2012; Elshandidy et al. 2013; Elshandidy et al. 2014; Al-
shammari 2014; Abdallah et al. 2015; Lopes & Rodrigues 2007; Lajili & Zéghal 2005; 
Abraham & Cox 2007). However, Beretta & Bozzolan (2004) suggest that researchers 
should concentrate on exploring what and how firms disclose about risk rather than just 
counting the quantity of provided information. Hence, proposing a new robust method to 
capture the quality of risk disclosure instead of measuring the quantity would be perceived 
as a significant contribution in the field of risk disclosure.  
8.5 Future research avenues 
The previous section presents the limitations of the present study. These limitations 
propose new paths for further risk disclosure research. Hence, the future research avenues 
suggested by the present study are as follows.  First, future studies can investigate the 
practices of risk disclosure among Saudi non-listed firms. Although most existing 
empirical works are performed on listed firms, non-listed firms should also be examined 
given their significant contribution to the Saudi economy. Also, it would be interesting to 
compare risk disclosure practices and determinants between listed and non-listed 
companies. Second, since the present study relies on the annual report as the resource of 
risk disclosure, other resources such as press-releases, firms` conference proceedings, 
websites, and social networking could be included. The comparison of risk disclosure 
practices and effects between different groups of resources would also be of interest.  
Third, given the associated costs (e.g. time and effort) with manual coding, future 
studies can implement auto-coding software in order to improve the number of 
observations. As a result, the generalisability of their results can be further improved. 
Fourth, future studies can add other corporate governance variables such as CEO duality, 
board meetings, audit committee quality, etc. The addition of those governance 
mechanisms can improve the specification of the statistical models and extend our 
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knowledge in relation to the effects of these variables on risk disclosure. Fifth, future 
research can measure risk disclosure differently. Future efforts should be spent on the 
development of risk disclosure indices that consider the qualitative aspects of the 
disclosure. The development of such indices that capture the quality of risk disclosure 
instead of measuring the quantity would be considered a major contribution. 
Sixth, since the present study concentrates on non-financial firms, further research 
could be carried out to investigate the practices and effects of risk disclosure among 
financial firms (e.g. bank and insurance). financial firms operate differently and they are 
exposed to different kinds of risk because of their diverse regulations (Linsley & Shrives 
2005; 2006). The different rules for regulating financial firms can result in significant 
differences in risk disclosure practices between financial and non-financial firms. Hence, it 
would be interesting to compare the differences in risk disclosure practices and 
determinants between financial and non-financial companies. 
Seventh, mixed models of research methodology (i.e. qualitative and quantitative) 
can be used simultaneously to overcome some drawbacks associated with the quantitative 
method. The use of a qualitative approach enables future studies to investigate risk 
disclosure phenomenon profoundly.  Hence, employing qualitative and quantitative 
approaches is expected to provide in-depth explanations of the determinants and 
consequences of risk disclosure in Saudi Arabia.  
Eighth, future research avenues can include the investigation of the effect of risk 
disclosure on several financial variables including but not limited to stock market 
volatility, and information asymmetry. It would be also interesting to investigate stock 
returns behavior, liquidity, and trading activity around the disclosure of risk-related 
information.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: A List of the Names of the 122 Sampled Firms  
No. Company symbol Company Full Name 
Tadawul 
No. 
1 SARCO Saudi Arabia Refineries Co. 2030 
2 Petro Rabigh Rabigh Refining and Petrochemical Co. 2380 
3 Bahri  National Shipping Company of Saudi Arabia 4030 
4 Aldrees Aldrees Petroleum and Transport Services Co. 4200 
5 Takween  Takween Advanced Industries Co. 1201 
6 MEPCO Middle East Paper Co. 1202 
7 BCI Basic Chemical Industries Co. 1210 
8 MAADEN Saudi Arabian Mining Co. 1211 
9 ASLAK United Wire Factories Co. 1301 
10 SSP Saudi Steel Pipe Co. 1320 
11 CHEMANOL  Methanol Chemicals Co. 2001 
12 Petrochem National Petrochemical Co. 2002 
13 SABIC Saudi Basic Industries Corp. 2010 
14 SAFCO Saudi Arabian Fertilizer Co. 2020 
15 TASNEE National Industrialization Co. 2060 
16 NGC  National Gypsum Co. 2090 
17 Zoujaj The National Company for Glass Industries 2150 
18 Alujain Alujain Corp. 2170 
19 FIPCO Filing and Packing Materials Manufacturing Co. 2180 
20 APC  Arabian Pipes Co. 2200 
21 Nama Chemicals  Nama Chemicals Co. 2210 
22 Maadaniyah National Metal Manufacturing and Casting Co. 2220 
23 Zamil Indust Zamil Industrial Investment Co. 2240 
24 SIIG Saudi Industrial Investment Group 2250 
25 Sahara Sahara Petrochemical Co. 2260 
26 YANSAB Yanbu National Petrochemical Co. 2290 
27 SPM Saudi Paper Manufacturing Co. 2300 
28 Sipchem Saudi International Petrochemical Co. 2310 
29 Advanced Advanced Petrochemical Co. 2330 
30 Saudi Kayan Saudi Kayan Petrochemical Co. 2350 
31 HCC Hail Cement Co. 3001 
32 Najran Cement  Najran Cement Co. 3002 
33 City Cement City Cement Co. 3003 
34 Northern Cement Northern Region Cement Co. 3004 
35 UACC Umm Al-Qura Cement Co. 3005 
36 ACC Arabian Cement Co. 3010 
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Appendix 1 (continued): A List of the Names of the 122 Sampled Firms  
37 YSCC  Yamama Cement Co. 3020 
38 SCC Saudi Cement Co. 3030 
39 QACCO  Qassim Cement Co. 3040 
40 spcc Southern Province Cement Co. 3050 
41 YCC Yanbu Cement Co. 3060 
42 EPCCO Eastern Province Cement Co. 3080 
43 TCC  Tabuk Cement Co. 3090 
44 Jouf Cement Al Jouf Cement Co. 3091 
45 Astra Indust Astra Industrial Group 1212 
46 Bawan  Bawan Co. 1302 
47 ALKHODARI  Abdullah A. M. Al-Khodari Sons Co. 1330 
48 Saudi Ceramics Saudi Ceramic Co. 2040 
49 SCC Saudi Cable Co. 2110 
50 ADC Al-Ahsa Development Co. 2140 
51 EIC Electrical Industries Co. 1303 
52 Amiantit  Saudi Arabian Amiantit Co. 2160 
53 AL-BABTAIN Al-Babtain Power and Telecommunication Co. 2320 
54 SVCP  Saudi Vitrified Clay Pipes Co. 2360 
55 MESC Middle East Specialized Cables Co. 2370 
56 SIECO  Saudi Industrial Export Co. 4140 
57 SPPC Saudi Printing and Packaging Co. 4270 
58 Catering Saudi Airlines Catering Co. 6004 
59 SISCO Saudi Industrial Services Co. 2190 
60 SGS Saudi Ground Services Co. 4031 
61 SAPTCO Saudi Public Transport Co. 4040 
62 BATIC Batic Investments and Logistics Co. 4110 
63 Budget Saudi United International Transportation Co. 4260 
64 AlSorayai Group Al Sorayai Trading and Industrial Group 1213 
65 SIDC Saudi Industrial Development Co. 2130 
66 AlAbdullatif Al Abdullatif Industrial Investment Co. 2340 
67 Fitaihi Group Fitaihi Holding Group 4180 
68 ALTAYYAR Altayyar Travel Group 1810 
69 Al Hokair Group 
Abdulmohsen Alhokair Group for Tourism and 
Development 1820 
70 Dur  Dur Hospitality Co. 4010 
71 TECO Tourism Enterprise Co. 4170 
72 Alkhaleej Trng Alkhaleej Training and Education Co. 4290 
73 Herfy Foods Herfy Food Services Co. 6002 
74 TAPRCO Tihama Advertising and Public Relations Co. 4070 
75 SRMG Saudi Research and Marketing Group 4210 
76 SHAKER  Al Hassan Ghazi Ibrahim Shaker Co. 1214 
77 Extra United Electronics Co. 4003 
209 
 
Appendix 1 (continued): A List of the Names of the 122 Sampled Firms  
78 SACO Saudi Company for Hardware 4008 
79 SASCO  Saudi Automotive Services Co. 4050 
80 Jarir  Jarir Marketing Co. 4190 
81 AlHokair Fawaz Abdulaziz Alhokair Co. 4240 
82 A.Othaim Market Abdullah Al Othaim Markets Co. 4001 
83 Farm Superstores Saudi Marketing Co. 4006 
84 Anaam Holding Anaam International Holding Group 4061 
85 THIMAR National Agricultural Marketing Co. 4160 
86 Savola Group Savola Group 2050 
87 WAFRAH Wafrah for Industry and Development Co. 2100 
88 SADAFCO Saudia Dairy and Foodstuff Co. 2270 
89 Almarai  Almarai Co. 2280 
90 H B  Halwani Bros. Co. 6001 
91 NADEC National Agricultural Development Co. 6010 
92 GACO  Al Gassim Investment Holding Co. 6020 
93 TADCO Tabuk Agricultural Development Co. 6040 
94 SFICO Saudi Fisheries Co. 6050 
95 Sharqiya Dev Co Ash-Sharqiyah Development Co. 6060 
96 ALJOUF  Al-Jouf Agricultural Development Co. 6070 
97 JAZADCO  Jazan Energy and Development Co. 6090 
98 Chemical  Saudi Chemical Co. 2230 
99 Mouwasat Mouwasat Medical Services Co. 4002 
100 Dallah Health  Dallah Healthcare Co. 4004 
101 Care  National Medical Care Co. 4005 
102 Al Hammadi  Al Hammadi Company for Development and Investment 4007 
103 SPIMACO 
Saudi Pharmaceutical Industries and Medical Appliances 
Co. 2070 
104 SAIC Saudi Advanced Industries Co. 2120 
105 Aseer  Aseer Trading, Tourism and Manufacturing Co. 4080 
106 Al-baha Al-Baha Investment and Development Co. 4130 
107 Kingdom Kingdom Holding Co. 4280 
108 STC  Saudi Telecom Co. 7010 
109 Etihad Etisalat Etihad Etisalat Co. 7020 
110 ZAIN KSA 
Mobile Telecommunication Company Saudi 
Arabia 7030 
111 Atheeb Telecom Etihad Atheeb Telecommunication Co. 7040 
112 GASCO  National Gas and Industrialization Co. 2080 
113 Saudi Electric.  Saudi Electricity Co. 5110 
114 SRECO  Saudi Real Estate Co. 4020 
115 Taiba Taiba Holding Co. 4090 
116 ARDCO  Arriyadh Development Co. 4150 
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Appendix 1 (continued): A List of the Names of the 122 Sampled Firms  
117 Emaar EC  Emaar The Economic City 4220 
118 RED SEA Red Sea International Co. 4230 
119 Jabal Omar  Jabal Omar Development Co. 4250 
120 Dar Al Arkan Dar Alarkan Real Estate Development Co. 4300 
121 KEC Knowledge Economic City 4310 
122 ALANDALUS  Alandalus Property Co. 4320 
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Appendix 2: Risk Disclosure Index 
Category  Disclosure items 
Financial 
1  Interest rates 
2 Exchange rates 
3 Commodity prices 
4 Liquidity 
5 Credit/default 
6  Equity prices 
7 Financial derivatives/instrument 
8 Executive compensation/employee pension commitments 
9 Assets impairment 
Operational 
10 Business processes and procedures/operations 
11 Technology/information technology/innovation 
12 information security 
13 Health and safety 
14 Environment 
15  Reputation/goodwill/image/brand name 
16 Saudization 
17  Compliance 
18 legal 
19 Production/product development 
20  Marketing/customer satisfaction/boycott 
21 Sourcing/raw material 
22 Internal audit and control 
23  Human resources/employee/labour turnover/unrest 
24 Risk management 
25 business disruption 
26 Product/service failure 
27 Customers/suppliers` concentration  
28 Business ethics/corruption 
29 Off balance sheet/contingent assets and liabilities 
Strategic 
30 political stability in the region 
31 Competition/proprietary/copyright 
32 Regulation  
33 Taxation 
34 GDP growth/market demand/aggregate demand 
35 Unemployment rate 
36 Inflation rate 
37 terrorism 
38 Natural disasters 
39 Money supply 
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 Appendix 2 (Continued): Risk Disclosure Index 
Strategic 
40 Oil price 
41 Public/budget deficit 
42 Government spending 
43 Government subsidy/energy prices discounts 
44 Changes in customer preferences 
45 research and development 
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Appendix 3: The presentation of accumulated losses in the financial statements. 
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Appendix 4: Disclosure decision rules 
The current study adopts the decision rules developed by Linsley & Shrives (2006), 
Muzahhem (2011), Rajab & Schachler (2009) and Rattanataipop (2013) with some 
modifications. The decision rules are: 
• The definition of RD applied by this study is the definition developed by Linsley & 
Shrives (2006), thus, a sentence is coded as a risk disclosure “if the reader is 
informed of any opportunity or prospect, or of any hazard, danger, harm, threat, or 
exposure, that has already impacted upon the company or may impact upon the 
company in the future or of the management of any such opportunity prospect, 
hazard, harm, threat or exposure”.  
 
• Each risk sentence is grouped into the appropriate risk type within the disclosure 
checklist (see Table 4.3) in order to capture the number of risk sentences. 
 
• A risk disclosure sentence is classified as: 
 
o “Quantitative” if the sentence consists of actual numbers, ratio, or 
percentage. 
o “Qualitative” if the sentence does not contain actual numbers, ratio, or 
percentage. 
• A risk disclosure sentence is classified as: 
o “Good-news” if the risk sentence indicates a positive influence on the firm. 
o “Bad-news” if the risk sentence indicates a negative influence on the firm. 
o “Neutral” if the risk sentence does not indicate a positive or negative effect 
on the firm. 
• A risk disclosure sentence is classified as: 
o “Forward-looking” if the risk sentence informs the reader about forward-
looking risk information. 
o “Historical” if the risk sentence informs the reader about backward-looking 
or historical risk information. 
• When a risk sentence contains both present and forward-looking information, it is 
classified as forward-looking information. This is consistent with Rattanataipop 
(2013). 
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• If the term “risk” is appearing in the text that does not necessarily mean it is a risk 
sentence. For instance, when a firm supplies risk management services. 
• A sentence is coded as a risk sentence when the reader is informed about a specific 
risk. However, the “term” risk does not have to appear in the sentence. 
• If a risk disclosure is tacit about its reference to risk, then it will not be coded as a 
risk sentence. 
• If a risk sentence contains more than one risk type, then the sentence is coded to the 
risk type that most asserted in the sentence. 
• In the case that a risk disclosure is repeated, the author codes it as a risk disclosure 
sentence each time it is repeated. The repetition of statements has significant effects 
on readers. This is derived from a psychological theory called the illusion of truth 
effect and developed by Hasher, Goldstein, & Toppino (1977). 
 
